Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-2lccl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-29T00:47:00.158Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - The nature of autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Get access

Summary

The concept of autonomy has assumed increasing importance in contemporary moral and political philosophy. Philosophers such as John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, Robert P. Wolff, and Ronald Dworkin have employed the concept to define and illuminate issues such as the characterization of principles of justice, the limits of free speech, and the nature of the liberal state.

In the most recent formulation of the foundations of his theory of justice, Rawls makes clear – what was implicit in his book – that a certain ideal of the person is the cornerstone of his moral edifice. A central feature of that idea is the notion of autonomy.

[T]he main idea of Kantian constructivism … is to establish a connection between the first principles of justice and the conception of moral persons as free and equal. … [T]he requisite connection is provided by a procedure of construction in which rationally autonomous agents subject to reasonable constraints agree to public principles of justice.

Scanlon's defense of a Millian principle of free speech relies also on a view of what powers autonomous persons would grant to the state.

I will defend the Millian principle by showing it to be a consequence of the view that the powers of a state are limited to those that citizens could recognize while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.

Ronald Dworkin, in his article on Liberalism, does not use the word “autonomy,” but in discussing the idea of treating people as equals he is arguing for equal respect for the autonomy of citizens.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1988

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×