Introduction
In the world of Austrian neonatal intensive care units (NICUs), the role of ethics is recognized only partially. The designated place for ethics is mainly outsourced to ethics committees that sometimes include the treating NICU professionals and sometimes consist of independent experts and heads of neonatal units (Stanak and Hawlik
2017). Depending on the hospital, these committees are established either formally or informally and their function is to support the decision-making process especially in the normatively tense cases (Stanak and Hawlik
2017). It is rarely so that a form of ethics moderation supporting the NICU team as such is present (Stanak and Hawlik
2017). The normatively tense cases that are at the backdrop of this essay concern the situations around the
limit of viability (weeks 22 + 0 days to 25 + 6 days of gestation), which is the point in the development of an extremely preterm (EP) infant at which there are chances of extra-uterine survival (Ehrenkranz and Mercurio
2017). Currently, according to the Austrian guideline on the management of EP infants, comfort (palliative) care is recommended in 22nd week, shared decision-making with parents in the
grey zone in 23rd week, and active care interventions from 24th week onwards (Berger
2017). This essay first outlines the key explicit ethical challenges present at the limit of viability. Then, it attempts to elucidate the more subtle (less explicit) ethical challenges related to the notion of nudging in the neonatal practice and argue that the role of ethics needs to be recognized more—with the focus on the role of virtue ethics—in order to improve the practice of neonatal medicine.
Analysis of nudging in NICUs: definitions and moral challenges
Definition of nudging and choice architecture
It is necessary to clarify the terms used in this essay and distinguish between choice architecture and nudging. As Sunstein and Thaler define it, nudging is “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein
2008). What this distinction means in the situation of shared decision-making with parents in the NICU is the following. In conversations with NICU professionals, parents get a particular set of choices laid out in front of them. On one level, parents choose between active and comfort care. On another level, these two options can be presented in many different ways: with the use of a default, with a positive or a negative frame, with the use of peer-pressure or without, etc. Choice architecture refers not only to
what is being presented, but also to
how that thing is presented (Thaler and Sunstein
2008). I use the term choice architecture to depict the state of things in which nobody wilfully interacts with the way the choice setting is architected. Nudging, to the contrary, refers to the wilful interaction with the setting—the
architecting of
what choices are presented and
how they are presented.
Definition of agency
When talking about the “wilful interaction with the choice setting”, it is important to distinguish between different dimensions of will, or agency, that are at play in nudging—particularly the psychological and the ethical (Hyman
2015). The two dimensions of agency that are in use here are
intention and
voluntariness.
On the one hand, intention, as a psychological concept, refers to the expression of purpose or desire (Hyman
2015). Nudging requires intentional use of choice architecture where the decision-makers use the tool for a particular purpose. For instance, the intentional use of the
framing effect in presenting the options in a positive or a negative frame (in the frame of survival vs mortality) aims to make the parents decide in one way or another. This is supported by a randomized survey that found a trend toward a
framing effect on the treatment preference. Participants for whom the prognosis was framed as survival and non-disability rates were more likely to choose resuscitation than participants for whom prognosis was framed as mortality and disability rates (Howard et al.
2012).
On the other hand, the dimension of voluntariness, as an ethical concept, refers to the related responsibility for nudging (Hyman
2015). Nudging requires the voluntary use of choice architecture where the decision-makers use the tool of nudging out of their own volition. An act is understood here as “voluntary if it is not due to ignorance or compulsion” (Hyman
2015; Aristotle.
2011). Hence, one ought not to bear the responsibility if compelled or forced to nudge because such an act can be categorized as done under duress (Hyman
2015). Equally, if one does not know of the fact that, for instance, negative framing of information nudges parents to choose comfort care for their EP infant (the case of ignorance), one does not bear full the responsibility for it either. Both ignorance and compulsion thus serve as exculpations.
Moral challenges with agency of the nudger
Concerning compulsion and nudging in the context of NICUs, one needs to distinguish between two categories of situations. There are some situations when nudging can be avoided and others when it cannot. While the NICU professional can avoid using the
bandwagon effect (by not telling parents how others decided in the specific situation), the above mentioned
framing effect is hard to be avoided (see table in (Stanak
2019)). What is meant here is that the NICU professional simply has to communicate the message in one way or another (in a positive frame of survival or in the negative frame of morbidity) and thus nudge the parents. There is thus an extent to which nudging is considered inevitable and hence, at times, nudging parents in the decision-making process at the limit of viability may present a moral challenge for the NICU professionals as it can be seen as done under duress.
