Article contents
Social affordances in context: What is it that we are bodily responsive to?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 July 2013
Abstract
We propose to understand social affordances in the broader context of responsiveness to a field of relevant affordances in general. This perspective clarifies our everyday ability to unreflectively switch between social and other affordances. Moreover, based on our experience with Deep Brain Stimulation for treating obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, we suggest that psychiatric disorders may affect skilled intentionality, including responsiveness to social affordances.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013
References
Chemero, A. (2003) An outline of a theory of affordances. Ecological Psychology
15(2):181–95.Google Scholar
Denys, D., Mantione, M., Figee, M., Van den Munckhof, P., Koerselman, F., Westenberg, H., Bosch, A. & Schuurman, R. (2010) Deep brain stimulation of the nucleus accumbens for treatment-refractory obsessive–compulsive disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry
67(10):1061–68.Google Scholar
Friston, K. J. (2011) Embodied inference: Or “I think therefore I am, if I am what I think”. In: The implications of embodiment (cognition and communication), ed. Tschacher, W. & Bergomi, C., pp. 89–125. Imprint Academic.Google Scholar
Friston, K. J., Shiner, T., FitzGerald, T., Galea, J. M., Adams, R., Brown, H., Dolan, R.J., Moran, R., Stephan, K.E. & Bestmann, S. (2012) Dopamine, affordance, and active inference. PLoS Computational Biology
8(1): 1–18.Google Scholar
Ingold, T. (2000/2011) The perception of the environment: Essays on livelihood, dwelling and skill. Routledge.Google Scholar
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/2002) Phenomenology of perception, trans. Smith, C.. Routledge.Google Scholar
Reed, E. S. (1996) Encountering the world: Toward an ecological psychology. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rietveld, E. (2008) Situated normativity: The normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action. Mind
117(468):973–1001. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn050.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rietveld, E. (in press) Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context. In: Consciousness in interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness, ed. Paglieri, F.. John Benjamins.Google Scholar
Thelen, E. & Smith, L. B. (1994) A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. MIT Press.Google Scholar
- 24
- Cited by
Target article
Toward a second-person neuroscience1
Related commentaries (28)
A mature second-person neuroscience needs a first-person (plural) developmental foundation
A second-person approach cannot explain intentionality in social understanding
Advancing the neuroscience of social emotions with social immersion
Brain games: Toward a neuroecology of social behavior
From synthetic modeling of social interaction to dynamic theories of brain–body–environment–body–brain systems
From the bottom up: The roots of social neuroscience at risk of running dry?
Further steps toward a second-person neuroscience
Interaction versus observation: A finer look at this distinction and its importance to autism
It takes two to talk: A second-person neuroscience approach to language learning
Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience
Mirror neurons are central for a second-person neuroscience: Insights from developmental studies
On projecting grammatical persons into social neurocognition: A view from linguistics
Parameterising ecological validity and integrating individual differences within second-person neuroscience
Reciprocity between second-person neuroscience and cognitive robotics
Second person neuroscience needs theories as well as methods
Second-person neuroscience: Implications for Wittgensteinian and Vygotskyan approaches to psychology
Second-person social neuroscience: Connections to past and future theories, methods, and findings
Social affordances in context: What is it that we are bodily responsive to?
Social affordances: Is the mirror neuron system involved?
Social cognition is not a special case, and the dark matter is more extensive than recognized
Social perception and “spectator theories” of other minds
Talking to each other and talking together: Joint language tasks and degrees of interactivity
The brain as part of an enactive system
The second person in “I”-“you”-“it” triadic interactions
The use of non-interactive scenarios in social neuroscience
Toward a neuroscience of interactive parent–infant dyad empathy
What we can learn from second animal neuroscience
Why not the first-person plural in social cognition?
Author response
A second-person neuroscience in interaction1