Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The phenomenology of chronic pain: embodiment and alienation

  • Published:
Continental Philosophy Review Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This article develops a phenomenological exploration of chronic pain from a first-person perspective that can serve to enrich the medical third-person perspective. The experience of chronic pain is found to be a feeling in which we become alienated from the workings of our own bodies. The bodily-based mood of alienation is extended, however, in penetrating the whole world of the chronic pain sufferer, making her entire life unhomelike. Furthermore, the pain mood not only opens up the world as having an alien quality, it also makes the world more lonesome and poor by forcing the sufferer to attend to the workings of her own body. To suffer pain is to find oneself in a situation of passivity in relation to the hurtful experiences one is undergoing. In making the body and the world more unhomelike places to be in, pain also tends to rob a person of her language. Severe pain is hard to describe because it pushes the person towards the borderlines of imaginable experience and because it makes it hard to see any meaning and purpose in the situation one has been forced into. The analysis of chronic pain in the article is guided by the attempts made by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Martin Heidegger to understand the nature of human embodiment and existence, and also by descriptions of chronic pain found in the Swedish author Lars Gustafsson’s novel The Death of a Beekeeper.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Gustafsson (1990: 22).

  2. See Melzack and Wall (1996) and Thernstrom (2010).

  3. The most well-known protagonist of such a view on suffering is Eric Cassell (2004).

  4. See Thernstrom (2010).

  5. See Moseley (2003).

  6. See Melzack (1993).

  7. Cassell (2004: 32).

  8. See http://www.iasp-pain.org.

  9. See, for instance, the splendid work by Peter Goldie (2000).

  10. For phenomenological analyses of the phenomenon of suffering itself, see Madison (2013) and Malpas and Lickiss (2012).

  11. For a good introduction to phenomenology in the Husserlian tradition, see Zahavi (2003).

  12. Regarding the phenomenology of pain in Husserl, see Geniusas (2014).

  13. For some historical and more recent exceptions to this negligence, see Bullington (2009), Buytendijk (1948), Carel (2008), Grüni (2004), Leder (1984-1985, 1990), Sartre (1956), Serrano de Haro (2012), and Svenaeus (2011, 2014).

  14. See Gallagher (2005).

  15. Merleau-Ponty (1962) is the obvious reference here, but regarding the visceral, lived body, see also Leder (1990).

  16. An example often referred to is Tolstoy (2013).

  17. Gustafsson (1990: 22–23).

  18. Gustafsson (1990: 151).

  19. Sartre (1956: 466).

  20. Sartre (1956: 440).

  21. Sartre (1956: 441).

  22. Gustafsson (1990: 23).

  23. Gustafsson (1990: 23).

  24. In Carel (2008) and Slatman (2014) we find good examples of attempts to spell out a phenomenology of illness from a Merleau-Pontyian perspective.

  25. Grüni (2004), regarding Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and chronic pain, see also Bullington (2009).

  26. Serrano de Haro (2012: 232).

  27. See Goldie (1990) and Svenaeus (2014).

  28. See Ratcliffe (2008: 105 ff.) and, also, Schmitz (1989).

  29. See Heidegger (1986: 134 ff.).

  30. See the works by Antonio Damasio, notably (1999).

  31. As developed by Grüni (2004) and Leder (1990).

  32. The expression of a “centripetal force” is used by Drew Leder in (1984–1985).

  33. Gustafsson (1990: 149).

  34. Gustafsson (1990: 24–25).

  35. Regarding the conceptualization and models of suffering in health care, see Anderson (2014).

  36. Gustafsson (1990: 155).

  37. See Scarry (1985: 38 ff.).

  38. The books by the sociologist Arthur Frank have been very influential in understanding and studying narrative aspects of pain and chronic illness, see Frank (1995).

