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Erschienen in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1/2022

17.11.2021 | Scientific Contribution

When the universal is particular: a re-examination of the common morality using the work of Charles Taylor

verfasst von: Michelle C. Bach

Erschienen in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy | Ausgabe 1/2022

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Abstract

Beauchamp and Childress’ biomedical principlism is nearly synonymous with medical ethics for most clinicians. Their four principles are theoretically derived from the “common morality”, a universal cache of moral beliefs and claims shared by all morally serious humans. Others have challenged the viability of the common morality, but none have attempted to explain why the common morality makes intuitive sense to Western ethicists. Here I use the work of Charles Taylor to trace how events in the Western history of ideas made the common morality seem plausible and yet, ironically, underscore the cultural particularity of the so-called common morality. I conclude that the supposedly universal common morality is actually quite culturally contained. Importantly, this should give us pause about the global authority of principlism and Beauchamp and Childress’ claim to a global bioethics project.
Fußnoten
1
As I describe below, the common morality is itself a pre-theoretical entity while metaethical accounts of the common morality can be referred to as theories.
 
2
Consider ancient groups like the Vikings. Or, for a modern example, consider that some evangelical Christians in the USA support war in the middle east as a necessary step to bringing about the end times and the return of Christ.
 
3
Or North Atlantic world (Taylor 2007, p. 1). Taylor, to his credit, seems aware that he likely overreaches in trying to generalize features of secularity or secularized religiosity in the modern West. Yet the hypotheses of his theory ring true for at least some subset of modern Western thinkers, particularly those of a certain brand of secular academia. Beauchamp and Childress’ theory lends itself to Taylor’s explanations of how certain philosophical assumptions became prevalent in some modern Western thought.
 
4
This is not an exhaustive list of the assumptions of the common morality but it is sufficient for the purpose of bringing into question whether Beauchamp and Childress’ second-order claims are representative of a universal moral entity.
 
5
Or a new group of closely related cultures.
 
6
On the surface, people who share background understandings often seem to come to radically dissimilar conclusions. Take for instance that Westerners with similar backgrounds can come to the seemingly polar perspectives on abortion as either a sin or as a human right. However, both of these perspectives are reliant on an understanding of the self as a discrete moral agent with the power and responsibility of choice or, even more fundamentally, that a fetus is present before birth. Imagine how different the conclusions about abortion could be if these assumptions weren’t made. How might abortion be understood by the Tiwi people of Australia who believe in parallel dream worlds where the unborn can move between states of unborn, living, and dead? See Goodale (2003).
 
7
It is important to note that Beauchamp and Childress’ common morality is not a strongly objective entity of the type Mackie is considering. Beauchamp and Childress see the common morality as neither a priori nor existing outside of human belief. Nonetheless, my weak reiteration of a portion of Mackie’s powerful argument would seem to apply to the weak objectivity of the common morality.
 
8
This happens to be the purpose of the common morality as described by Beauchamp and Childress.
 
9
I am referring not to just the Christian religious community, but also the societies often dominated culturally and politically by Christiandom.
 
10
For instance, see Gillon (2003)
 
11
Almost always taken to be individuals in modern Western society.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
When the universal is particular: a re-examination of the common morality using the work of Charles Taylor
verfasst von
Michelle C. Bach
Publikationsdatum
17.11.2021
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy / Ausgabe 1/2022
Print ISSN: 1386-7423
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-8633
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-021-10059-8

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