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Psychological Challenges for Normative Models

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Quantified Representation of Uncertainty and Imprecision

Part of the book series: Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems ((HAND,volume 1))

Abstract

Some years ago, at the Center for Advanced Study at Stanford, one of my economist colleagues concluded a discussion on cognitive illusions with the following dictum: ‘Look, either reasoning is rational or it’s psychological’. In this chapter, I argue against the widespread view that the rational and the psychological are opposed. According to this view, the rational is defined by the laws of probability and logic — that is, by content-free axioms or rules, such as consistency, transitivity, Bayes’s theorem, dominance, and invariance. The irrational is left to be explained by the laws of psychology. Here I present examples that are intended to illustrate that defining human rationality independent of psychology is myopic. The ‘challenges’ in the title of this chapter are not directed against probability theory and logic, or specific versions thereof, but against using these systems as psychologically uninformed, content-free norms. Before I turn to these challenges, I begin with a historical example that illustrates how norms have been revised and made more realistic by the introduction of psychological concepts.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin

    Gerd Gigerenzer

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  1. Gerd Gigerenzer
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. IRIDIA, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

    Philippe Smets

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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Psychological Challenges for Normative Models. In: Smets, P. (eds) Quantified Representation of Uncertainty and Imprecision. Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1735-9_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1735-9_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5038-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1735-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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