Abstract
The Perceptions of Children’s Theory of Mind Measure (Experimental version; PCToMM-E) is an informant measure designed to tap children’s theory of mind competence. Study one evaluated the measure when completed by primary caregivers of children with autism spectrum disorder. Scores demonstrated high test–retest reliability and correlated with verbal mental age and ToM task battery performance. No ceiling effects were observed. In addition, caregivers accurately predicted their children’s ToM task battery performance. In study two the scores of primary caregivers of typically developing children demonstrated high test–retest reliability and distinguished children on the basis of age and developmental status. Ceiling effects were not evident until late childhood. The utility of the PCToMM-E and directions for future research are discussed.
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Acknowledgments
Portions of this paper were presented at the annual conference of the American Speech, Language, and Hearing Association (November, 2006, Miami, FL). Data from study 2 were originally collected and analyzed by the second author as part of an undergraduate honor’s thesis.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Instructions.
The Perception of Children’s Theory of Mind Measure (PCToMM-E)
The purpose of this measure is to learn about caregivers’ ideas regarding children’s thoughts and feelings. Please read each statement carefully and indicate the degree to which you believe each statement is true for your child. Indicate your response by making a vertical hash mark at the appropriate point along the continuum. You may feel that you don’t know for sure whether a statement is true or not. When you feel this way, reflect upon your experiences with your child and try to decide, given everything you know about this child, how certain you are that the statement is true or not true. There are no right or wrong answers and no answers are valued over any other answers. Please remember to respond as honestly and thoughtfully as possible. Your answers are completely confidential.
EXAMPLE: Read the following statement and indicate your response by making a vertical hash mark along the appropriate point on the continuum. If you don’t know the answer to the question, make a slash mark somewhere underneath “Don’t Know.” If you have more definite feelings that the statement is true or not true, make a hash mark along the point in the continuum that reflects those feelings.
Example: My child can communicate to me that s/he wants something.
Appendix B: Sample items from the PCToMM-E
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1.
My child understands that when someone says they are afraid of the dark, they will not go into a dark room.
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2.
My child understands that to know what is in an unmarked box, you have to see or hear about what is in that box.
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3.
My child understands that when people get what they want, they will be happy.
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My child can pretend that one object is a different object (for example, pretending a banana is a telephone).
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5.
My child empathizes with others.
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6.
My child understands whether someone hurts someone else on purpose or by accident.
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7.
My child understands that when people frown, they feel differently then when they smile.
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8.
My child understands that, when I show fear, the situation is unsafe or dangerous.
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9.
My child uses the word ‘know’ as in “I know it.”
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10.
My child understands that if two people look at the same object from a different standing point, they will see the object in different ways.
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11.
My child understands that when a person promises something, it means the person will do it.
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12.
My child understands that people often have thoughts about other peoples’ thoughts.
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13.
If I put my keys on the table, left the room, and my child moved the keys from the table to a drawer, my child would understand that when I returned, I would first look for my keys where I left them.
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14.
My child understands that peoples’ personalities basically don’t change from day to day.
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15.
My child understands that people can be wrong in what they think other people want.
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16.
My child understands that people might not always say what they are thinking because they don’t want to hurt others’ feelings.
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Hutchins, T.L., Bonazinga, L.A., Prelock, P.A. et al. Beyond False Beliefs: The Development and Psychometric Evaluation of the Perceptions of Children’s Theory of Mind Measure—Experimental Version (PCToMM-E). J Autism Dev Disord 38, 143–155 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-007-0377-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-007-0377-1