Influenza viruses evolve in two different ways including antigenic “drift” (e.g. small genetic mutations occurring continuously over time) and “shift” (e.g. major, abrupt changes/reassortment leading to different virus subtypes with high virulence and pandemic potential) [
4]. This evolutionary process presents significant challenges in developing therapeutics and vaccines, as well as responding with appropriate public health measures, as viruses adapt to their environment and traverse multiple animal and human hosts. Similar to the “drift” that occurs in viral evolution, previous disease outbreaks of SARS (2002), H1N1/A (2009), MERS-CoV (2013), and the ever-looming threat of highly pathogenic influenza (e.g. H5N1), precipitated the current crisis in global health governance now occurring post-EVD [
5‐
8]. Criticism has been swift, including strong statements from several heads of state, key civil society actors, national governments, and academia, opining on the need to pursue more radical reform measures, primarily focused on the future of WHO [
9‐
13]. These developments could mark the beginnings of a “shift” in the evolution of global health governance.
Calls to reform WHO are not new, but have grown incessantly louder in the wake of EVD [
13,
14]. As the international public health agency charged with “the attainment by all people of the highest possible level of health”, WHO has faced many hurdles over the past two decades [
15,
16]. Many of WHO’s challenges can be attributed to persistent budget limitations that have led to cuts in funding/staff and reallocation of resources from normative functions to discretionary programs highly influenced by donors [
5,
6,
17]. Additional challenges arise from changing programmatic and Member State priorities, the formation of new global health initiatives (e.g. UNAIDS, GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, PEPFAR, Stop TB Partnerships, and The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) that often maintain parallel health systems and bypass traditional international governance structures, the rise of alternative channels/mechanisms of funding, and political inaction by Member States to pursue needed reforms identified as early as the 1990s [
5,
6,
14‐
16,
18].
Previous international public health emergencies have also foreshadowed governance challenges that WHO would be forced to confront during the EVD outbreak. Specifically, the 2002 SARS outbreak, a novel coronavirus that spread to more than two dozen countries, marked a paradigm shift ushering in a new era of the globalized pathogen and demanded a modernization of WHO governance instruments and outbreak response processes [
19,
20]. Though generally viewed as well managed due to an unprecedented international response coordinated by WHO and its Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), the SARS outbreak nevertheless exposed certain weaknesses [
21]. Challenges included countries failing to report the threat of a potential outbreak with international implications, lack of sufficient “global” surveillance capacity, conflict between economic and trade considerations in public health emergencies, and global politics hindering WHO assistance [
19,
21‐
24].
Most importantly, SARS also made it clear that the WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR) were in need of an urgent update, leading to its revision in 2005, which required Member States to commit to minimum core public health systems, including surveillance, laboratory capacity, and emergency response capabilities [
19,
25,
26]. The revision also granted WHO expanded authority by requiring Member States to proactively report potential international disease events and giving WHO the power to declare a “public health emergency of international concern” (PHEIC.) It also charged the agency with the difficult duty of balancing competing interests of trade, travel, human rights, and public health measures [
19]. Fast forward to August 2014, when WHO issued its third-ever PHEIC for the EVD outbreak, and many of these challenges would “re-emerge” despite efforts to address them in the 2005 IHR revision.
Though a revision to the IHR was an important step post-SARS, more fundamental reform measures to address limitations associated with WHO’s governance and organizational structure have not been carried out as successfully. Proposals on how to pursue WHO reform post-SARS and pre-EVD have differed widely in scope and strategy. This includes reform proposals that have been structural, such as forming a new “Committee C” to engage a broader set of stakeholders (including civil society organizations); creating a “World Health Forum” for non-state actor engagement (a proposal rejected by Member States and criticized by civil society actors); splitting WHO into two separate technical and political entities; revising WHO’s constitution; and reforming WHO’s decentralized regional structure [
6,
27‐
30]. Other reforms have focused on operational and financial aspects of WHO including: ensuring more sustainable operational financing by abolishing the zero-nominal growth requirement for member state contributions; allowing WHO to practice currency hedging, and establishing an ‘emergency fund’ [
10,
31‐
33]. Still others have argued for additional powers/authority for WHO including: empowering WHO with additional normative "soft" and "hard" law instruments (e.g. 'Framework Convention on Global Health';) and complete "reinvention" of WHO's mandate, powers, and structures (see summary in Table
1) [
10,
15,
34].