Concerning ignorance and nudging, NICU professionals are exculpated from ignoring the tool of nudging only as long as they lack the knowledge of it. They are thus to be held responsible once they know of the tool, but do not use it intentionally. What adds complexity to this debate is the controversial nature of what epistemic conditions on responsibility are (Levy
2018). While some argue that agents can be held responsible only for what they actually know (Peels
2016), others suggest that agents can be responsible for ignorant choices as long as they could have been reasonably expected to know the required facts about their choice (Smith
1983). Along the lines of the latter, it is suggested here that as long as NICU professionals are aware that nudging may play a role in the communication with parents of EP infants, the only options that they are left with are either to nudge or to close their eyes and hope for the best—yet bear the responsibility nonetheless (Stewart
2005). Another aspect of the moral challenge with respect to agency thus concerns the question of ignorance of the tool of nudging and the related question of responsibility.
It needs to be stressed that if no intention is in place, we do not talk about nudging, but merely about unguided choice architecture. The moment, however, that NICU professionals get to be aware of the tool of nudging, they are presented with a moral challenge of having to decide whether or not to use it. Also, nudging can happen voluntarily as well as against the will of the nudger. If NICU professionals cannot avoid nudging and thus they do not nudge (strictly speaking) out of their own volition, compulsion serves as an exculpation.
Moral challenges with coercion of the nudged
Another set of moral challenges with respect to nudging in NICUs concerns paternalism and the related notion of coercion. The key proponents of nudging, Sunstein and Thaler, place nudging into the category of libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein
2008). While the traditional view of paternalism refers to the situation when individuals are interfered with against their will with the motivation of preventing harm or making them better-off (Dworkin
2007), libertarian paternalism aims to preserve the freedom of choice, yet still make people better-off. Sunstein and Thaler suggest that that can be done via orchestrating choices that promote the good of the agents nudged and that are in line with their own desires (Thaler and Sunstein
2008). While avoiding significant incentives and choice restriction or elimination, they claim that the sheer alteration of the choice architecture does not constitute coercion – as the agent is free to choose after all (Ploug et al.
2012). What is true then about the criticism that nudges are coercive especially when considering the neonatal clinical context?
Coercion and agency
The first premise of libertarian paternalism that needs to be examined is whether nudges really preserve freedom of choice—while freedom is understood here as the capacity to react to reasons (Fischer and Ravizza
1998). Here, it is important to introduce a distinction between those nudges that preserve freedom in, what Saghai calls, a basic sense and those that do so in a substantive sense (Saghai
2013). Nudges clearly preserve freedom in the basic sense in that they do not foreclose options. The point of concern is, however, whether nudges preserve freedom in the substantive sense, i.e. whether they bypass an agent’s capacity for deliberation (Levy
2017). The heart of the problem is that nudges often “take advantage of non-rational features of our nature…to produce their effect” (Levy
2017). Hence, to the extent that nudges do not preserve freedom in the substantive sense, they are to be seen here as coercive.
Critics of nudging argue that by bypassing our deliberative reasoning, nudging undermines responsible agency (Levy
2017). As discussed above, the elements of agency that are particularly relevant with respect to nudging are intentionality and voluntariness. When using the tool of nudging in the NICUs, the question is whether the agents nudged can decide intentionally (or purposefully) and voluntarily (bearing the responsibility for their decision). What stands in the way of intentional and voluntary decision is the obstacle of epistemic pollution and the challenge with nudges that merely aims to change the behaviour as opposed to changing the mind.
Levy suggests that we live in an environment that is epistemically polluted (Levy
2018). What he means is that there are “agents who use mimicry and other methods as a means of inflating their pretence to expertise”, which in turn makes it hard to distinguish between a genuine expert and a charlatan (Levy
2018). This may be problematic for parents of an EP infant in the shared decision-making procedure who have to rely on information from neonatologists when making their decision about active or comfort treatment. Assuming that neonatologists are the genuine experts, epistemic pollutant googled on the internet may mislead parents in their decision-making procedure. For instance, finding an information taken out of its context about the exaggerated burden of NDIs or, to the contrary, about the hopeful chances of EP infant’s survival below the limit of viability may serve as an epistemic pollutant.
