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Confirmation Theory

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Quantified Representation of Uncertainty and Imprecision

Part of the book series: Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems ((HAND,volume 1))

Abstract

In both science and everyday life, we use the notion of evidence (e) confirming a hypothesis (h) or a prediction (d). Confirmation theory is an attempt to analyse this crucial notion of confirmation. The degree of confirmation of h given e is written C(h,e). Strictly speaking, the evidence e will be in addition to some background knowledge b. Thus we should really write C(h, e&b). The background knowledge will, however, often be omitted for ease of writing, but it should not be forgotten.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. King’s College, London, UK

    Donald Gillies

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  1. Donald Gillies
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. IRIDIA, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

    Philippe Smets

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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Gillies, D. (1998). Confirmation Theory. In: Smets, P. (eds) Quantified Representation of Uncertainty and Imprecision. Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1735-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1735-9_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5038-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1735-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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