Abstract
Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction—traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism—can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.
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Notes
Or, alternatively, the entities of the lower level explanations are true, while the ones of the higher level explanations are fictions, because, as Hacking (1983) has defended, one may be a realist about entities without being a realist about theories. We will not develop the “realist about entities”—option here as the conclusions in relation to explanations will be similar to the ones of the “realist about theories”—option. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this distinction.).
The adequacy, efficiency and accuracy of explanations are elaborated in Van Bouwel and Weber (2008).
Note that, in our terminology, all reductive explanations are individualist explanations, but not vice versa. Decomposition is situated within the individual here.
Presuming that genetic differences cannot be removed (for now).
Decomposition (and explanatory reduction) can also be linked to other (more theoretical) epistemic interests like understanding. This has been done, for instance, by Mayr (1982, 60). He considers explanatory reduction as sometimes being yielding understanding, e.g. “(…) the functioning of an organ is usually not fully understood until the molecular processes at the cellular level are clarified.”
The fundamental theory should be distinguished from the basic theory. Where the basic theory is more modest in answering to the question ‘What do genes do?’, i.e., they “code for” or “determine” the linear sequences in RNA molecules and polypeptides synthesized in the cell, the fundamental theory is bolder, claiming that genes are “fundamental” entities that “direct” the development and functioning of organisms by “producing” proteins that in turn regulate all the important cellular processes (Waters 2007).
Famous examples of biologisation in social science are E. O. Wilson’s (1975) Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, and sociobiology’s heir, evolutionary psychology.
Worries of relativism might arise here. We refer the reader to Van Bouwel and Weber (2008), which explicitly discusses the question of how to avoid relativism in a pluralistic framework.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Jan De Winter, Merel Lefevere and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. The research for this paper was supported by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) through research projects G.0651.07 and G.0031.09.
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Van Bouwel, J., Weber, E. & De Vreese, L. Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations. J Gen Philos Sci 42, 33–46 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9141-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9141-5