Is a naturalistic theory of communication possible?

Abstract

This article presents a theoretical discussion of the relationship between language and communication. I discuss Chomsky’s position on this topic. Chomsky claims that if it is possible to construct a scientific theory of the language faculty, there is no possibility to construct a scientific theory of communication because in communication human intentionality is involved. This position is contrasted by philosophers of language considering that communication is to be studied as a form of rational action. I maintain that both these positions are not supported by the evidence coming from developmental research. Taking a cognitive point of view I contend that a communicative faculty can be defined that develops since infancy to adulthood, which has features independent of language and action. Different steps in the development of the communicative ability are linked to a parallel development of the theory of mind. I then argue in favor of a distinction between collective action and communication considering that while collective action is common to human and nonhuman primates, communication is typically human.

Introduction

In this article I present a theoretical discussion of the relationship between language and communication. I argue in favor of a human species-specific communicative faculty to which particular cognitive structures are devoted. Chomsky in all his theoretical work has stressed the fact that language is a human faculty and that linguistics has to be conceived as part of psychology. Nevertheless for this author only some features of language can be studied in a scientific way. As it is well known, Chomsky has proposed a sharp distinction between those features of language, which can be part of a scientific theory, and the communicative use of language, which is considered as part of the more general human ability to perform intentional action. The philosophers of language working on pragmatics agree that communication is a form of intentional action but they maintain that the study of the structure of language cannot be separated by the study of its use (see for instance Searle, 1972). The definition of communication as a form of rational action is crucial to support both arguments. I propose an analysis of the evidence provided by recent research in developmental psychology to argue against this definition. In the following I present Chomsky’s position on the relationship between language and communication. Then I discuss the basic tenets of the classical theories of communication formulated within the philosophy of language. In particular I discuss the form of intersubjectivity that these theories presuppose. I present an alternative point of view where the evidence produced in developmental and comparative psychology is used to support a distinction between collective action and communication. Finally, I clarify my point of view through the discussion of Tomasello’s recent work that argues in favor of a distinction between intentionality and shared intentionality.