Abstract
Scientists have rules pertaining to data fabrication and falsification that are enforced with significant punishments, such as loss of funding, termination of employment, or imprisonment. These rules pertain to data that describe observable and unobservable entities. In this commentary I argue that scientists would not adopt rules that impose harsh penalties on researchers for data fabrication or falsification unless they believed that an aim of scientific research is to develop true theories and hypotheses about entities that exist, including unobservable ones. This argument presents a challenge for constructive empiricists, such as van Fraassen. Constructive empiricists need to be able to explain why rules pertaining to data fabrication and falsification do not threaten their philosophy of science.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bogen, J. (2009). Theory and observation in science. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/#DatPhe. Accessed November 9, 2012.
Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the phenomena. Philosophical Review, 97, 303–352.
Bok, S. (1979). Lying: Moral choice in public and private life. New York: Pantheon Books.
Boyd, R. N. (1983). On the current status of the issue of scientific realism. Erkenntnis, 19, 45–90.
Chakravartty, A. (2007). A metaphysics for scientific realism: Knowing the unobservable. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cyranoski, D. (2006). Blow follows blow for stem-cell work. Nature, 439, 8.
Fanelli, D. (2009). How many scientists fabricate and falsify research? A systematic review and meta-analysis of survey data. PLoS One, 4, e5738.
Fine, A. (1996). The shaky game: Einstein, realism and the quantum theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hull, D. (1990). Science as a process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hwang, W. S., Roh, S. I., Lee, B. C., Kang, S. K., Kwon, D. K., Kim, S., et al. (2005). Patient-specific embryonic stem cells derived from human SCNT blastocysts. Science, 308, 1777–1783.
Hwang, W. S., Ryu, Y. J., Park, J. H., Park, E. S., Lee, E. G., Koo, J. M., et al. (2004). Evidence of a pluripotent human embryonic stem cell line derived from a cloned blastocyst. Science, 303, 1669–1674.
Kitcher, P. (1995). The advancement of science. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, I. (1980). The methodology of scientific research programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its problems. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48, 19–48.
Laudan, L. (1984). Sciences and values. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Office of Science and Technology Policy. (2000). Federal research misconduct policy. Federal Register, 65(235), 76260–76264.
Resnik, D.B., & Dinse, G.E. (2012). Scientific corrections and retractions related to misconduct findings. Journal of Medical Ethics, 39, 46–50.
Resnik, D.B., Peddada, S., & Brunson Jr, W. (2009). Misconduct policies of scientific journals. Accountability in Research, 16, 254–267.
Shamoo, A.S., & Resnik, D.B. (2009). Responsible conduct of research (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1985). Empiricism in the philosophy of science. In P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (Eds.), Images of science (pp. 245–308). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
van Fraassen, B. C. (2001). Constructive empiricism now. Philosophical Studies, 106, 151–170.
Wylie, A. (1986). Arguments for scientific realism: The ascending spiral. American Philosophical Quarterly, 23, 287–298.
Acknowledgments
This article is the work product of an employee or group of employees of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), National Institutes of Health (NIH). However, the statements, opinions or conclusions contained therein do not necessarily represent the statements, opinions or conclusions of NIEHS, NIH, or the United States government. I am grateful to Kevin Elliott and K. Brad Wray for reading earlier versions of this paper and providing useful comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Resnik, D.B. Data Fabrication and Falsification and Empiricist Philosophy of Science. Sci Eng Ethics 20, 423–431 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-013-9466-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-013-9466-z