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Erschienen in: The European Journal of Health Economics 8/2018

21.02.2018 | Original Paper

Unobserved heterogeneity in work absence

verfasst von: María José Suárez, Cristina Muñiz

Erschienen in: The European Journal of Health Economics | Ausgabe 8/2018

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Abstract

Labour absenteeism may be detrimental to firms and society because of the economic costs, organizational problems and production cuts that it involves. Although involuntary absenteeism due to accident or illness that prevents workers from performing their work is unavoidable, avoidable voluntary absenteeism may also emerge due to asymmetric information given that neither employers nor doctors have perfect information about workers’ health status. Assuming that there is heterogeneity in individual’s behaviour and thus some workers are more likely to take sick leave than others due to differences in observable and unobservable characteristics, we specify a Finite Mixture Model to analyse sick leave days per year using a sample of employees from the 2014 European Health Survey in Spain. This specification accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in a discrete way assuming that there are two types of workers even though the data do not allow us to identify which group any individual belongs to. Our results reveal that, although health indicators have the greatest impact on the proportional change in days of absenteeism, there is heterogeneity in sick leave decisions and individual and job characteristics have different effect on the absenteeism of each group.
Fußnoten
1
Companies are in charge of the benefit between the Fourth and the Fifteenth days.
 
2
See Villaplana [5] for more details about the Spanish sickness benefit system.
 
3
Deb and Trivedi [7] also discuss these reasons to explain the distinction between groups with high average demand for medical care and low average demand.
 
4
Workers may be willing to accept a job, even if they will not work the number of desired hours, if it is the best option among the available alternatives.
 
5
See Brown and Sessions [1] and Allen [11].
 
6
Barmby et al. [18] develop a theoretical model assuming that preferences are a positive function of leisure, consumption and health, and leisure valuation of workers is higher when they are in bad health. They also model the firm’s decisions and obtain a positive relationship between wages and monitoring costs, supporting the efficiency wage hypothesis.
 
7
A different approach can be found in Kahana and Weiss [19], who apply game theory to the explanation of unjustified absenteeism in labour-managed firms and profit-maximizing firms.
 
8
See INE [42] for more details. The EESE has been carried out every 5 years since 2009.
 
9
White collar occupations include managerial, professional, technical, clerical, sales, service and military occupations.
 
10
In initial estimates, we also considered regional unemployment rates and activity sector but these variables were never significant, and the Bayesian Information Criteria took higher values when including them.
 
11
The zero inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) is a particular case of the negative binomial finite mixture model. ZINB just allows mixing with respect to zeros whereas the second model allows mixing in both zero and positive values of absenteeism [7].
 
12
The classification obtained by Johansson and Palme [8] distinguishes between a group primarily consisting of the long-term sick and the rest of the sample.
 
13
In the case of dummy covariates it would be more accurate to compute the difference in absenteeism when the variable takes the value 1 and 0, respectively. However, the coefficients give an approximation of their impact.
 
14
Young Spaniards tend to be overqualified for the jobs they perform and a third of Spanish university graduates are employed in jobs below their qualifications [44].
 
15
Although we cannot rule out presenteeism in our country, this problem is more serious when there are no sick leave benefits or they are very low. This is not the case of the Spanish system, which covers from 60 to 75% of the reference wage from the fourth day -and many collective agreements increase these percentages up to 100%. However, the high rate of temporary employment in Spain could justify presenteeism in this group for fear of losing the job. In fact, absenteeism is higher among workers with permanent contracts.
 
16
In the last two estimates mentioned in the text, we apply likelihood ratio tests because the models are nested.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Unobserved heterogeneity in work absence
verfasst von
María José Suárez
Cristina Muñiz
Publikationsdatum
21.02.2018
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
The European Journal of Health Economics / Ausgabe 8/2018
Print ISSN: 1618-7598
Elektronische ISSN: 1618-7601
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-018-0962-6

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