Background
Methods
Results
Range and quality of the body of literature
Study | Study design | Setting | Description of intervention | Recommendation | Outcomes of interest reported |
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Conditional cash transfers | |||||
Oportunidades, Mexico
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Barber and Gertler (2008) | Cross-sectional | Rural communities, Mexico | Oportunidades (conditional cash transfers)The programme was launched in 1997 as PROGRESA and later renamed Oportunidades. Monthly cash transfers are paid directly to mothers and are conditional on meeting health and education requirements. These included regular antenatal visits for pregnant women and attendance at health education meetings. | Conditional cash transfers | Perinatal morbidity, ANC |
Barber and Gertler (2009) | Cross-sectional | Rural communities, Mexico | Conditional cash transfers | QoC | |
Barber (2010) | Cross-sectional | Rural communities, Mexico | Conditional cash transfers | C/I | |
Barham (2011) | Retrospective area study | Rural communities, Mexico | Programme less effective in areas that do not meet minimum level of sanitation | Infant mortality, NM | |
Hernandez Prado et al. (2004) | Retrospective area study | Rural, semi-urban and urban areas, Mexico | Conditional cash transfers | MM, infant mortality | |
Hernandez Prado et al. (2004) | Repeat cross-sectional | Rural, semi-urban and urban areas, Mexico | Conditional cash transfers | ANC, SBA, C/I, QoC, infant morbidity | |
Sosa-Rubai et al. (2011) | Cross-sectional | Rural communities, Mexico | Conditional cash transfers, but need better targeting to marginalised groups | ANC | |
Urquieta et al. (2009) | Repeat cross-sectional | Rural communities, Mexico | Conditional cash transfers, but need to include household members who influence decision-making on place of birth | SBA | |
Program Keluarga Harapan, Indonesia
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Alatas et al. (2011) | Repeat cross-sectional | Rural and urban districts in Indonesia | Program Keluarga Harapan (conditional cash transfers)The programme was introduced in 2007 and was targeted to five provinces. It was piloted in sub-districts that were felt had sufficient supply-side capacity to meet additional demand for services. Eligible households included those with pregnant or lactating women and women were expected to attend ANC, use a SBA and receive PN/PP. A cash transfer is paid quarterly to the women through a nearby post office. Facilitators are expected to verify that conditionalities are met. | Conditional cash transfers, but relax conditionalities in areas with weaker health systems | ANC, SBA, FB, PN, NM, infant mortality |
Febriany et al. (2011) | Qualitative – interviews and focus groups | 12 villages (mixed urban and rural) in 2 provinces, Indonesia | Conditional cash transfers, but need to reduce gaps in service provision and overcome social, economic and geographical barriers | Implementation | |
Triyana (2012) | Repeat cross-sectional | Rural and urban areas in Indonesia | Conditional cash transfers | MM, NM, infant mortality, SBA, QoC | |
Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES), Uruguay
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Amarante et al. (2011) | Repeat cross-sectional | Uruguay | Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES) (conditional cash transfers)Between April 2005 and December 2007, Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social was implemented by the Uruguayan government. Monthly payments were made to eligible households. In homes with a pregnant woman, payments were conditional on her attendance at ANC. | Conditional cash transfers | Perinatal morbidity, maternal morbidity, ANC, SBA |
Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity Benefit Scheme, India
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Bala-subramanian and Ravindran (2012) | Cross-sectional | Tamil Nadu, India | Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity Benefit Scheme (conditional cash transfers)The programme was launched in Tamil Nadu, India, in 1987 and provided unconditional payments (in two instalments) to pregnant women. Payments were increased in size over time and were made conditional on antenatal care attendance in 2012. The eligibility of women is determined by a village health nurse and includes those who meet criteria for poverty and who had previously had no more than two live births. | Conditional cash transfers, but shorter application process needed | FB |
Public Health Resource Network (2010) | Qualitative – in-depth interviews | 2 districts in Tamil Nadu, India | Conditional cash transfers, but with universal eligibility, timely payments, assistance from community-based workers, and supply-side investment so that maternity care services are universally available and are free | Implementation | |
Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, El Salvador
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De Brauw et al. (2011) | Repeat cross-sectional | Rural communities, El Salvador | Comunidades Solidarias Rurales (conditional cash transfers)The programme was introduced in 2005 and eligible households are identified from census data. Pregnant woman in eligible households must attend ANC and monthly local health education meetings are held. The programme coincided with health system strengthening programmes introduced by the government. | Conditional cash transfers, but should be conditional on ANC during first trimester, SBA and PNC | ANC, FB, SBA, PN |
