Abstract
This article distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus.
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Notes
Determinism is “The thesis that there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future” (van Inwagen 1983, p. 3). There are more detailed definitions of determinism in the literature, but this one will do for my purposes. As I use “morally responsible” in this article, any agent’s being morally responsible for performing a good intentional action entails that he deserves some moral credit for it, and any agent’s being morally responsible for performing a bad intentional action entails that he deserves some moral blame for it. [For a critique of a more inclusive use of “morally responsible,” see Mele (2006, pp. 150–153).]
What agents can and cannot do in deterministic worlds is a topic of considerable debate (see Mele (2003a), for discussion and references). Here, I assume that there is a respectable, interesting sense of “can” in which some agents in some deterministic worlds can resist desires that they do not, in fact, resist—and, more generally, can do things that they do not, in fact, do. This traditional compatibilist position about “can” (and “able”) is not under attack by any of the three styles of argument for incompatibilism examined in this article. However, I certainly am open to a plausible semicompatibilist analogue of the assumption (see Mele 2006, pp. 157–159, 195). [Because some philosophers misunderstand semicompatibilism as the view that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility but not with free action, they are likely to misunderstand the preceding sentence. Such philosophers should read Mele (2006, p. 28).] Readers who know that I have developed Frankfurt-style cases that I claim falsify the so-called “principle of alternate possibilities” (PAP) on various natural readings of it may be puzzled by my openness to compatibilism about “could have done otherwise.” After all, Frankfurt-style cases are a driving force behind semicompatibilism. [For PAP, see Frankfurt (1969); see also Mele and Robb (1998); Mele and Robb (2003); and Mele (2006, Chapter 4).] To such readers, I point out that I nowhere claim that an agent’s being able to do otherwise than A is a necessary condition for his being morally responsible for A. Rejecting the principle of alternate possibilities is consistent with believing that there is an interesting sense of “could have done otherwise” in which agents in deterministic worlds sometimes could have done otherwise than they did. [For an interesting traditional compatibilist reaction to Frankfurt-style cases, see Smith (2003).]
Readers should not confuse the theoretical boldness of a task with how time-consuming it would be. Obviously, tracking down all the sets of jointly sufficient conditions for free and morally responsible action ever proposed by compatibilists would be very time-consuming.
Kane (1985).
Mele (1995, p. 116).
In Mele (1995) I develop both a compatibilist position and a libertarian position. (Libertarianism is the conjunction of incompatibilism and the thesis that some human beings sometimes act freely and are morally responsible for some of what they do.) When I am in the business of developing the former, I temporarily assume that compatibilism is true (see, e.g., p. 177) and work my way up to proposed sets of sufficient conditions for “psychological autonomy” (p. 187) and “autonomous overt action” (p. 193) that do not require the falsity of determinism. Later in the book (Chapter 13), after I develop an overlapping set of libertarian conditions for these things, I argue that the disjunction of a compatibilist and an incompatibilist claim that there are human agents who sometimes act autonomously (and freely and are morally responsible for some of what they do) is more credible than the denial of this disjunctive claim.
Mele (1995, Chapter 9).
Some readers may worry that Paul has been replaced by “another person.” I lack the space to discuss worries about personal identity here, but see Mele (1995, p. 175, n. 22).
See Mele (1995, pp. 152–173 together with p. 191). Daniel Dennett contends that Martin Luther was morally responsible for refraining from recanting even if, as Luther claimed, he could not do otherwise because “his conscience made it impossible for him to recant” (Dennett 1984, p. 133). My contention about Pat is similar. Incidentally, I believe that the claim that Pat deserves moral credit for taking out the loan has more intuitive plausibility than the claim that he freely takes out the loan. I also believe that if compatibilism is true, then both of these claims are true.
Mele (1995, p. 193).
Michael McKenna writes: “Mele argues that if unsheddable values or principles were installed in a person by means of a process that bypassed her ability to critically assess them, and if she did not participate in the sustaining or preserving them, then when she acts upon them, she does not act of her own free will and is not morally responsible for what she does” (McKenna 2004, p. 173). This ignores (among other things) condition 2 of NFM. The reference McKenna provides here is to a forty-three page span of text, which makes it difficult for me to learn where I am supposed to have made the claim at issue; but, if memory serves, I have never endorsed the thesis that no manipulated agent of the kind in question who “acts upon” unsheddable values but could have done otherwise at the time (on a respectable compatibilist reading of “could have done otherwise”) acts freely and morally responsibly. Both Mele (1995) and Mele (2006), are discussed in McKenna (2004) and NFM is identical with a statement (NF) in Mele (2006, p. 170), with one exception: NFM includes the words “and is not morally responsible for A-ing” (between “does not freely A” and condition 1).
For a defense of a version of NFM, see Mele (2006, Chapter 7).
See Frankfurt (2002, p. 27).
Any interpretation of “could not have done otherwise” that makes it true, given the details of the case, that Beth could not have done otherwise in the circumstances than kill George will be too inclusive for some compatibilists. In a variant of this case, even if Beth can do otherwise than attempt to kill George, this ability is not rooted in any of her former values and is instead rooted in a collection of values produced by brainwashing that matches the values in which Chuck’s parallel ability is rooted. In Mele (forthcoming), I argue that Beth is not morally responsible for killing George in a case of this kind.
Frankfurt (2002, p. 27).
Frankfurt (2002, p. 28).
Frankfurt (1988, p. 54).
Mele (1995, p. 187). I simplify a bit when I write “no compelled ... attitudes.” What I actually said was “no compelled* ... attitudes.” One feature of compulsion* is that the compulsion is not arranged by the compelled agent (1995, p. 166). For another, see 2* below (from Mele (1995, p. 172). By a “reliable deliberator,” I mean, roughly, a person who consistently deliberates in ways that “reliably maximize his chances of locating efficient, effective means to his ends, whatever those ends might be” (p. 183).
