Abstract
Paternalism is an attempt to influence individuals’ decisions for their own benefit, even if there are no third parties involved. This seems to contradict normative individualism, which provides the general orientation to our modern democracies. Soft or libertarian paternalism accepts the necessity of paternalism due to the existence of behavioural anomalies, but intends to apply only such measures that do not restrict the decision leeway of individuals. Nevertheless, the same objections that can be raised against its strong version can also be raised against soft paternalism. On the other hand, as soon as we accept that human beings are able to reflect not only about their actions but also about the preferences guiding their actions, there is no longer a necessary contradiction between paternalism and normative individualism. As far as we know today, the possibilities to successfully apply soft paternalistic measures are rather limited. On the other hand, while some criticisms are justified, others largely overshoot the mark and seem to be at least partly ideologically motivated.
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Notes
In his 1957 paper he does not present a clear definition of merit goods (wants), but acknowledges that such “public policy aims at interference with individual preferences” (p. 341). In his 1987 paper he describes six different interpretations of this concept. His main preferred one is relying on “community preferences”: “consider a setting where individuals, as members of the community, accept certain community values or preferences, even though their personal preferences might differ.” (p. 452.) “… offering community values as a restraint on individual choice did, however, fit the pattern and, as I see it, goes to the heart of the merit concept. (p. 353.)—On early discussions of merit goods see also Head (1966), Andel (1984) as well as Schmidt (1988).
On this, see for example Bernheim et al. (2011). The labelling ‘401(k)’ stems from the corresponding definition of the US finance department. For income that is paid into these accounts, social security payments have to be made, but this income is not taxed. Contributions are voluntary. Taxes are only due when the insured receive payments later on. (This tax arrangement corresponds to the one of the Swiss pension system).
On anti-authoritarian pedagogics see, for example, Koch (2000, pp. 9ff.).
It is somewhat more problematic with respect to adolescents. See for this Manson (2015).
From a (traditional) economic perspective, this tends to be inefficient, because the poor man might reach a higher utility level if he is free to use this money. See, for example, Blomquist and Micheletto (2006). However, Pommerehne (1975) has shown that such a conditional transfer might be better for the recipient if this increases the donors’ willingness to make voluntary contributions.
Other countries, for example the US, do not impose such an obligation. There, mandatory schooling is still seen as an obligation to offer public education. On the history of mandatory education in Germany, see, for example, Mors (1986).
In many cases, definitions of paternalism do only implicitly but not explicitly imply that no interests of third parties are at stake. See, for example, Hausman and Welch (2010, p. 129) or Dworkin (2014): “Paternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm”.
On the introduction of soft paternalism, see for example Loewenstein and Haisley (2008), who consider this a new normative economics. The term libertarian paternalism was coined by Sunstein and Thaler (2003). On this, see also Thaler and Sunstein (2003). A different distinction between hard and soft paternalism with reference to Feinberg (1986) is, for example, provided by Pope (2004), who also defends this kind of hard paternalism. On the position of Feinberg, see also Arneson (2005).
Hausman and Welch (2010) deny that providing information by “rational persuasion” is paternalistic and they contrast it with “shaping a choice” (or “manipulation”) (p. 128). However, the former is also a kind of government intervention to benefit the individual involved without effects on third parties. Thus, given the definition presented above, it is paternalistic. Correspondingly, Beck (2010, pp. 50f.) is wrong when he denies that the elimination of informational asymmetries is also an element of soft paternalism. It is, however, only paternalistic as long as no third parties are involved. As soon as informational asymmetries lead to effects on third parties, their elimination can be justified by the existence of external effects.
More recently, Sunstein (2014) extended the term ‘nudge’ to any kind of trigger that provides some information or reminds us of something. He states, for example, that a GPS “should be seen as a form of means paternalism” (p. 61). Moreover, as for example in Sunstein and Reisch (2014) discussed below, nudges are proposed that are not soft and/or are not intended to promote the well-being of the individuals directly involved but have other objectives. Here, we restrict our discussion to the traditional meaning of ‘paternalism’ which implies that there is some (human) authority who tries to influence the behaviour of others. Thus, we stick to the definition of Thaler and Sunstein (2008) given above and assume that libertarian paternalism has to be soft, i.e. there is no difference between soft and libertarian paternalism.
