Background
Most industrialised nations have workers’ compensation (WC) or other social insurance systems to provide wage replacement, medical, and rehabilitation services in the event of occupational injury or disease. Cause-based WC systems such as those in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States provide these services after a process to determine whether the injury is compensable [
1]. This can delay the claim lodgement process and access to services, which can in turn lead to more time off work [
2‐
5], higher claim costs [
4,
6,
7], and poorer long-term anxiety, depression, disability, and quality of life [
8]. Further, delays at different stages in the claim lodgement process – such as initial reporting of the injury, claim lodgement, insurer liability decision, and receipt of treatment – have each been linked to more time off work [
9,
10].
Providing financial incentives for employers to report worker injuries more quickly has been proposed as a way to shorten the claim lodgement process [
11,
12]. With this goal in mind, two Australian WC jurisdictions, South Australia (SA) and Tasmania (TAS), introduced early reporting incentives (ERIs) in January 2009 and July 2010 respectively [
13,
14]. Policies such as ERIs can have major impacts on WC claims [
4,
15‐
17] though there has been limited research into their effect. In SA, ERIs were previously evaluated as part of a broader review of the WC legislation that introduced them, finding that they were followed by reductions in claim reporting and insurer decision times [
18]. However, the analyses were largely descriptive, did not account for national trends that may confound the association, and had a limited amount of lead-in time to account for secular, or pre-existing, trends.
In this study, we addressed the following questions: 1) Were ERIs successful in reducing the duration of the claim lodgement process? And, 2) how did ERIs affect the different time periods within the claim lodgement process? We analysed administrative records of WC claims using an interrupted time series (ITS), a powerful, quasi-experimental study design of outcomes before and after an event while accounting for secular trends [
19‐
22]. Aside from the legislative review described above, this is to our knowledge the first study to evaluate ERI impact on the claim lodgement process, account for secular and national trends, and to do so across multiple populations.
Discussion
Our findings suggest that ERIs achieved some success in shortening the claim lodgement process. Following implementation, median claim reporting times saw significant level reductions with either sustained or decreased trends, and median total time saw significant trend reductions, in both SA and TAS. Trend reductions in total time suggest long-term ERI effectiveness. However, sensitivity analysis of the 75th percentile found neither level nor trend reduction in total time in TAS. Part of the justification for ERIs in TAS was that nearly 25% of claims exceeded the old statutory reporting period [
12]. Our findings suggest that ERIs did not improve timeliness for those it was designed to help.
There are several other issues with attributing success to the policy. The first is that in SA there was no significant decrease in the ERI target, employer reporting time. One possible explanation is that the ERI design in SA removed incentives to report an injury quickly once the two day threshold had been crossed, since employers were ineligible for the rebate after this time. It may have even reduced the sense of urgency among employers to report injuries, as demonstrated by the increase among the 75th percentile. This is in contrast to the penalty format in TAS, which accrued for each day employers were late to report an injury, building pressure once they crossed the three day threshold.
In SA, the change in claim reporting time was driven by reductions in worker reporting time. While a decrease in worker reporting time is a positive outcome, since delays in this time period are predictive of claims becoming long-duration [
9,
10], the implication is that these reductions are indirectly attributable to ERIs, or to another cause entirely. One possibility is that provisional liability, which grants injured workers WC services while awaiting a decision on their claim, fostered a sense of certainty of benefits and encouraged workers to engage with the system earlier [
18]. In SA, ERIs and provisional liability were part of the same amendment package and were implemented concurrently [
13]. TAS also had provisional liability, though it had been introduced two decades earlier, rather than at the same time as ERIs [
27]. It was unfortunate that we were unable to examine worker reporting time and employer reporting time in TAS, as the contrast between ERIs introduced in concert with provisional liability (SA) and ERIs introduced where provisional liability was established (TAS) would have been illuminating.
The second issue with attributing success to the policy is that the reductions in claim reporting time in TAS were offset by increases in insurer decision time. These may have been due to an increase in administrative burden, or the time costs for insurer and regulatory staff to learn, manage, and implement new regulations [
46]. In TAS, ERIs were enforced via the transfer of wage replacement payments from insurers to employers, which may have entailed additional administrative burden for insurers on top of adapting to new policies. Interestingly, sensitivity analysis found no level change, but a significant, non-linear trend increase among the 75th percentile of claims. This suggests that whatever caused the increase in insurer decision time – whether administrative burden or some other factor – only affected longer-duration claims gradually. It is unclear why the effect would be different from the median, and merits further investigation.
Trends in SA further suggest administrative burden as the driver of increased insurer decision time. While it did not significantly change at ERI implementation, insurer decision time began to increase with the first wave of WC amendments in July 2008. The second increase in mid-2010 is likely explained by disruption due to the SA regulator’s introduction of a new IT system in late April 2010 [
47]. Administrative burden may have been more of an issue in TAS, where claims were managed by smaller organisations (seven insurers for 9000 claims per annum in TAS, versus one claims agent for 27,000 claims per annum in SA [
24,
25]). Insurers in TAS, which had to adopt the entire legislation at one time, likely had fewer resources to cope with the administrative burden [
48]. There was also an increase in monthly claim volumes in TAS (significant when not adjusting for the comparator), which may have been more difficult for their smaller insurers to manage. However, this does not explain why TAS’s increases in median insurer decision time were sustained, nor the trend increase among the 75th percentile.