Table 1
Select WHO reform recommendations in the literature pre-EVD
Committee C | Establishment of a new “Committee C” of WHA to debate major health initiatives and engage and coordinate across a broader array of global health stakeholders (including non-state actors.) | Silberschmidt G, Matheson D, Kickbusch I. Creating a committee C of the World Health Assembly. Lancet. 2008 May 3; 371(9623):1483–6. [ 27] |
World Health Forum | Establishment of a new informal multistakeholder forum to engage non-state actors. This proposal was subsequently rejected by member states and also criticized by civil society actors | |
Splitting WHO | Dividing WHO secretariat functions into two different technical and political stewardship entities, with collaboration in areas that overlap. | Hoffman SJ, Rottingen J-A. Split WHO in two: strengthening political decision-making and securing independent scientific advice. Public Health 2014; 128(2):188–94. [ 6] |
Revising WHO’s Constitution | Revising WHO’s constitution to fill the gaps in global governance as part of WHO reform process and for broader democratization of the agency. | Hoffman SJ, Rottingen J-A. Dark Sides of the Proposed Framework Convention on Global Health’s Many Virtues: A Systematic Review and Critical Analysis”. Health & Human Rights Journal 15(1): 117–134. [ 29] |
Though the WHO reform process has been ongoing for decades crossing the tenure of several past WHO Director Generals, the formal reform process carried out by WHO immediately proceeding the EVD outbreak was limited in scope, primarily focused on incremental internal governance changes [
14]. These included: reassessing future financing of WHO, setting the organization’s priorities in health, cutting its budget, drafting a framework for engagement with non-state actors, and implementation of other internal governance, programmatic, evaluation, accountability, and managerial reform measures [
14,
35].
Post-Ebola reform
Post-EVD, WHO’s future is now at a critical juncture, as widespread criticism of WHO’s handling of the EVD outbreak has exposed fundamental weaknesses in the specialized agency’s ability to lead, coordinate, and mobilize an effective international response to the threat of a pandemic. With the stakes never higher, the urgency for WHO reform has been accelerated and is influenced by a collection of recommendations from four high-level panels/commissions that examined WHO’s performance during the EVD outbreak [
13,
36,
37]. These include recommendations from the Interim Panel, the Harvard-LSHTM panel, the CGHRF, and the Kikwete Panel, which were reviewed and compared for: (1) proposals specifically addressing internal governance reforms or new mechanisms within WHO’s structure (not including reform proposals specific to the functioning of IHR, which deserve separate in-depth discussion); and (2) proposals focused on involvement and/or coordination from the United Nations on global health and health emergency activities (see summary of characteristics of Panels in Table
2).
Table 2
Characteristics of EVD High-level panels and commissions
WHO Interim Assessment Panel | Established by WHO Executive Board comprised of mix of independent experts | -Date issued: May 2015 −5 members −21 recommendations |
Harvard-LSHTM Panel | Establishment by Harvard Global Health Institute and London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine primarily from academia, foundations, think tanks, and NGOs | -Date issued: November 2015 −22 members −10 recommendations |
CGHR | Established as an independent commission with National Academy of Medicine as secretariat funded by foundations and agencies. Commission comprised of members from different countries, foundations, and entities. | -Date issued: January 2016 −17 members −26 recommendations |
Kikwete Panel | Established by UN Secretary General comprised of political representatives of member states | -Date issued: January 2016 −6 members −27 recommendations |
WHO Advisory Group on Reform of WHO’s Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies | Established by the WHO Director General to offer guidance on the organization’s emergency reform process. Group chaired by UN SG Special Envoy on Ebola and various members from UN agencies, NGOs, representatives of government health agencies, and others. | -Date issued: January 2016 −19 members −9 core recommendations in its second report |
The first group to issue its recommendations was the WHO Interim panel comprised of independent experts appointed by WHO, who at the May 2015 68th World Health Assembly (WHA) delivered a report stating that the agency lacked the “capacity or organizational culture” to respond to emergency public health events [
38]. The Interim Panel also concluded that WHO managed the crisis by prioritizing “good diplomacy” over necessary action, but offered no alternative to WHO, arguing instead that the agency should continue in its central role as the world’s lead health emergency response agency [
38]. The panel recommended a set of reforms largely aimed at re-establishing WHO’s central role in health emergencies by advocating for: (a) strengthening of the IHR; (b) establishing a contingency fund for outbreak response; (c) formation of an independent Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response (housed within WHO but overseen independently); (d) support for a WHO plan to develop a global health emergency workforce; and (e) WHO playing a more central role in R&D efforts for future health emergencies [
38]. It also recommended the UN Secretary-General consider the appointment of a Special Representative or Special Envoy aimed at garnering greater political and financial support during a global health crisis, but did not recommend establishment of a permanent UN structure/mission. Importantly, many of these core proposals would set the framework for similar proposals expanded upon and carried forward by the other panels.