To presence the freedom of choice is necessary but not sufficient to qualify a paternalistic measure as being libertarian: A cigarette tax, for example, does not forbid smoking, but makes it more costly. Thus, there is still freedom of choice.
There is also a fluid transition between medium and hard paternalism: High taxes can be interpreted as fines for deviation behaviour, while fines for not obeying a permit or prescription might be interpreted as a high tax.
Hausman and Welch (2010) correctly note that not all nudges have to be paternalistic. They are not always intended to improve the decision of individuals to their own benefit. See, for example, the default rule of two-sided printing described in Sunstein and Reisch (2014, pp. XXff.). There, the objective is to reduce the amount of paper used, i.e.an environmental objective.
On this in particular, see Jolls and Sunstein (2006). Though behavioural anomalies are often employed as a justification for the application of nudges, they can also justify harder paternalistic measures as, for example, the permit of trading ‘illegal’ drugs. Thus, the existence of such anomalies might be a necessary condition for using paternalistic measures, but they do not have to be libertarian ones. This depends, beside other, on the effectiveness of the measures proposed.
On this, see Camerer et al. (2003). They speak of “asymmetric paternalism”.
In social insurance, the existence of moral hazard or adverse selection is often used as justification of government intervention. However, behind these there are in most cases distributional considerations and/or problems of external effects and/or undersupply of public goods.
Consistent with this argument, the first column of the Swiss old age pension system, the Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung (AHV), covers only the subsistence level. (This, of course, holds only for the maximum pension. Whenever somebody receives less than this maximum and does not have additional income and/or wealth, (s)he is entitled to receive additional payments in order to guarantee the subsistence level.).
On this, see for example de Pury et al. (1995, pp. 62ff.).
On estimations of the external effects of road traffic, see for example, Quinet (2004).
The revenue that the 144 German theatre and opera houses took in through ticket sales covered only about 17 per cent of total expenditure in the season 2008/2009. On average, each ticket was subsidised by € 99.31. Source of the data: Statistical Yearbook 2011 for Germany, Table 7.6, p. 180.
Those members of the lower classes who, due to their low income, do not have to pay direct taxes might not be directly affected. They might, however, be affected indirectly whenever, in order to finance these subsidies, indirect taxes are increased and/or the government cuts services and/or payments that would have benefitted these people.
On such an argument, see for example Withers (1979).
As mentioned above, relying on “community values” is his most preferred interpretation of merit goods. As another alternative, he at least mentions the possibility of “multiple preferences or ‘higher values’” and also refers to Brennan and Lomasky (1983), but without discussing their approach. On the problem of group preferences independent of those of the individuals involved see also Kirchgässner (2008, pp. 205ff.).
See, for example, Dworkin (2005), who speaks of “moral paternalism”, but also Pope (Pope 2004, 2005a, b), Shafer-Landau (2005), Marneffe (2006), Sacha (2007), or Glod (2008). But see also Rebonato (2012, 2013) who defends some kinds of medium paternalism but nevertheless criticizes libertarian paternalism because it “does not live up with its claim of being a benign, ‘safe’ and unobtrusive ‘real-Third-Way’ alternative to both paternalism and liberalism” (2013, p. 56).
On this see Kultgen (2014).
That people dislike the behaviour of others and are insofar (mentally) negatively affected by their behaviour is no valid argument for government intervention given the principles of normative individualism. See, for example, the definition of individual rights in Sen (1970). For “A Liberal Argument for Slavery” see, for example, Philmore (1982) or Kershnar (2003).
On a short history of the philosophical tradition, see also Brennan and Lomasky (1983, pp. 195f.).
An alternative is presented by Grüne-Yanoff (2009) who, in his integrity approach, distinguishes for the case of inconsistent preferences more from less central ones proposes a reordering “which respects people’s core preferences and reconstructs a consistent preference ordering around them” (p. 19).
Even Wicksell (1896), who—in principle—demanded unanimity for such decisions, accepted that “absolute unanimity may have to be ruled out for practical reasons” (p. 92).
On this, see for example van Aaken (2006).