Epistemic pollution is not a source of coercion. It is merely another obstacle on the way towards deliberative reasoning and decision-making that is intentional and voluntary. Sources of coercion, however, are all the nudges that make use of the non-rational features of our nature such as those that make use of the above mentioned
bandwagon effect or
framing effect. It is all those nudges that do not fall into the category of what Levy calls “nudges to reason” (Levy
2017). Nudges to reason are those nudges that “increase our responsiveness to evidence” (Levy
2017). Their aim is not to directly affect behaviour, but to “affect behaviour in ways that are mediated by beliefs. They change behaviour by changing minds”- just like rational arguments do (Levy
2017). A nudge to reason must make the agent’s mind more responsive to genuine evidence (Levy
2017).
In the case of NICUs, a nudge that could qualify as a nudge to reason would be, for instance, making use of the salience bias in decision aids used in the shared decision-making procedures. Decision aids are, for instance, visual tools with short messages and graphics that depict chances of survival, situation in the delivery room resuscitation, or the risks for neurodevelopmental disabilities (Kakkilaya et al. xxxx). The aim of decision aids is to improve health literacy and not harness bad reasoning such as in situations of communication of proportional data. The aim is to prevent situations such as when patients tend to irrationally choose a procedure where the risk of death is described as 24 out of 100, but they tend not to choose the one where the risk is described as 120 out of 1000. It is the case even though the first one presents the risk of 24%, while the second just 12%, yet the number 120 is greater than 24 (Janvier et al.
2014). Working with salience, in this context, would mean making the key data noticeable with the aim of helping the parent to decide on genuine evidence. Deciding on genuine evidence would allow parents to make an intentional and voluntary decision. Hence, altering the choice architecture with any aim other than the one that aims to nudge parent to reason is seen here as coercive. What constitutes coercion then are all the influences that aim at change in behaviour and not at change of mind. Of all the nudges, it is only those that attempt to change the mind that lead the parents to make an intentional and voluntary decision. Surely, decision aids also need to be subject to quality control as they too can present the developer’s bias and steer the parental decision towards active or comfort care (Guillen and Kirpalani
2018).
Coercion and agent’s good
The second premise of libertarian paternalism is that preserving the freedom of choice, it still makes people better-off. In case of NICUs, to know this would require the nudger to know what the best interest of the EP infant and the family is. However, not only are the clinical facts about what exactly is beneficial in part unknowable, but also the meaning of the word best is inevitably connected to the subject who evaluates the case. Different subjects, different stakeholders, may interpret the best interest of the EP infant differently.
This can be illustrated on the case of cochlear implants for children. At the beginning, when the implants were introduced to the clinical practice, the clinical staff valued the intervention differently from the way parents did. While the clinicians praised the fact that the use of cochlear implants brought about partial hearing, the parents objected that the technology represented a negative value judgment on deaf culture and upon its most important feature, sign language (Daniels and Wilt
2016). In case of NICUs, the evaluation of both best interest as well as QoL of the infant and the family is subject to individual judgment (Larcher
2013). Opinions on the threshold of QoL may differ and just as the parents valued the cochlear implant intervention differently to the way clinicians did, it may also be the case when passing judgments on the best interest of EP infants at NICUs. For that reason, nudgers cannot know what, in fact, makes the agents nudged better-off and hence all other nudging in NICUs than nudging to reason constitutes coercion.
As Mill puts it “a man’s mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode” (Mill
2011). Scrutinized as this Mill’s statement may be, it contributes well to our discussion. In the process of finding out their (and their infant’s) own best interest, parents should be nudged to deliberate (via nudges to reason) rather than nudged to act in ways the NICU professional perceives as best. This is particularly at stake in situations when the parents are uncertain about their decision (and so they do not know themselves what contributes to their and the infant’s best interest). In these situations, the promise of making the nudged better-off gets to be particularly ambiguous. In these vulnerable situations when the subtle use of nudging may steer the parental decision, nudging to change behaviour constitutes coercion.
To sum up, even if the choice is just guided by choice alteration, in the context of neonatology, all the nudging that aims merely at change in behaviour remains coercive. Even the libertarian form of paternalism interferes with the parents’ intention and voluntariness as well as their understanding of the good.
A way forward
Taken into account all the above, the current situation appears to be particularly problematic. On the one hand, there seem to be situations when nudges are inevitable, while on the other hand, making use of the tool of nudging seems to constitute coercive paternalism. Nudges seem not to deliver upon the libertarian promise of being freedom preserving while making the nudged better-off. And, as they tend to fail in preserving freedom in a substantive sense, except for nudges to reason, the NICU professionals are, so to speak, stuck between the rock and a hard place. In other words, NICU professionals must, at time, be inevitably coercive. They may want ignore the tool of nudging altogether, but thanks to epistemic conditions on responsibility, they can be arguably held responsible as they could have been reasonably expected to know about nudging in the first place. What is then the possible way out of this? Apart from using nudging for the purpose of supporting deliberative reasoning (as outline above) (Levy
2017), I want to suggest that nudges should be dealt with transparently on the grounds of the respective professions.