Bolsa Familia, Brazil
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Guanais (2013) | Retrospective area study | Brazil | Bolsa Familia (conditional cash transfers)Since 2003 Brazil has paid monthly cash transfers to eligible households that meet conditionalities including that pregnant women attend ANC. Payments are made to women and are credited to electronic benefit cards. | Conditional cash transfers, but should be accompanied by supply-side interventions | Post-neonatal mortality |
Shei (2013) | Retrospective area study | Brazil | Conditional cash transfer effective but need to meet increased demand for services and need to target vulnerable groups | NM, post-neonatal mortality, infant mortality | |
Mi Familia Progresa, Guatemala
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Gutierrez et al. (2011) | Repeat cross-sectional | Guatemala | Mi Familia Progresa (conditional cash transfers)Introduced by the Guatemalan government in 2008, Mi Familia Progresa payments are made to eligible households with a pregnant woman and are conditional on ANC attendance. | Conditional cash transfers | ANC, FB, PM |
Programa de Asignación Familia, Honduras
| |||||
Morris et al. (2004) | Repeat cross-sectional | Rural municipalities, Honduras | Programa de Asignación Familia (conditional cash transfers)Vouchers with a cash value were distributed to eligible households on a regular basis. Distribution to households with a pregnant woman was conditional on her ANC attendance. | Conditional cash transfers | ANC, PN |
Unconditional cash transfers | |||||
Child Grant Programme, Zambia
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Handa et al. (2015) | Repeat cross-sectional | Three rural districts in Zambia | Child Grant Programme (conditional cash transfers)Launched in 2010, the programme operates in three districts with the highest rates of mortality and morbidity. Eligibility is universal within programme areas as long as there is a young child in the household. Payments are made directly to mothers. | Unconditional cash transfers, but need access to maternity services and may need complimentary short-term payments that are conditional on uptake of maternity care services | ANC, QoC, SBA |
Short term cash payments to offset costs of access | |||||
Janani Suraksha Yojana, India
| |||||
Amudhan et al. (2013) | Quasi-experimental pre- and post- comparative with control groups | Rural area in Haryana, India | Janani Suraksha Yojana (payments to offset costs of access)The programme was launched in 2005 as part of the National Rural Health Mission. A cadre of community-based workers (accredited social health activists) were created to promote the programme in communities. Women from low-income households could receive a cash payment if they give birth in a health facility (usually government, although some states also accredited private facilities). Accredited social health activists are salaried and expected to encourage ANC, facility-based births and PN/PP. They are eligible to receive a payment for accompanying a woman to a health facility to give birth. | Short-term payments, but followed by supply-side strengthening | FB |
Carvalho et al. (2014) | Cross-sectional | National sample of districts (mixed urban and rural), India | Short-term payments, but need appropriate systems for payments | PN, PP | |
Chaturvedi and Randive (2009) | Qualitative – semi-structured interviews and focus groups | Ahmednagar district in Maharashtra, India | Short-term payments, but ensure that private service providers are monitored and regulated | Implementation | |
Chaturvedi and Randive (2011) | Qualitative – semi-structured interviews and focus groups | Ensure sufficient government capacity to design and manage public-private partnerships | Implementation | ||
Chaturvedi et al. (2015a) | Qualitative – observations and interviews | 11 health facilities in Madhya Pradesh | Improve quality of care before introducing short-term payment programmes | Implementation | |
Chaturvedi et al. (2015b) | Qualitative – record reviews and interviews | 73 health facilities in Madhya Pradesh | Train and support staff to use partographs | Implementation | |
Coffey (2014) | Qualitative – interviews and observations | Three villages in a rural district in Uttar Pradesh | Short-term payments, but need to incentivise health outcomes | Implementation | |
Dasgupta (2007) | Qualitative – maternal death investigations | 7 districts in Uttar Pradesh, India | Invest in supply-side capacity, promote awareness of programme benefits, and develop systems to track each pregnancy | Implementation | |
Devadasan et al. (2008) | Qualitative - interviews | One district in each of four states, India | Short-term payments, but need to ensure quality of care, use streamlined processes for distribution of payments and monitor the programme | Implementation | |
Gopalan et al. (2012) | Qualitative – interviews and focus groups | Three districts in Orissa | Short-term payments, but with greater protection for families from costs of care | Implementation | |
Gupta (2007) | Qualitative – interviews and focus groups | Nalanda and West Champaran (rural) districts in Bihar, India | No recommendations made | Implementation | |
