The development of a prototype behavioral marker system for US Navy officers of the deck

Abstract

The officer of the deck (OOD) of a US Navy ship is in charge of the safe and proper operation of the ship, and accountable to the commanding officer for every event that occurs during his or her OOD watch. This paper discusses the development of a prototype behavioral marker system to evaluate, and provide feedback on, the nontechnical (cognitive, social, and personal resource) skills of OODs.

An initial set of 17 categories of nontechnical skills were identified from a literature review. A focus group with four qualified OODs used the skills identified from the literature review to develop an initial taxonomy of five categories, each with two or three corresponding behavioral elements. This taxonomy was then used to classify 149 statements concerned with the nontechnical skills of OODs collected from 16 critical incident interviews. After three iterations of adaptations to the taxonomy, two independent raters were able to reach acceptable levels of reliability in using the taxonomy to classify the statements. Although further development work is required, it is suggested that the prototype behavioral marker system has implications for improving safety and performance on military and civilian ships.

Introduction

The officer of the deck (OOD) is a critical watch station on a US Navy ship. The OOD is accountable to the Captain for every event that occurs during his or her OOD watch. “As the Captain’s direct representative, the OOD is the only person on board who can make decisions that affect the safety of the ship and the lives of her crew” (Stavridis and Girrier, 2007, p. 3). There are 13 separate watch stations (individuals in the ship’s company responsible for carrying out particular tasks) that report directly to the OOD. When underway, the OOD is designated by the Captain to be in charge of the ship including its safe and proper operation (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005). “Nowhere in military or civilian life is there a parallel to the range and degree of responsibility that is placed in the hands of the OOD. As direct representative of the Captain, he or she acts with all the authority of command and, next to the Captain and the Executive Officer (XO), [the OOD] is the most important person on the ship” (Stavridis and Girrier, 2007, p. 1).

While technical skills and knowledge are obviously necessary for an effective OOD, they are not sufficient. The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) stated that the majority of maritime accidents are attributed to human error (MAIB, 2000). Rothblum (2000) states that 75–96% of marine casualties are caused, at least in part, by human error. Similarly, Wagenaar and Groeneweg (1987) analyzed 100 Dutch shipping mishaps and found that in 96 of the mishaps those individuals involved could have prevented the mishap. In a recent study of mishaps involving Greek-flagged ships from 1995 to 2006, 57% of mishaps were attributed to human factors (Kokotos and Linardatos, 2011). Two examples of US Navy maritime mishaps in the public domain caused by poor nontechnical skills were the downing of an Iranian Airliner by the USS Vincennes in July 1988 (Klein, 1998), and the ramming of an anchored Spanish bulk carrier by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in August 1988 (National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB, 1990). It was determined that the probable causes of the ramming of the Spanish vessel were the delayed and insufficient action to correct the USS Eisenhower’s deviation from the intended track by the navigator and the OOD. The OOD did not adequately track the vessels movement (failure of situation awareness), and the commanding officer (CO) was not informed of a change of speed in a timely manner (failure of communication; NTSB, 1990).

Nontechnical skills are the “cognitive, social, and personal resource skills that complement technical skills, and contribute to safe and efficient task performance” (Flin et al., 2008, p. 1). Stavridis and Girrier (2007) state that the nontechnical skills of forehandedness, vigilance, judgment, intuition, and leadership are just as important to OODs as technical skills and knowledge. However, despite the recognized importance of nontechnical skills, there has not been any research conducted to identify the specific nontechnical skills required by the OOD. There are also no valid and reliable tools to evaluate and provide feedback on the nontechnical skills of OODs. The lack of a framework for evaluating nontechnical skills is not confined to the OOD watch station. There has been little human factors research conducted in the maritime industry more generally (Hetherington et al., 2006). The purpose of this paper is to carry out a task analysis to identify the nontechnical skills required by effective OODs, and develop a prototype behavioral marker system for evaluating these skills.