Elsevier

Aggression and Violent Behavior

Volume 7, Issue 5, September–October 2002, Pages 513-528
Aggression and Violent Behavior

Good lives and the rehabilitation of offenders: Promises and problems

https://doi.org/10.1016/S1359-1789(01)00076-3Get rights and content

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that every rehabilitation program presupposes conceptions of possible good lives for offenders and, associated with this, an understanding of the necessary internal and external conditions for living such lives. I first clarify the notion of good lives and outline its necessary features. Second, I establish the conclusion that all offender programs presuppose a conception of good lives. In order to make the argument a little more concrete, I demonstrate how a state-of-the-art treatment program for sex offenders and research on the process of offender change presuppose such a conception and expose the problems evident in the way they engage with this dimension of rehabilitation. Third, I argue that it is necessary for individuals working to rehabilitate offenders to explicitly construct conceptions of good lives for different offenders and to use these conceptions to shape the behavior change process.

Introduction

In this paper, I argue that every rehabilitation program presupposes conceptions of possible good lives for offenders and, associated with this, an understanding of the necessary internal and external conditions for living such lives. By the term “good lives” I am referring to ways of living that are beneficial and fulfilling for individuals. The primary goods comprising good lives are outcomes sought by individuals for their own sake and typically reflect propensities evident in basic human needs. The conception of a possible good life for an offender should also include a concrete understanding of the possible ways of living that are realistic for him or her. It should take note of each offender's capabilities, temperament, interests, skills, deep commitments (i.e., basic value system and preferred ways of living in the world, for example, as a teacher or provider), and support networks. The notion of primary goods overlaps to some extent with other motivational constructs outlined in research on psychological well-being. For example, the goals associated with personal strivings (Emmons, 1996) and the domains of life satisfaction identified by Cummins (1996), that is, material well-being, health, productivity, intimacy, safety, community, and emotional well-being.

The conception of good lives or well-being that underlie rehabilitation programs is what gives them their directedness. It effectively links identification of risk factors or psychological problems with the desired outcome of reduced recidivism. In other words, a necessary condition for the reduction of offending is the instillation of ways of living that are more fulfilling and coherent. That is, individuals are unlikely to refrain from offending if their lives are characterized by an absence of valued outcomes. In fact, I suggest that one of the reasons individuals commit crimes is that they are perceived to be rewarding in some ways, a criminal lifestyle represents one way of achieving personal goods (Ward & Stewart, in press-Psychology, Crime & Law). It may be the only way of living that is judged capable of this outcome. Thus, one of my core assumptions is that, in order to rehabilitate offenders, it is necessary to instill in them the skills, knowledge, and resources to live different kinds of lives.

Of course, therapists cannot dictate exactly what kind of life this should be. Offenders need to make their own choices, and this is guided by a conception of good lives and the belief that it is possible to achieve different ways of living in the world. The clinicians' task is to focus on establishment of the capabilities and skills needed to meet each offender's basic needs and therefore to increase the chances of him or her living a good life, that is, one characterized by the instantiation of basic goods or valued outcomes. The rehabilitation process is crucially dependent on identifying the internal and external obstacles that have been thwarting an individual's ability to meet his or her fundamental needs. These may be defensive strategies, personal and vocational skill deficits, maladaptive attitudes and beliefs, and lack of social support and integration.

Although the role of values in the rehabilitation of offenders has often been acknowledged (Marshall, 1999), there has been little explicit discussion of the ways in which this should occur. Too often, the conception of good lives in an offender program is unfocused and vague, for example, simply stating that the goal is to increase individuals' prosocial skills or to enhance their capacity to establish intimate relationships (Ward, Hudson, & Keenan, 2001).

In this paper, I will first clarify the notion of good lives and outline its necessary features. Second, I will establish the conclusion that all offender programs presuppose a conception of good lives. In order to make the argument a little more concrete, I will demonstrate how a state of the art treatment program for sex offenders presupposes such a conception and expose the problems evident in the way it engages with this dimension of rehabilitation. Third, I then argue that it is necessary for individuals working to rehabilitate offenders to explicitly construct conceptions of good lives for different offenders and to use these conceptions to shape the behavior change process. Finally, I will conclude by suggesting ways in which these problems can be avoided and also sketch out a possible framework to guide the rehabilitation of offenders.

Section snippets

What is a good life?

Primary goods are actions or states of affairs that are viewed as intrinsically beneficial to human beings and are therefore sought for their own sake rather than as means to some more fundamental ends. While instrumental goods are actions or states of affairs that reliably result in primary goods, for example, possessing language or being in a relationship that leads to the primary human good of intimacy or relatedness. A good life becomes possible when an individual possesses the necessary

Conceptions of good lives and offender rehabilitation

In the last section, I defined the construct of good lives and discussed the features that constitute this concept. It remains to establish the claim that every rehabilitation program for offenders presupposes a conception of good lives. I have three main arguments. The first sets out to demonstrate that rehabilitation programs, as a matter of fact, do allude to goods or values. I achieve this by way of the example of a sex offender treatment program and a consideration of a study by Maruna

Conclusions

I argue that clinicians ought to explicitly construct a conception of good lives to guide the rehabilitation of each offender. The identification of individuals' psychological dispositions or vulnerability factors causally related to their offending is a first step in the assessment process. This provides information on the internal and external obstacles that are frustrating the meeting of basic human needs and therefore preventing the achievement of primary human goods. Once this is done, it

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