Hangmi and Kuki (2009) | Qualitative – interviews and focus groups | Churachandpur (rural) district in Manipur, India | Short-term payments, but need to invest in capacity of service providers, ensure fair selection of community-based workers, and streamline cash payments | Implementation | |
Human Rights Watch (2009) | Qualitative – individual and group interviews | Rural areas in Uttar Pradesh, India | Develop monitoring systems | Implementation | |
Joshi and Sivaram (2014) | Repeat cross-sectional | National sample of districts (mixed urban and rural), India | Concurrent supply-side strengthening and flexibility in guidelines | ANC, SBA, PN | |
Khan et al. (2010) | Qualitative – interviews | 24 villages in Uttar Pradesh (rural), India | Short-term payments, but with adequate training and incentives for community-based workers, and inclusion of private service providers | Implementation | |
Krishna and Ananthpur (2011) | Qualitative – interviews and focus groups | Gulbarga and Raichur (rural) districts in Karnataka, India | No recommendations made | Implementation | |
Kumar et al. (2009) | Qualitative – focus groups | Una (predominantly rural) district in Himachal Pradesh, India | Short-term payments, but with streamlined distribution of cash payments and ensure community-based workers appropriately trained and that posts are filled | Implementation | |
Lim et al. (2010) | Repeat cross-sectional | National sample of districts (mixed urban and rural), India | Short-term payments, but need improved targeting and quality of care | ANC, FB, SBA, PM, NM | |
Lodh et al. (2009) | Qualitative – interviews and focus groups | Muzaffarpur district (predominantly rural) in Bihar, India | Short-term payments, but with streamlined distribution of cash payments | Implementation | |
Mazumdar et al. (2012) | Repeat cross-sectional | National sample of districts (mixed urban and rural), India | Short-term payments, but caution regarding unintended consequences | ANC, FB, SBA, C/I, NM | |
Nandan et al. (2008) | Qualitative – semi-structured and in-depth interviews and focus groups | 3 districts in Orissa (predominantly rural), India | Short-term payments using streamlined payment systems, inclusion of private service providers, supply-side investment and awareness generation | Implementation | |
Nandan et al. (2008) | Qualitative – semi-structured and in-depth interviews and focus groups | 3 districts in Orissa, India | Short-term payments using streamlined payment systems, supply-side investment and awareness generation | Implementation | |
Purohit et al. (2014) | Cross-sectional | Four districts in Rajasthan, India | Short-term payments | ANC, PN, QoC | |
Rai et al. (2012) | Qualitative – in-depth interviews and focus groups | 12 villages in Jharkhand, India | Short-term payments alongside investment in supply-side capacity | Implementation | |
Randive et al. (2013) | Repeat cross-sectional | 284 districts across nine Indian states | Short-term payments, but need to improve quality of care to impact on MM | FB | |
Santhya et al. (2011a) | Repeat cross-sectional | Alwar and Jodhpur districts (mixed rural and urban), India | Short-term payments, but improve awareness among communties, quality of services and administrative capacity | ANC, FB, SBA, PP, QoC, oxytocin | |
Santhya et al. (2011b) | Qualitative – in-depth interviews | Alwar and Jodhpur districts in Rajasthan, India | Short-term payments with trained community-based workers to raise awareness in communities | Implementation | |
Singh and Chaturvedi (2007) | Qualitative – focus groups and interviews | Five districts in Uttar Pradesh and three districts in Uttarakhand, India | Short-term payments using streamlined systems, inclusion of postpartum care and removal of formal and informal user fees | Implementation | |
Sri et al. (2012) | Qualitative – maternal death reviews | Barwani district, Uttar Pradesh, India | Investments must be made in supply-side strengthening and ensuring quality of care before short-term payments are considered | Implementation | |
Uttekar et al. (2007a) | Qualitative - interviews | 3 districts in Himachal Pradesh, India | Short-term payments, but need to ensure quality of care by investing in supply-side capacity, use streamlined payments and raise awareness among hard-to-reach communities | Implementation | |
Uttekar et al. (2007b) | Qualitative - interviews | 3 districts in West Bengal, India | Short-term payments, but need to ensure quality of care by investing in supply-side capacity, use streamlined payments and raise awareness among hard-to-reach communities | Implementation | |
Uttekar et al. (2007c) | Qualitative - interviews | 3 districts in Orissa, India | Short-term payments, but need to ensure quality of care by investing in supply-side capacity, use streamlined payments and raise awareness among hard-to-reach communities | Implementation | |
Uttekar et al. (2007d) | Qualitative - interviews | 3 districts in Rajasthan, India | Short-term payments, but need to ensure quality of care by investing in supply-side capacity, use streamlined payments and raise awareness among hard-to-reach communities | Implementation | |
Uttekar et al. (2007e) | Qualitative - interviews | 3 districts in Assam, India | Short-term payments, but need to ensure quality of care by investing in supply-side capacity, use streamlined payments and raise awareness among hard-to-reach communities | Implementation | |