On this “distinction in our thinking between the constitutional level of the discourse, evaluation, or choice and the post-constitutional level”, see also Buchanan (1986, p. 86).
On optimal sin taxes that relate, however, to the consumption of potato chips, see O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006).
On the possibilities of soft paternalism to reduce smoking, see also Lucas (2012).
Investigating supermarkets in Melbourne, Dixon et al. (2006) show that high-energy food is often placed close to cash points; this is to induce children to ask their parents to buy these for them. On the other hand, Just and Payne (2009) believe that there are possibilities to have such an impact on consumers without reducing the profits.
“We therefore urge ministers to ensure that policy makers are made aware of the evidence that non-regulatory measures are often not likely to be effective if used in isolation and that evidence regarding the whole range of policy interventions should be considered before they commit to using non-regulatory measures alone.” House of Lords (2011), 5.15, p. 36.
See: Bundestag beschliesst Organspendereform, ZEIT-ONLINE of 25 May 2012. http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2012-05/organspende-bundestag. June 27, 2012.
On this, see Eurotransplant (2011, p. 36). However, this is true only of those transplantations that are operated via Eurotransplant. Those transplantations that are carried out in the same hospital as where the removal took place are not covered by this statistic. There is, however, no obvious reason that this should largely bias the results.
Due to a big scandal in 2012, the number of transplantations drastically decreased in 2013. Thus, at the moment it is impossible to say whether the new rule will finally increase the number of donations. See: Zahl der Organspender sinkt auf neuen Tiefpunkt, Zeit-Online of January 15, 2014. http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2014-01/organspende-dso-transplantation-zahlen. February 5, 2014.
Though this is hardly a problem of paternalism, because environmental problems, usually caused by external effects, involve third parties. Nevertheless, nudges might be helpful in some cases.
See for this Allcott and Greenstone (2012).
Compared to the traditional bulb, the energy saving bulb had some disadvantages. Thus, in the decision was a trade-off involved.
See Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008, p. 66).
Sunstein and Reisch (2014, p. 144) admit that nudges do not “stick” when “people have clear preferences that run counter to them.” High costs will usually indorse such “clear preferences”.
Given these costs and taking into account the definition above, this can hardly be qualified as being ‘libertarian’.
This argument goes back to Buchanan (1954).
See also Rebonato (2012, p. 11; pp. 221ff.).
See for example the critique of model Platonism by Albert (1963).
On this, see Kirchgässner (2010) as well as Pommerehne and Schneider (1985), who showed for the canton Basel-County that, in referenda about the first column of the Swiss old age pension system (AHV), a majority of voters voted in favour of those with low income and against their own material interests.
On this, see Kirchgässner (2008, pp. 154ff.).
It is not the trivial regret at not having been lucky when making a risky decision (investment), that is relevant in this respect, but the consciousness that I should have behaved differently even if I have been lucky and my behaviour did not have negative consequences for me.
If one accepts that the government should take on measures only that lead to a Pareto improvement, then it would also be illegitimate to provide information in order to overcome informational asymmetries or to financially support institutions that provide such information, for example, such as the Stiftung Warentest in Germany. The costs for such activities have to be borne by the taxpayers. Thus, there are citizen who have to pay for these activities but do not benefit. They come into a worse position, which violates the Pareto criterion. On this, see also Marneffe (2006) who believes that it does not make sense with respect to governmental actions always to look for justifications with non-paternalistic arguments, because this sometimes excludes the best arguments for such measures.
On this, see Kirchgässner (1994).
See, for example, Schnellenbach (2011, p. 452).
On this, see the contributions in Constitutional Political Economy 15 (2004), issue 2, in particular the introduction by Brennan (2004).
See also Hausman and Welch (2010, p. 132) who despite being rather reluctant to the use of nudges state: “When choice shaping is not avoidable, then it must be permissible”.
On this, see also Schmidt (1988).
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Kirchgässner, G. Soft paternalism, merit goods, and normative individualism. Eur J Law Econ 43, 125–152 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9500-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9500-5
Keywords
- Libertarian paternalism
- Soft paternalism
- Merit goods
- Normative individualism
- Constitutional economics
- Democracy