Firstly, transparency should serve as a tool of quality control in order to limit the coercive threat of nudging. In case of NICUs, applying the condition of transparency would mean that in the process of antenatal counselling, NICU professionals would communicate openly about, for instance, the possible impact of the
framing effect or the
default bias (even though there is evidence suggesting that the impact of a default tends to persist even if the patients are aware of it (Loewenstein et al.
2015)). The agents who are nudged ought to know that they are being nudged, especially in the vulnerable context of shared decision-making procedures at the limit of viability
, even if we run the risk of the nudge potentially losing its effect. Focusing on the meso-level of neonatal guidelines, I want to suggest that the impact of the form of communication on parental decision-making needs to be explicitly recognized on this ground. I have also argued elsewhere that this chould be done along the line of Norman Daniels’
accountability for reasonableness framework (Stanak
2019).
Secondly, under the above condition of transparency, I want to suggest that the tool of nudging should rest in the hands of professions that, in case of clinical medicine, use it in line with their professional commitment to serve the good of the patient. The work of NICU professionals is not only clinical in its nature, but it is also normative. Because of the above reasons of moral challenges as well as the issue of coercion and values related to paternalistic communication with parents, NICU professionals have to participate in ethics. They need to make judgments that are concerned with rightness and wrongness that stand separate to their clinical decisions. This constitutes the
moral sphere of their profession (Stanak
2018). For instance, in communication with parents, they need to make judgments about the threshold QoL of the EP infant and hence its best interest. These are essentially value judgments and once the NICU professionals are aware of it (and hence the exculpation based on ignorance cannot be applied (Hyman
2015)), they ought to recognize the role of ethics in their profession.
I want to further argue that there is a need to recognize the role of ethics in the NICU profession more not only because of the theoretical argument above, but also because of the practical argument that recognizing the role of ethics leads to better care for infants (Stanak
2018). It is the case because of two reasons. Firstly, better care is reached indirectly via resolving the ethical tensions within teams. Resolving ethical tensions leads to better organizational culture that, as suggested by a Canadian survey, in turn has an impact on the quality of care provided (Mahl, et al.
2015). Secondly, ethics education empowers the NICU professionals when facing normatively challenging decisions. As it was suggested in a US survey, ethics education among NICU doctors played a large role in their decision-making, especially in situations when they considered active care mandatory with respect to their understanding of the notions of best interest and beneficence (Weiss et al.
2016; Weiss and Munson
2016).
Facing the explicit moral challenges connected to uncertainty of data and the ambiguous notion of best interest as well as the implicit challenges surrounding the tool of nudging, NICU professionals should recognize the normative aspect of their work. Virtues of the NICU profession are to guide the use of the tool of nudging on a case by case basis.
Virtue ethics solution
Recognizing the role of ethics education for clinical practitioners brings the moral sphere of the profession forward. I want to suggest, however, that in order to allow NICU professionals to develop as moral agents, education itself is not enough and a more holistic virtue ethics approach has a particular role to play. Assuming MacIntyre’s position that virtues develop in practices (MacIntyre
2014), I want to scrutinize the practice, or profession in this sense (Pellegrino
2009), of neonatology to see the room for virtue ethics there. The profession of clinical medicine (and hence also the NICU professionals), are orientated toward an end (
telos) inherent to the their profession, which is the good of the patient (Pellegrino
2009). The clinical professionals commit to act in the best interest of the patient served and through their Hippocratic oath, they enter into a covenantal trust relationship with patients. This is their
act of profession (Pellegrino
2009). As opposed to mere occupations, professions entail a clear act of profession that is committed to the pursuit of its concrete end. On the way of this pursuit, there are specific character traits or virtues that enable one to attain the end of the profession best (Pellegrino
2009). These are the virtues internal to the respective profession.
The virtues we are concerned with are both intellectual and moral. I have argued elsewhere that intellectual virtues in the neonatal context concern the virtues of
episteme and
phronesis and moral virtues include the virtues of
courage, compassion, fidelity to trust, and
integrity (Stanak
2018). What distinguishes these moral virtues from mere character traits is their commitment to goodness (Annas
2011). Virtues are understood here as lasting character features of a person that persist through challenges and that are weakened or strengthened depending on success or failure (Annas
2011). They are reliable in the sense that they make others know what they can expect of us because the virtues are characteristic of us – they are deep features of a person. However, virtues are not merely static dispositions of character that do not change over time, but they are active features of a person that develop via selective response to circumstances (Annas
2011). Thus, they can be acquired through habituation.