Uttekar et al. (2008a) | Qualitative - interviews | 3 districts in Uttar Pradesh, India | Short-term payments, but need to ensure quality of care by investing in supply-side capacity, use streamlined payments and raise awareness among hard-to-reach communities | Implementation | |
Uttekar et al. (2008b) | Qualitative - interviews | 3 districts in Bihar, India | Short-term payments, but need to ensure quality of care by investing in supply-side capacity, use streamlined payments and raise awareness among hard-to-reach communities | Implementation | |
Vora et al. (2012) | Cross-sectional | Rural areas in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, India | Short-term payments, but should expand availability of health facilities, develop referral networks, include public and/or private facilities depending on local health system, promote awareness generation, and divide payments across maternity care services to incentivise multiple services. | ANC, FB, C/I | |
CHIMACA project, China
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Hemminki et al. (2013) | Cross-sectional | One county in Anhui province, China | CHIMACA project (payments to offset costs of access)Women could claim a small cash payment from a health centre if they attended ANC between 2007 and 2009. The size of the payment was increased with the number of ANC visits. Village family planning workers distributed leaflets in communities to advertise the programme and midwives distributed the leaflets to women attending ANC. | Short-term payments, but need payments that are appropriately sized and relatively easy to obtain | ANC, C/I, PN, QoC |
SURE-P, Nigeria
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Okoli et al. (2014) | Retrospective area study | Nine states, Nigeria | SURE-P (short term payments to offset costs of access)Cash payments were made to women who attended specific maternity care services (ANC, childbirth and PN/PP). Eligibilty was geographic and was based on the selection of health facilities participating in the wider SURE-P health programme. If a woman was referred to a higher level hospital, the hospital received a payment. | Short-term payments, but need to improve retention of programme recipients throughout pregnancy | ANC, SBA |
Safe Delivery Incentive Programme, Nepal
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Powell-Jackson et al. (2009) | Retrospective area study | Makwanpur district (rural), Nepal | Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (payments to offset costs of access)The programme was launched in 2005 and provides a cash payment to women who give birth in a health facility, and to a health worker who attends her birth (either at home or in a health facility). Payments were initially only available to women who have had two or fewer previous live births, but this condition was later removed. The programme was initially limited to government health facilities but later expanded to include the private sector. | Short-term payments, but need to improve quality of care to impact on NM and need to ensure good communication to communities | ANC, FB, SBA, C/I, NM |
Powell-Jackson et al. (2009) | Qualitative – interviews and focus groups | 10 districts, Nepal | Attention to implementation challenges in countries with poor capacity to administer programmes and provide services, and careful planning | Implementation | |
Powell-Jackson and Hanson (2012) | Cross-sectional | National sample of districts (mixed urban and rural), India | Short-term payments, but need effective implementation | SBA, FB, C/I | |
Vouchers for maternity care services | |||||
Pilot programmes, Pakistan
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Agha (2011a) | Repeat cross-sectional | Dera Ghazi Khan City (urban), Pakistan | Pilot voucher scheme (vouchers for maternal health services)12 month programme in which vouchers were sold to eligible families and local officials verified eligibility. Vouchers could be exchanged at participating Greenstar facilities for ANC, childbirth (including caesarean section if needed), PP and PN. Providers were reimbursed for each voucher accepted. | Vouchers for maternity care services | ANC, FB, PN |
Agha (2011b) | Repeat cross-sectional | Jhang district (rural), Pakistan | Vouchers for maternity care services | ANC, FB, PN | |
Maternal Health Voucher Scheme, Bangladesh
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Ahmed and Khan (2011) | Cross-sectional | Sarishabari district (predominantly rural), Bangladesh | Maternal Health Voucher Scheme (vouchers for maternal health services) Since 2007 poor pregnant women received vouchers (some districts had universal distribution, some had targeted distribution) entitling them to free maternity care services (ANC, childbirth, PN/PP), transport subsidies, a cash incentive for delivery with a qualified provider (at home or in a designated facility) and a gift box. Providers received incentives to distribute vouchers and provide services that were covered by the vouchers. | Vouchers for maternity care services | ANC, FB, SBA, PN |
Ahmed and Khan (2011) | Qualitative – semi-structured interviews | Sarishabari district (predominantly rural), Bangladesh | Vouchers for maternity care services, but with significant expansion of service delivery capacity of health facilities | Implementation | |
