Elsevier

The Lancet

Volume 376, Issue 9744, 11–17 September 2010, Pages 852-853
The Lancet

Comment
Philip Morris versus Uruguay: health governance challenged

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(10)61256-1Get rights and content

References (12)

  • K Lee et al.

    Bridging the divide: global governance of trade and health

    Lancet

    (2009)
  • WTO legal texts. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: the text of the general agreement

  • R Roemer et al.

    Origins of the WHO framework convention on tobacco control

    Am J Public Health

    (2005)
  • A Woo

    Health versus trade: the future of the WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

    Vanderbilt J Transnational Law

    (2002)
  • Switzerland and Uruguay: agreement on the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments (with protocol)

  • LE Peterson

    Uruguay: Philip Morris files first-known investment treaty claim against tobacco regulations. Investment Arbitration Reporter

There are more references available in the full text version of this article.

Cited by (23)

  • Exposing and addressing tobacco industry conduct in low-income and middle-income countries

    2015, The Lancet
    Citation Excerpt :

    LMICs have also been subject to industry efforts to use economic treaties to threaten innovative tobacco control policies both historically129,130 and recently. Uruguay is currently defending its large, graphic warning labels in international arbitration.131 PMI (with 2013 revenues of more than US$59 billion and profits near $9 billion132) claims that Uruguay (with total budget revenues of around $17 billion and expenditures of $19 billion133) is violating the provisions of a bilateral investment treaty that the country has with Switzerland (PMI's corporate home), even though Article 2.1 of the treaty clearly provides for a public health exception.134

  • Tobacco control campaign in Uruguay: A population-based trend analysis

    2012, The Lancet
    Citation Excerpt :

    Similar legal actions have been taken by international tobacco manufacturers against Australia, which has also adopted stringent anti-tobacco measures.7 As previously noted,8 such a legal strategy has the potential to reverse many of the tobacco control accomplishments codified in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which was originally adopted at WHO's 56th World Health Assembly in May, 2003, and has now been accepted by 174 countries.9 It also has important implications for global health governance—especially the conflict between health and trade—that go beyond the narrower issue of tobacco control.

  • Using a legal and regulatory framework to identify and evaluate priorities for cancer prevention

    2011, Public Health
    Citation Excerpt :

    The decision by PMI to seek compensation for the economic consequences of a good-faith attempt to reduce tobacco use is based on the assumption that PMI is entitled to claim compensation under a BIT for the economic consequences of Uruguay either fulfilling its treaty obligations under the FCTC, or for introducing tobacco controls that exceed the minimum standards required under the FCTC. The success of PMI’s strategy does not depend on it achieving a complete victory, but on intimidating other countries into relinquishing areas of health sovereignty in order to avoid trade disputes.63 Identifying and managing risk factors for chronic disease in general practice: some Australian initiatives.

View all citing articles on Scopus
View full text