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6 - Who knows what and who can we believe? Epistemological beliefs are beliefs about knowledge (mostly) to be attained from others

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2010

Torsten Porsch
Affiliation:
University of Muenster
Lisa D. Bendixen
Affiliation:
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Florian C. Feucht
Affiliation:
University of Toledo, Ohio
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Summary

Introduction

In this chapter we will discuss some implications of the distributed nature of knowledge for the study and for the teaching of epistemological beliefs. We will elaborate on the following argument: due to the division of labor in modern societies, knowledge is distributed and used unevenly. Most knowledge claims are based on specialized knowledge provided by specialized experts, and the knowledge is organized into disciplines, reflecting such specialization. In the following chapter, the uneven distribution and use of knowledge is called “division of cognitive labor.” Because much of our knowledge is acquired from others, most everyday epistemological issues regard the assessment of knowledge claims made by others who are experts for issues we are not experts for. Improving epistemological judgments, therefore, requires the improvement of a person's capacity to understand how specialized knowledge is distributed (who knows what) and to evaluate expert sources (whom to believe). In the first part of this chapter the notion of the “division of cognitive labor” is explained. Secondly, how the uneven distribution of cognitive labor and the dependency from experts has been conceived in research on epistemological beliefs will be discussed. The well-known dimensions “source” and “justification of knowledge” will take the section's center stage. The dimension “source” describes knowledge which is not constructed by the knower and implies a rather negative view on experts’ knowledge. The dimension “justification of knowledge” refers to beliefs necessary for the assessment of experts’ knowledge claims, but the “sophisticated” subject is mostly conceived of as overcoming the division of cognitive labor.

Type
Chapter
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Personal Epistemology in the Classroom
Theory, Research, and Implications for Practice
, pp. 163 - 194
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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