Hatt et al. (2010) | Cross-sectional | Early implementation subdistricts (mainly rural), Bangladesh | Vouchers for maternity care services | ANC, FB, C/I, PN | |
Qualitative – interviews and focus groups | Early implementation subdistricts (mainly rural), Bangladesh | Vouchers for maternity care services | Implementation | ||
Koehlmoos et al. (2008) | Qualitative – structured and in-depth interviews and focus groups | Vouchers for maternity care services, but with investment in physical infrastructure at government facilities, appropriate human resources, and attention to incentives to conduct caesarean sections | Implementation | ||
Nguyen et al. (2012) | Cross-sectional | Early implementation subdistricts (mainly rural), Bangladesh | Vouchers for maternity care services as part of a wider initiative that includes supply-side strengthening | ANC, FB, SBA, C/I, PN | |
Reproductive Health Vouchers Evaluation Team (2011) | Qualitative - interviews | 22 sub-districts, Bangladesh | Vouchers for maternity care services | Implementation | |
Pilot voucher programme, Bangladesh
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Rob et al. (2009) | Repeat cross-sectional | Habiganj district (rural), Bangladesh | Pilot voucher scheme (vouchers for maternal health services)12 month programme in which fieldworkers identified a total of eligible women who were then validated as “poor” by a community support group Women could use vouchers for ANC, childbirth, PN and PP. Providers were reimbursed for vouchers accepted. Service providers and fieldworkers were trained and strengthened health facilities for providing ANC, delivery, and PNC services. | Vouchers for maternity care services | ANC, FB, SBA, PN |
Qualitative – semi-structured interviews | Habiganj district (rural), Bangladesh | Vouchers for maternity care services | Implementation | ||
Makerere University Voucher Scheme, Uganda
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Alfonso et al. (2015) | Retrospective area study | Kamuli and Pallisa districts, Uganda | Makerere University Voucher Scheme (vouchers for maternal health services)Between June 2010 and May 2011, vouchers were distributed to women in two selected areas of two Ugandan districts during ANC visits. Vouchers could be exchanged at public facilities or participating private facilities for intrapartum care, transport to and from the hospital, and for PN/PP in case of complications. Transport vouchers’ reimbursement covered the cost of the average distance in the treatment areas, and health facilities were reimbursed for services provided. | Vouchers for maternity care services | FB |
Pariyo et al. (2011) | Qualitative – focus groups | Kamuli district, Uganda | Vouchers for maternity care services, but with inclusion of transport providers | Implementation | |
HealthyBaby vouchers, Uganda
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Okal et al. (2013) | Qualitative - interviews | 7 districts, Uganda | HealthyBaby vouchers (vouchers for maternal health services)Since 2008 vouchers for maternity care services have been sold to eligible women in 20 districts. Vouchers can be exchanged at accredited private providers for ANC, childbirth, PN. Community-based voucher distributors are responsible for targeting poor pregnant women using district-customized poverty grading tool. | Vouchers for maternity care services, but with public facilities included, greater awareness raising in communities and support for policy champions | Implementation |
Reproductive Health Vouchers Evaluation Team (2012) | Repeat cross-sectional | 6 districts, Uganda | Vouchers for maternity care services | ANC, FB, PN | |
Qualitative - interviews | 30 health facilities, Uganda | Vouchers for maternity care services | Implementation | ||
Vouchers for Health, Kenya
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Abuya et al. (2012) | Qualitative – in-depth interviews | Three districts and two urban slums | Vouchers for Health (vouchers for maternal health services)Since 2006 vouchers have been sold to eligible women in three districts and two informal settlements in Kenya. Vouchers can be exchanged for ANC, childbirth (including caesarean section if needed) and PN. A facility was accredited if it met criteria set by the public authorities in terms of staffing and quality of care. | Vouchers for maternity care services, with strong partnerships between public and private sectors and leading role for government | Implementation |
Amendah et al. (2013) | Repeat cross-sectional | Two urban slums in Nairobi, Kenya | Vouchers for maternity care services | FB for subsequent pregnancy | |
Arur et al. (2009) | Qualitative – semi-structured interviews | Kenya | Vouchers for maternity care services if financial issues are the main barrier to care-seeking | Implementation | |
Bellows et al. (2012) | Repeat cross-sectional | Informal settlements in Nairobi (urban), Kenya | Vouchers for maternity care services | ANC, FB, SBA | |
Njuki et al. (2013) | Qualitative – structured interviews and focus groups | Three districts in Kenya | Vouchers for maternity care services, but with adequate information and availability of voucher distributors | Implementation | |
Njuki et al. (2015) | Qualitative – in-depth interviews | Three districts in Kenya | Vouchers for maternity care services, but greater awareness of eligibility criteria and entitlements, and greater flexibility for public facilities to use income from vouchers | Implementation | |
