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Die Rolle von Verhaltensökonomik und experimenteller Forschung in Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Politikberatung

  • Joachim Weimann EMAIL logo

Zusammenfassung

Verhaltensökonomische Ansätze und experimentelle Methoden sind in den vergangenen dreißig Jahren zu festen Bestandteilen der ökonomischen Methodik geworden. Joachim Weimann zeichnet nach, wie es zu dieser Erweiterung gekommen ist und wie sich die neuen Konzepte und Methoden mit dem paretianischen Programm des „Rational choice“ vertragen. Auf der Grundlage dieser Analyse schlägt er eine Integration aller Methoden in ein Konzept evidenzbasierter Politikberatung vor. In diesem Konzept ordnen die Dimensionen „Kausalität“, „externe Validität“ und „Breite der Anwendbarkeit“ die Methoden. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die Verhaltensökonomik und die experimentelle Methode hervorragend geeignet sind, komplementär zur neoklassischen Theorie und zur empirischen Forschung eingesetzt zu werden.

JEL-Klassifikation: A11; A12; B10; B13; C10; C18; C90; C91; C93

Danksagung

Friedrich Breyer, Sönke Hoffmann, Markus Sass und Florian Timme sei für wertvolle Hinweise gedankt. Außerdem geht mein Dank an Karen Horn für ihre wertvolle Unterstützung.

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Autoreninformation

Joachim Weimann ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für allgemeine Wirtschaftspolitik an der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg. Er ist Vorsitzender der Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung und wissenschaftlicher Direktor des MaXLab (Magdeburger Labor für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung). Er ist Mitglied der Akademie der Technikwissenschaften (acatec). Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte liegen in der Verhaltensökonomik, der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, der Lebenszufriedenheitsforschung und der Umweltökonomik. Er ist Autor mehrerer Monographien, zweier Lehrbücher und zahlreicher Beiträge in wissenschaftlichen Journalen.

Online erschienen: 2015-9-9
Erschienen im Druck: 2015-10-1

© 2015 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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