In November 2015, the Harvard-LSHTM panel published a set of 10 recommendations in the
Lancet, which included several governance reform measures far more expansive than the first set of recommendations made by the Interim Panel. Reforms cover broader areas of global health governance and also include specific reform measures for WHO, all of which are grouped into four thematic areas of preventing, responding, conducting research, and governing the broader global system for disease outbreaks [
39]. Reforms specific to WHO included: (a) creating a WHO dedicated independent centre for outbreak response; (b) formation of a politically insulated WHO Standing Emergency Committee for PHEIC declaration; (c) investing and strengthening global capacity to rapidly respond to outbreaks; (d) carrying out time-bound reforms to refocus and streamline WHO; (e) having WHO convene global stakeholders to develop a framework of norms and rules and a global financing facility for R&D relevant to disease outbreaks; and (f) instituting internal good governance reforms in exchange for more sustainable funding [
39]. Broadly speaking the Harvard-LSHTM panel calls for more active engagement by WHO with the greater global community in managing infectious disease outbreaks, while also recommending that the agency scale back operational activities and instead focus on certain core functions [
39]. Importantly, the panel also took the step of recommending the establishment of two structures by the UN Security Council: an Accountability Commission and a Global Health Committee that would independently assess outbreak response and elevate political attention to international health threats [
39].
A few months later in January 2016, the CGHRF issued its own comprehensive report with an even more expansive list of 26 recommendations aimed at serving as a broader framework to address the “neglected” threat of infectious-disease crises. Recommendations were categorized under four domains of investment, building public health capabilities, strengthening surveillance, and accelerating R&D for pandemics [
40]. Ten of these recommendations are specific to WHO, with some mirroring previous recommendations by the Interim and Harvard-LSHTM panels (e.g. formation of an independent Center funded by increased member state contributions, establishment of a contingency fund, and strengthening of the IHR.) [
41]. The CGHRF generally advocated for strengthening WHO’s capacity to lead in pandemic preparedness and response by further reinforcing previous recommendation to create a WHO Center for Health Emergency Preparedness and Response, though independently overseen by a Technical Governing Board [
41]. It also called for the involvement of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help finance and strengthen implementation of IHR core capacities. Additionally, the CGHRF called for WHO to actively engage in other proposed governance structures that would oversee acceleration of R&D for pandemic preparedness and response (including the establishment of an independent Pandemic Product Development Committee) [
41]. Finally, though the CGHRF report advocates for enhanced cooperation between WHO and regional, sub-regional, national governments, and non-state actors, it does not directly call for a UN leadership role, other than in the context of developing strategies for sustaining health systems capacity in fragile/failed states and during times of war.
Shortly thereafter, at the end of January 2016, the Kikwete Panel finalized its own report titled “Protecting Humanity from Future Health Crises”, recommending a final set of 27 measures to avert a future global pandemic, specifically noting that the risk of a highly pathogenic influenza virus was a chief concern [
42]. Recommendations from the panel carry on similar themes to prior panel recommendations and are grouped into national, regional/sub-regional, and international-level recommendations, as well as sub-themes of development and health, R&D, financing, and follow-up and implementation recommendations. Chief among them included forming a Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response within WHO, advancing full implementation of the IHR, securing appropriate financing for the WHO Centre and IHR compliance, and having WHO oversee the establishment of a fund and priority list to support R&D for neglected communicable diseases [
42]. In addition, the panel strongly emphasized the need for a clear line of command within the UN system to coordinate a global response to a health and humanitarian emergency and more bodly recommended the establishment of a High-level Council on Global Public Health Crises housed within the UN General Assembly [
42]. Similar to the Interim Panel and CGHRF, the Kikwete Panel offered its strong endorsement of WHO as the “single” global health leader, but also noted that should the WHO fail to successfully reform or be empowered by its member states, that an “alternate” UN institutional response mechanism(s) might be necessary [
42].
Collectively, these review panels, all governed by different stakeholders with varying operational mandates and perspectives, add increasing complexity to the urgent need for WHO reform post-EVD that the agency must now navigate (see Table
3 for a summary of reform recommendations summarized into themes of WHO reform and UN participation.) One proposal that had unanimous support was the formation of a WHO Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, which would be independently funded and governed but still housed within WHO [
36,
37]. Other reform measures that garnered cross-panel support included the urgent need to increase WHO’s assessed contributions, developing mechanisms to enhance cooperation with non-state actors, strengthening global disease surveillance and IHR core capacities (including creating incentives/disincentives for IHR compliance,) and establishing better operational and policy coordination between WHO, UN agencies, and other global health partners [
36,
37].
Table 3
Matrix of WHO governance reform recommendations post-EVD
In response, to the myriad of recommendations set forth, the WHO, its Executive Board and its decision-making body, the WHA, were tasked with how to prioritize reforms, assess the feasibility and resources necessary to carry them out, and determining what reforms would be agreeable to all of its member states. Complicating this calculus is the fact that WHO’s current governance structure only allows formal participation by state actors, though the influence of powerful non-state actors (including those who provide the majority of funding to WHO through voluntary contributions) is unlikely to be completely silenced. The emergence of the Zika virus, which was declared a PHEIC event (subsequently removed November 2016), also has the potential to delay and/or significantly alter the pathway of post-EVD WHO reform. The emergence of Zika once again demonstrates that changes needed to ensure WHO can lead in averting the next health crisis are not currently in place [
43]. Further, current WHO Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan’s tenure is coming to an end, meaning any long-term reforms will likely need to wait until her replacement is elected in 2017 [
33,
37,
44].