Obare et al. (2012) | Cross-sectional | Six districts (all mixed urban and rural), Kenya | Vouchers for maternity care services | ANC, FB, SBA, PN | |
Obare et al. (2014) | Repeat cross-sectional | Six districts (all mixed urban and rural), Kenya | Vouchers for maternity care services, but transport costs should be included | FB | |
Reproductive Health Vouchers Evaluation Team (2011) | Qualitative - interviews | 6 rural districts and 2 informal settlements, Kenya | Vouchers for maternity care services with awareness generation, monitoring of quality of care, and adequate provisions to overcome geographical (transports) issues | Implementation | |
Watt et al. (2015) | Repeat cross-sectional | Six districts (all mixed urban and rural), Kenya | Vouchers for maternity care services, and need to include PP before discharge from hospital within hospital agreements | QoC | |
Chiranjeevi Yojana, India
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Bhat et al. (2009) | Cross-sectional | Dahod district (mixed urban and rural), India | Chiranjeevi Scheme (vouchers for maternal health services)The programme was introduced in five districts in Gujarat, India, in 2005. Women with documentation that indicate eligibility can receive free maternity care services at participating private facilities. Facilities are reimbursed for every 100 women who they provide care to. | Vouchers for maternity care services | PN |
De Costa et al. (2014) | Retrospective area study | Gujarat, India | Further research needed | FB | |
Ganguly et al. (2014) | Qualitative – interviews | Two districts in Gujarat, India | Vouchers for maternity care services, but with greater attention to developing trust between service providers and communities | Implementation | |
Jega (2007) | Qualitative – interviews | 2 districts in Gujarat (mixed urban and rural), India | Vouchers for maternity care services, but with antenatal and postnatal care included, supply-side investment (to establish blood banks) and formal monitoring systems | Implementation | |
Mohanan et al. (2014) | Cross-sectional | Gujarat, India | Further research needed | ANC, FB, PN | |
Voucher programme, Cambodia
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Ir et al. (2010) | Qualitative – in-depth interviews and focus groups | 3 districts in Kampong province, Cambodia | Voucher programme (vouchers for maternal health services)The programme was implemented in 22 districts between 2007 and 2010. Voucher distribution was universal in 14 districts and targeted in 8 districts. Eligible women were identified local volunteers and could use vouchers for free ANC, childbirth and PN/PP at public health facilities. Health centres were reimbursed for vouchers. | Vouchers for maternity care services alongside interventions to promote quality of care and to overcome non-financial barriers to demand | Implementation |
Van de Poel et al. (2014) | Cross-sectional | Nationally representative sample, Cambodia | Vouchers for maternity care services, but universal distribution may be more effective than targeting | ANC, FB, C/I, PN | |
Vouchers for merit goods | |||||
Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme, Tanzania
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Hanson et al. (2009) | Repeat cross-sectional | 21 districts (mixed urban and rural), Tanzania | Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme (vouchers for merit goods)Women attending ANC were given a voucher that entitled them to a discounted insecticide-treated net (of any size) from an approved supplier. The programme began in 2004 and expanded globally over subsequent years. | Vouchers for merit goods | Ownership and use of insecticide-treated net |
Koenker et al. (2013) | Qualitative – meetings, site visits and mathematical modelling | Five areas in Tanzania | Vouchers for merit goods, with voucher distribution in schools and at health clinics | Implementation | |
Mubyazi et al. (2010) | Qualitative – interviews and focus groups | Mkuranga and Mufindi districts (rural), Tanzania | No recommendation made | Implementation |
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conditional cash transfers (Brazil’s Bolsa Familia [17, 18], El Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias Rurales [19], Guatemala’s Mi Familia Progresa [20], Programa de Asignación Familia in Honduras [21], the Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity Benefit Scheme in India [22, 23], Indonesia’s Program Keluarga Harapan [24‐26], Mexico’s Oportunidades [27‐34], and Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES) in Uruguay [35]);
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unconditional cash transfers (Zambia’s Child Grant Programme [36]);
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vouchers for maternity care services (Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher Scheme [79‐84], a pilot programme in Bangladesh [85], a voucher programme in Cambodia [86, 87], the Chiranjeevi Yojana in India [88‐92], Kenya’s Vouchers for Health programme [93‐102], pilot programmes in Pakistan [103, 104], and the HealthyBaby vouchers [105, 106] and Mekerere University Voucher Scheme in Uganda [107, 108]), and vouchers for merit goods (the Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme [109‐111]).