Mele (1995, p. 193).
Mele (1995, pp. 166–172, 183–184).
McKenna (forthcoming).
McKenna (forthcoming).
McKenna (forthcoming).
The claim in (1) is not that there is some activity of compelling that occurs over the stretch of time at issue. It is that Paul’s and Beth’s possessing the relevant unsheddable values over that interval is something that is compelled.
Mele (1995, p. 172).
McKenna (forthcoming).
McKenna (forthcoming).
McKenna (forthcoming).
Cuypers (2006).
Cuypers (2006, p. 181).
Cuypers (2006, p. 181).
Cuypers (2006, p. 175).
Cuypers (2006, p. 175).
Mele (1995, pp. 158–159).
Mele (1995, p. 166).
Interested readers should consult Mele (1995, p. 171).
Cuypers (2006, p. 181).
Cuypers (2006, p. 181).
Pereboom (2001, p. 116); emphasis added.
Pereboom also asserts that “Causal determination by factors beyond Plum’s control most plausibly explains his lack of moral responsibility in the first case, and I think we are forced to say that he is not morally responsible in the second case for the same reason” (Pereboom 2001, p. 114), and he makes a parallel claim about case 3 (p. 115). Notice that here the explanandum is the (alleged) fact that Plum lacks moral responsibility rather than the intuition that he lacks it. The test to be sketched of Pereboom’s best-explanation premise about an intuition can be modified to apply to a parallel best-explanation premise about Plum’s alleged lack of moral responsibility.
Obviously, additional evidence may support a different conclusion—for example, that something (other than the Ys) that accompanies the Xs broke the original dam.
Mele (2006, pp. 139–140).
If we were to run further tests on incompatibilists, we might check to see whether the strength of their intuitions that the agent in not responsible for the featured action varies across the three kinds of case at issue: determinism plus manipulation, very similar manipulation without determinism, and determinism without manipulation. We might also check to see whether the strength of the same intuition in compatibilists differs in cases of the first two kinds.
Pereboom (2001, p. 116).
Mele (1995, p. 193).
Mele (1995, pp. 168–169).
I make no judgment about whether it is reasonable or rational to allow oneself be influenced in the way described here.
Some of my students suggested rejecting premise (2) on the grounds that Diana is morally responsible for Ernie’s A-ing, Ernie is not also morally responsible for it, and Bernie is morally responsible for his A-ing (partly because no one else is). A significant relevant difference between the ways in which the two zygotes come into existence, they say, is that Ernie’s comes to be in a way that makes Diana morally responsible for what he does and Bernie’s does not come to be in a way that makes anyone other than himself morally responsible for what he does. The suggestion is easy to block. Just suppose that Diana is not morally responsible for anything because she has always been stark raving mad and has never had a grip on the difference between right and wrong. (Eddy Nahmias suggested a worry about the zygote argument based on counterfactual thoughts about potential subsequent intervention by Diana. Any such worry can be blocked by supposing that Diana dies immediately after she implants the zygote and no other potential interveners exist.)
See Mele (2006, pp. 174–178), for discussion of a related claim by Daniel Dennett.
Such cases are relevant if the rejection of (2) is based on the idea that what matters is the difference between having and lacking radically false beliefs of a certain kind about one’s origins. On this, see Mele (2006, pp. 174–178).
Gideon A. Rosen constructs a collection of stories that in some ways resemble a collection I discussed in Mele (1995, pp. 189–191), and in other ways resemble Ernie’s story (Rosen 2002). R. Jay Wallace presents a thoughtful compatibilist reply in Wallace (2002, pp. 721–725). Wallace makes it clear that he does not share Rosen’s intuitions about his cases, and he concludes his reply as follows: “I can only invite readers to reflect for themselves on whether they share Rosen’s intuition, and whether it seems to them a sufficient basis for his incompatibilist position, even while they bear firmly in mind the distinctions and interpretative complexities to which I have called attention” (p. 725). For a similar, informal exchange of ideas between Carl Ginet and John Fischer, see McKenna (2000), pp. 414–415 (I am grateful to Michael McKenna for calling my attention to the latter exchange).
In Mele (1995) and Mele (2006), I take a reflective agnostic position on compatibilism, and I maintain that the disjunctive proposition identified in note 9 is more credible than its negation. To the extent to which going disjunctive in this way is reasonable, it is reasonable for me to undertake the project of developing both a compatibilist view and a libertarian view—the project I most wanted to undertake.
The strength of intuitions may also be affected by whether or not E benefits Diana, as Neil Levy suggested in conversation.
Are these attitudes inconsistent? That depends on whether correct standards for attribution of free and morally responsible action vary depending on the badness or goodness of the action.
Lewis (1973, p. 73).
Rosen (2002, p. 705).
Beebee and I explained that Humean compatibilists face a problem about luck that is very similar to a problem that luck poses for typical libertarians (Beebee and Mele 2002, pp. 218–221). My response to the latter problem in Mele (2006, Chapter 5), is easily adjusted for use by Humean compatibilists.
A draft of this article was a topic of discussion on the “Garden of Forking Paths” blog, the URL for which is: http://gfp.typepad.com/the_garden_of_forking_pat/2006/09/al_meles_paper_.html#comments. I am grateful to the discussants—especially, Neil Levy, Eddy Nahmias, Tim O’Connor, Derk Pereboom, and Paul Torek—for their comments.
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Mele, A.R. Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility. J Ethics 12, 263–286 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-008-9035-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-008-9035-x