Though SA and TAS have cause-based WC systems, provisional liability made insurer decision time less of a barrier to service access. Prospective claimants in TAS were entitled to wage replacement and treatment from the moment their claim was lodged [
27], while in SA they began seven days after worker report date [
13]. Additionally, TAS’s amendment package introduced a requirement for employers to provide rehabilitation services as soon as they become aware of the injury [
14]. With provisional liability, the decreases in claim reporting and worker reporting times following ERIs would mean accelerated access to WC services, which was the policy aim. In the absence of provisional liability, increases in insurer decision time, whether due to ERIs or the legislation they are part of, could delay WC service access. Our findings suggest that increases in insurer decision time may be due to administrative burden of large WC legislative changes. Future ERI iterations are likely to be delivered similarly, as WC changes often come in larger packages. Without a provisional liability safeguard, WC changes may delay insurer decision time and WC service access. Alternatively, provisional liability may counter the sense of “urgency” for insurers to deal with claims more quickly [
18] if access to WC services is not contingent on insurer decision. However, even if service access is accelerated, increased insurer decision times could worsen outcomes for the injured worker [
8].
Our findings concur with the review of SA’s WC legislation in terms of ERI impact on claim reporting time (both found a reduction), though differ on insurer decision time [
18]. The review’s authors found insurer decision time decreased, which they attributed to the introduction of ERIs and provisional liability. However, this time series began in the quarter ending June 2008, which was near the first wave of SA’s legislative amendments and, according to our data, was the start of a period of increased insurer decision time. The report thus started at a higher baseline, creating the perception that later reductions were a decline rather than a regression to the mean.
Strengths and limitations
This study’s main strengths were the use of a powerful quasi-experimental research design, the ITS, with multiple baselines, a comparator, and adjustments for seasonality and autocorrelation, using a large number of claims from a dataset created for inter-jurisdictional comparisons and national data analysis [
23]. The number of observations exceeded most recommended minimums and generated greater certainty about seasonal and autocorrelation adjustments. Additionally, we evaluated several time periods within the claim lodgement process, exploring both the ERI target, claim reporting times (via employer reporting times), and areas that could have been indirectly affected (insurer decision time).
The study had several limitations. The ITS design is vulnerable to confounding from co-occurring events, which can lead to misattributions of cause [
29,
32]. Further, ITS assumes linear trends among data, which is likely to be violated with longer time series [
32,
33], and with the use of aggregated data, does not allow for adjustment of individual-level characteristics [
28,
33]. The staggered introduction of SA’s amendments likely confounded insurer decision time, as did the introduction of a new IT system.
Changes in monthly claim volumes raise the possibility of selection bias, but also demonstrate the strength of using a comparator within an ITS study design. While claim volumes significantly changed in SA and TAS following ERI implementation, both attenuated to non-significance when adjusting for the comparator (i.e., controlling for the national-level effect). The timing and direction of volume changes suggest they were the result of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Though the GFC did not have as large an impact on Australia as other developed economies [
49], there was nevertheless a reduction in WC claims. This may be due to worker reluctance to make a claim and risk unemployment in the face of economic uncertainty, and/or employers favouring experienced, less risky workers in hiring/firing decisions, resulting in safer worker cohorts [
50]. If the change in claim volumes was due to the GFC, use of the comparator likely reduced its potential to bias outcomes.
The comparator was unable to adjust for all co-occurring events, particularly those specific to each jurisdiction. While SA and TAS introduced ERIs as part of a larger set of legislative WC amendment packages, they likely varied in terms of their impact on the claim lodgement process. For instance, the staggered introduction of WC amendments in SA likely diffused administrative burden. The introduction of provisional liability in concert with ERIs in SA could have incentivised injury reporting among workers due to greater certainty of WC services. There is also the possibility that other co-occurring events, specific to either jurisdiction, could have confounded the associations. Further, the two ERI policies had different designs. It is unclear whether the number of days prescribed (two in SA, three in TAS) or the incentive type (limited rebate in SA, accruing penalty in TAS) modified ERI effectiveness. Lastly, in several cases baseline durations were different, which likely moderated ERI impact.
Conclusions
After implementing ERIs, claim reporting time in two Australian WC jurisdictions decreased. This suggests the policy succeeded in reducing one source of delay in the claim lodgement process. However, where it could be evaluated, we did not find a significant effect on the ERI target, employer reporting time, which raises questions about why the reductions occurred. Increases in insurer decision time highlight the possibility of negative indirect effects of ERIs, or the legislation they are part of. SA and TAS both had provisional liability safeguards that removed insurer decision time as a barrier to WC service access, though this may not be the case in other jurisdictions considering ERIs. While we evaluated the impact of ERIs on the claim lodgement process, the ultimate aim was to improve injured worker outcomes such as health, disability duration, and claim costs. We recommend these areas for future research into ERI impact.