Stakeholder perspectives and experiences
Women who are potential DSF programme users
Community-based workers
Staff in health facilities
Barriers and facilitators to successful implementation
Scope of the programme
Supply-side capacity
Contracting private providers
Administrative processes and procedural considerations
Information systems
Fraudulent practices and their control
Sustainability issues
Discussion
Programme | Effect on care-seeking outcomesa
| Key findings from synthesis of factors influencing implementation | |
---|---|---|---|
Enablers | Barriers | ||
Conditional cash transfers
| |||
Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, El Salvador | Increased skilled birth attendance and facility births. No effect on antenatal care and postnatal care | -Awareness generation during monthly meetings [19] -Concurrent investments in health facility infrastructure and recruitment of health workers [19] -Payments made to women (not their husbands) [19] | None stated |
Mi Familia Progresa, Guatemala | Increased antenatal care. No effect on facility births | -Concurrent investments in health facility infrastructure and recruitment of health workers [20] | None stated |
Programa de Asignación Familia, Honduras | Increased antenatal care. No effect on postnatal care | -Conditionalities to submit paperwork at health facilities [21] | -Poor awareness among women of programme conditionalities [21] |
Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity Benefit Scheme, India | Associated with use of public facilities for antenatal care and childbirth | -Increased total amount of payments [22] | -Delays in receipt of money for women [22] -Overly bureaucratic process for determining eligibility [22] -Eligibility criteria that restrict payments to women for her first or second live birth [22] |
Program Keluarga Harapan, Indonesia | Increased antenatal and postnatal care. Mixed picture of positive and no effect on skilled birth attendance. No effect on facility births | -Awareness generation by community-based workers [24] | -Poor awareness of the programme among target groups [24] -Delays in receipt of money for women [24] -Failure to implement verification systems to penalise households that do not meet conditionalities [24] -Poor availability of midwives [26] -High start-up costs [24] |
Oportunidades, Mexico | Mixed picture of positive and no effect on skilled birth attendance. No effect on antenatal care | -Perceived poor behaviour of staff at participating hospitals [33] -Attitudes towards formal maternity care services of family members who do not attend monthly meetings [34] -Distance to participating facilities [33] -Cost of travel to health facilities [33] | |
Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES), Uruguay | Increased antenatal care. No effect on skilled attendance at birth. | -Conditionalities for antenatal care were not enforced [35] | -Conditionalities for antenatal care were not enforced [35] |
Unconditional cash transfers | |||
Child Grant Programme, Zambia | No effect on skilled birth attendance or antenatal care | None stated | -Lack of concurrent investment in health facilities [36] |
Short-term cash payments
| |||
CHIMACA programme, China | No effect on antenatal care or postnatal care | None stated | -Payment too small [37] -Overly difficult process for claiming money [37] |
Janani Suraksha Yojana, India | Increased skilled birth attendance and facility births. Mixed picture of positive, negative and no effect on antenatal care and postnatal care | -Emergency transport programmes [62] -Accreditation of remote health facilities to reduce travel distances [55] -Active involvement of state and district officials [55] -Detailed implementation plans [38] | -Poor awareness of the programme among target groups [63] -Perceived poor quality of care at participating facilities [39] -Overly bureaucratic process for determining eligibility [55] -Inappropriate proxy measures of poverty, such as caste [38] -Women who travel to another area to give birth [51] -Delays in recruitment of community-based workers [39] -Poor awareness of the existence of community-based workers [63] -Delays in payments for community-based workers [55] -Lack of trained midwives [62] -Existence of a similar programme – the National Maternity Benefit Scheme [55] |