  39. Scarry (1985), see also Gotlieb (2013).

  40. Gustafsson (1990: 71).

  41. See Scarry (1985: 169 ff.).

  42. On methods for treating chronic pain, see Melzack and Wall (1996) and Thernstrom (2010).

  43. A prototypical example would be Søren Kierkegaard (1997).

  44. See Chiurazzi (2012).

  45. A phenomenological version of this argument is found in Madison (2013).

  46. For instance: Jeremy Bentham (1996), Albert Camus (1960) and Emmanuel Levinas (1998).

  47. Gustafsson (1990: 156).

  48. Gustafsson (1990: 154).

References:

  • Anderson, R.E. 2014. Human suffering and quality of life: Conceptualizing stories and statistics. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bentham, J. 1996. An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bullington, J. 2009. Embodiment and chronic pain: Implications for rehabilitation practice. Health Care Analysis 17: 100–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buytendijk, F. 1948. Über den Schmerz. Mannheim: Huber Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Camus, A. 1960. The plague. London: Penguin Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carel, H. 2008. Illness: The cry of the flesh. London: Acumen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cassell, E.J. 2004. The nature of suffering and the goals of medicine, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Chiurazzi, G. 2012. Pathei mathos: The political-cognitive value of suffering. In Perspectives on human suffering, ed. J. Malpas, and N. Lickiss, 23–32. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Damasio, A.R. 1999. The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank, A.W. 1995. The wounded story teller: Body, illness, and ethics. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. 2005. How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Geniusas, S. 2014. The origins of the phenomenology of pain: Brentano, Stumpf and Husserl. Continental Philosophy Review 47: 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldie, P. 2000. The emotions: A philosophical exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gotlieb, A. 2013. On the borderlands: Chronic pain as crisis of identity. In Dimensions of pain: Humanities and social science perspectives, ed. L.Folkmarson Käll, 41–59. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grüni, C. 2004. Zerstörte Erfahrung: Eine Phämnomenologie des Schmerzes. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gustafsson, L. 1990. The death of a beekeeper. Translated by Janet K. Swaffar and Guntram H. Weber. London: Collins Harvill.

  • Heidegger, M. 1986. Sein und Zeit, 6th ed. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kierkegaard, S. 1997. The joy of it: That one suffers only once but is victorious eternally. In Christian discourses: The crisis and a crisis in the life of an actress, ed. & trans. H. V. Hong, and E. H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

  • Leder, D. 1984–1985. Toward a phenomenology of pain. Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 19: 255–266.

  • Leder, D. 1990. The absent body. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levinas, E. 1998. Useless suffering. In Entrenous: On thinking-of-the-other, ed. & trans. M. B. Smith, and B. Harshav. New York: Columbia University Press.

  • Madison, G.B. 2013. On suffering: Philosophical reflections on what it means to be human. Hamilton, Ontario: McMaster Innovation Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malpas, J., and N. Lickiss (eds.). 2012. Perspectives on human suffering. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Melzack, R. 1993. Pain: Past, present and future. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 47: 615–629.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Melzack, R., and P.D. Wall. 1996. The challenge of pain. London: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. Phenomenology of perception. Translated by C. Smith. London: Routledge.

  • Moseley, G.L. 2003. A pain neuromatrix approach to patients with chronic pain. Manual Therapy 8: 130–140.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ratcliffe, M. 2008. Feelings of being: Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sartre, J.-P. 1956. Being and nothingness. Translated by H. E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scarry, E. 1985. The body in pain: The making and unmaking of the world. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitz, H. 1989. Leib und Gefühl. Materialien zu einer philosophischen Therapeutik. Paderborn: Junfermann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Serrano de Haro, A. 2012. New and old approaches to the phenomenology of pain. Studia Phaenomenologica XII: 227–237.

  • Slatman, J. 2014. Our strange body: Philosophical reflections on identity and medical interventions. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Svenaeus, F. 2011. Illness as unhomelike being-in-the-world: Heidegger and the phenomenology of medicine. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 14: 333–343.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Svenaeus, F. 2014. The phenomenology of suffering in medicine and bioethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35: 407–420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thernstrom, M. 2010. The pain chronicles: Cures, myths, mysteries, prayers, diaries, brain scans, healing, and the science of suffering. New York: Picador.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tolstoy, L. 2013. The death of Ivan Ilyich. London: SoHo Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 2003. Husserl’s phenomenology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for good advice in making the arguments developed above more lucid and consistent.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge, School of Culture and Learning, Södertörn University, 141 89, Huddinge, Sweden

    Fredrik Svenaeus

Authors
  1. Fredrik Svenaeus
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Fredrik Svenaeus.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Svenaeus, F. The phenomenology of chronic pain: embodiment and alienation. Cont Philos Rev 48, 107–122 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9325-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9325-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation