Abstract
In this chapter I will examine the relationship of fact and value. The value-dependent realism I am advocating holds that all facts in medicine, including facts about diagnosis, depend on values for their specification. However, I will argue that there are objective values. If this is so, we can maintain the possibility that medical facts, even though they are built upon values, reflect an objective reality. This will avoid the sort of relativism that results from the extreme social constructivist view that we simply invent our facts in order to produce a world that is socially useful.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Stempsey, W.E. (2000). Fact Vs. Value. In: Disease and Diagnosis. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 63. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4160-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4160-4_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-6322-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-4160-4
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