Safe Delivery Incentive Programme, Nepal | Increased antenatal care. Mixed picture of positive or no effect on skilled birth attendance and facility births | -Awareness generation by women’s groups in communities [77] -Lack of geographical barriers in the study district [77] -Universal eligibility [77] -Output-based reimbursements for providers [77] | -Poor awareness of the programme among target groups [77] -Delays in receipt of money for women [77] -Payments not sufficient to cover treatment costs [77] -Demands for additional or informal payments [77] -Overly difficult process for claiming money [77] -Confusion amongst health workers and officials regarding eligibility criteria, sharing of health worker incentives and payment mechanisms for women [77] |
SURE-P programme, Nigeria | No effect on skilled birth attendance or antenatal care | -Prompt payments to pregnant women [78] -Defined roles and contracts for local banks and for organisations that will develop information systems [78] -Concurrent programmes to expand availability of maternity care services [78] | -Increased workload at participating health facilities [78] -High start-up costs including research, advocacy, development of information systems, recruitment of workers for data collection and the logistics and security of payments to pregnant women [78] |
Programme | Effect on care-seeking outcomes a
| Key findings from synthesis of factors influencing implementation | |
---|---|---|---|
Enablers | Barriers | ||
Vouchers for maternity care services
| |||
Maternal Health Voucher Scheme, Bangladesh | Increased skilled birth attendance, facility births, antenatal care and postnatal care | -Activities by community workers and local leaders to raise awareness of the programme [81] -‘Seed’ funds for participating facilities to promote investment in services and capacity [81] | -Perceived poor quality of care at participating facilities [81] -Pressure from local politicians to distribute vouchers to ineligible women [81] |
Pilot vouchers, Bangladesh | Increased skilled birth attendance, facility births, antenatal care and postnatal care | -Inclusion of transport and medicine costs [85] | -Poor awareness of the programme among target groups [85] -Perceived poor quality of care at participating facilities [85] |
Voucher programme, Cambodia | Increased skilled birth attendance and postnatal care. No effect on antenatal care. | -Awareness generation by voucher distributors [87] -Output-based reimbursements for providers [87] | None stated |
Chiranjeevi Yojana, India | No effect on skilled birth attendance, antenatal care and postnatal care | -Community health workers provided information on the programme [88] -Use of an existing government system (‘below poverty line’ cards) as a targeting mechanism [88] | -Poor awareness of the programme among target groups [89] -Distance to participating facilities in rural areas [88] -Cost of transportation [92] -Providers not reimbursed for postnatal care [88] -Provider attrition in urban areas [89] -Waning political commitment [89] |
Vouchers for Health, Kenya | Increased skilled birth attendance and facility births. No effect on antenatal care and postnatal care | -Awareness generation by voucher distributors and previous service users [99] -Locally appropriate tool for targeting pregnant women from low-income households [99] -Output-based reimbursements for providers [94] | -Perceived poor behaviour of staff at participating hospitals [94] -Overly bureaucratic process for determining eligibility [94] -Delays in contract signing and voucher printing [99] |
Pilot vouchers, Pakistan | Increased facility births. Mixed picture of positive and no effect on antenatal and postnatal care | -Many women left the facility within 24 h after giving birth as there was no one to look after their homes and children [103] -Distance to participating facilities [104] | |
Makerere University Voucher Scheme, Uganda | Increased facility births | -Inclusion of transport costs [107] -Output-based reimbursements for providers [107] | None stated |
HealthyBaby vouchers, Uganda | Increased facility births, antenatal care and postnatal care | -Locally appropriate tool for targeting pregnant women from low-income households [106] | -Turnover of staff in the Ministry of Health [106] -Cost of travel to health facilities [106] -Procedural burden of fraud detection system [106] -Inclusion (based on geographical needs) of facilities that did not meet minimum quality requirements [106] |
Vouchers for merit goods
| |||
Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme | Increased use of insecticide-treated nets | -Awareness generation by service providers [109] | -Distribution of vouchers during antenatal care visits misses women who do not seek formal antenatal care [109] -Cost of purchasing insecticide-treated net (even at a reduced rate) [109] |