Following Artistotle’s understanding of human psychology, we start with a set of dispositions and we develop them as life progresses (Aristotle.
2011). We move from an untutored state to the tutored state via formation and education (Annas
2011). The acquisition of virtues is understood to occur via habituation as it is the case in acquisition of practical skills such as playing the piano. The first step is to consciously learn the skill step by step, note by note. Through repetition of scales and simple sonatas, the pianist becomes more skilled to the point that little conscious thinking is needed to play from the notes. Observing a skilled pianist may make one think that the conscious experience present at the beginning of learning the piano has disappeared and that mere habit acquired via repetition is now present (Annas
2011). That is, however, wrong. Even though the pianist does not need the conscious input for playing, his playing is now infused with his individual expression and feeling about the piece played (Annas
2011). Hence, what makes a good pianist is not solely the mastery of his routine, but rather his capacity to put an expression into the piece played. Important to note is that just as the skill was once acquired, practice is required for the sake of maintaining its level (Annas
2011).
The same applies to virtues of the NICU profession. It has been repeatedly reported in qualitative literature that what makes the NICU professional different from the fellow obstetrician is the disposition to be
compassionate (Tucker Edmonds et al.
2014;
2015a,
b). Having compassion as a starting point, the NICU professionals face situations that challenge, for instance, their virtue of
courage that may at times be required from them, for instance, when having to override the parental decision to withhold active care when medically indicated (Stanak
2018). Furthermore, the virtue of
fidelity to trust and
integrity need to be acquired by NICU professionals in practice when facing the parents of EP infants and when communicating uneasy messages to them (Stanak
2018).
Virtues require appropriate response to unique situations – especially to unforeseen situations that require prompt action – and those occur frequently in a NICU. A rational moral calculus may be the method of choice when time is plentiful, but under time constraints, it is the dispositions of character acquired through the repetitive work in the neonatal department—just like the practical skill of playing the piano—that make a good NICU professional stand out. The professional’s virtuous character is, however, not just the result of the everyday routine in the neonatal department, but it is the acquired skill that the professional developed over time thanks to which he or she can face the challenging reality of the profession and make apt decisions. The above listed virtues require precisely this intellectual virtue of phronesis, practical wisdom, that is an analogue to clinical judgment in the moral sphere. Since virtues cannot be learned in isolation, phronesis is needed to help one discern what action to pursue in what situation.
In terms of the practical application of virtue ethics to medical practice, research from the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtue on Virtuous Medical Practice maps the process of formation of medical professionals in the UK and argues for more focus on the character of medical professionals. The results from their research suggest that when solving an ethical dilemma, there is a discrepancy in approach between experienced doctors and doctors in early career stages (Arthur et al.
2015). While experienced doctors rely on their judgment and character, early career doctors rely on rules. It was argued that even though the character of doctors is often recognized as important, it is not part of the formal curriculum (as formal curriculum, for the most part, puts stress on rule-based and cognitive approaches) (Arthur et al.
2015). Moreover, as part of their qualitative interviews, the “interviewees commented on the influence of role models in their initial education and subsequent practice” emphasizing the presence of a “hidden” curriculum that shapes the doctors’ early professional identity in the chosen specialties (Arthur et al.
2015).
Applying these findings to the present case, I want to suggest a stronger focus on the formation of early career NICU professionals that aims not only on the shaping of their clinical, but also on their moral judgment. Role modelling and workplace culture can thus influence the growth of NICU professionals as moral agents. As suggested by the Jubilee Centre report, “more attention should be given to training in moral character and senior staff should create more opportunities for reflecting on ethics in the workplace” (Arthur et al.
2015). It is the
phronetic judgment of the NICU professionals that is believed to be able to help them use the tool of nudging in an appropriate way also in the conversations surrounding the limit of viability. For the flourishing of NICU professionals (or for their character development), the respective organizational culture needs to recognize the importance of their role also as moral agents (Stanak
2018). Some of the methods applied already are support from ethics committees, in-house supervision mechanisms, and ethics moderation of team discussion (that I outlined here (Stanak
2018)). The organizational culture hence needs to recognize the role of ethics in the NICU profession and support the NICU professionals on the way.
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