Background
Globally 39,000 girls under the age of 18 years are married daily and 14.2 million girls annually [
1]. More than 700 million women alive worldwide were married before age 18 [
2]. The highest prevalence of girl-child marriage is in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa [
2]. Early marriage violates the human rights of the girl-child, increases her risk of maternal morbidity and mortality, and robs her of educational and developmental opportunities [
3‐
5]. There is a global consensus to end girl-child marriage and Target 5.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is to “eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilations” by 2030 [
6]. Ending girl-child marriage has the potential to contribute to eight SDGs, including those addressing poverty (goal 1), good health and well-being (goal 3), inclusive and quality education (goal 4), gender equality (goal 5), and economic growth (goal 8) [
7,
8]. Progress in reducing child marriage rate has so far been quite slow in sub-Saharan Africa [
2,
9].
Nigeria, with over 3.5 million under-18 girls currently married [
10] has the highest number of child brides in Africa [
7,
10] and the third highest number in the world [
8]. The rate of child marriage varies significantly by geo-political zones in Nigeria, ranging from 39.0% to 67.6% for the Northern zones compared to the much lower rates of 13.9-21.6% for the Southern zones [
11]. Girl-child marriage rate in Nigeria has not improved over the years with only a 1% decline in over three decades. Whereas Nigeria passed the Child Rights Act that prohibits marriage below the age of 18 in 2003, 12 Northern states (out of 36 states) are yet to domesticate the Act. If the current pattern continues, Nigeria’s population of child bride is expected to double by 2050 [
2].
Globally, child marriage is associated with inequitable gender norms, which are deeply engrained in local socio-cultural context [
12,
13] and associated with poverty, low educational level and rural location [
14‐
22]. Surprisingly, very few peer-reviewed research has been published on child marriage in Nigeria [
12‐
19] and most are small-scale studies lacking rigorous analysis of the determinants. In particular, very few studies on girl-child marriage have examined the role of ethnicity – a representation of local practices/values and a sociological marker of cultural diversities [
23,
24].
Ethnicity is particularly important in the context of Nigeria – a nation with 374 identifiable ethnic groups [
25] with substantial variation in ethnic cultural beliefs and practices. Nigeria’s ethnic groups include the three major ones – Hausa (30%) concentrated in the North, Yoruba (15.5%) in the South-West, Igbo (15.2%) in the South-East, and several ethnic minority groups – Fulani (6%), Tiv (2.4%), Kanuri/Beriberi (2.4%) in the North, and Ibibio (1.8%), Ijaw (1.8%) in the South-South, and many others accounting for 24.7% [
26]. In Nigeria, ethnicity has remained a major underlying factor associated with many health-related and social behaviours, including risky sexual behaviour, poor contraceptive uptake or discontinuation of use, poor maternal healthcare utilization, female genital mutilation, intimate partner’s violence and so many others [
27‐
32]. Despite being an important sociological marker of cultural diversities, the role of ethnicity on child marriage has not been sufficiently ascertained in empirical studies in Nigeria. Interplaying with religious beliefs, the multi-ethnic setting of the country serves as a predisposition for varied marital ideologies that tend to portend health risk for a girl-child.
Nigeria is also a multi-religious society with three major divisions – Islam (53.5%), Christianity (45.9%), adherents of Nigeria’s indigenous religions and others (6.0%) [
26]. Religious beliefs have a significant role in shaping gender-related behaviours and practices. Nigeria’s geo-political zones, interestingly, are characterised by an interplay of religion and cultural values; religion may be associated with the sociocultural framing of gender norms and girl-child marriage practices [
33,
34]. Though not limited to one religious group, available evidence reveals that child marriage is more prevalent in Muslim communities [
35,
36]. This is associated with the belief among the conservative Muslims that Quran allows girl’s marriage at any age, and Prophet Muhammad’s wife was nine years at marriage [
34]. In Nigeria, the Northern States refusing domestication of Nigeria’s Child Right Act are Muslim dominated and are reacting to protect their ethno-religious standpoint on child marriage. There are however a contrary perspective by other Muslims who argue that a girl-child should attain puberty and emotional maturity before marriage [
35].
Though higher level of education, socioeconomic status, and urban residence are precursors for reducing child marriage practice [
14,
18,
36], variations subsist due to ethnic and religious differences. For example, in Malaysia, despite the country’s economic progress and high educational level, child marriage practice remains high and is underpinned in religious and traditional beliefs [
35]. In Nigeria, educated Hausa/Fulani girls may not have the same risk of child marriage as educated Yoruba or Igbo counterparts. However, there is need for empirical evidence indicating whether educated adolescents or those who share some other specific socioeconomic characteristics have the same risk of child marriage across ethnic and religious affiliations in Nigeria.
To date, the available peer-reviewed publications have hardly rigorously examined and explained, either singly or jointly, the influence of ethnic and religious beliefs on girl-child marriage in Nigeria. This study aims to address the existing research gap by specifically examining the influence of ethnic and religious affiliations on girl-child marriage based on a nationally representative sample of female adolescents in Nigeria. The empirical evidence generated will contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of girl-child marriage in multi-religious and multi-ethnic society settings and can inform better framing and contextualisation of interventions.
Discussion
Girl-child marriage is a leading adolescent health and development concern of global importance but so far under-researched in Nigeria despite the country’s very high burden of child marriage [
10]. This study is one of the few that has so far examined some determinants of girl-child marriage in Nigeria using a nationally representative sample. We have specifically focussed on the role of ethnicity and religious affiliation – two key elements in the socio-cultural dynamics relating to girl-child marriage, but which had been largely unaddressed in previous research.
We found that girl-child marriage prevalence differs considerably among girls aged 15–19 years from different ethnic groups in Nigeria. On the one hand, we found the level of girl-child marriage among the Hausa/Fulani – the major Northern ethnic group – to be about 15–18 times higher than that of the Southern major ethnic groups (Yoruba and Igbo). This finding accords with previous reports of a higher girl-child marriage rate in Northern Nigeria compared to the South [
14,
25,
42] and among the Hausa/Fulani compared to other major tribes [
11,
15]. The high rate of girl-child marriage among the Hausa/Fulani is promoted, among others, by parents’ betrothal of their daughters in order to sustain family alliance, seal up friendship, fulfil a promise or appreciate their benefactor [
44]. This cultural practice permits parents or guardian to betroth a girl-child – usually from childhood or at puberty age without her consent – to an individual who had previously provided financial or otherwise support to the family. Contrariwise, such practice is less pronounced among the major southern ethnic groups, thus the low prevalence of child marriage in the southern region.
On the other hand, contrary to what Adebowale [
15] had reported in the only published work that used a nationally representative sample to examine the relationship between ethnicity and girl-child marriage, we found that the Hausa/Fulani group does not actually have the highest girl-child marriage in Nigeria. The ethnic groups with the highest rates are the Kambari and Fulfude – two Northern ethnic minority groups with prevalence of 74.9% and 74.8% respectively compared to 54.8% among the Hausa/Fulani group. This finding support the claim that regardless of geographical co-existence, ethnic groups in Nigeria are distinct and diverse in beliefs and practices, particularly in relation to gender norms [
41]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to report the prevalence of girl-child marriage individually for each minority tribe, unlike previous studies [
14,
15,
25,
42]. Also, unlike our more rigorous approach of classifying ethnic groups in the North and South separately, Adebowale [
14], following the approach that has been used in other studies on ethnicity and health outcomes in Nigeria, had lumped all ethnic minorities in the country into one [
27‐
30,
45]. This popular approach obviously and sadly results in a lost opportunity to uncover any difference that may exist between geographically-, culturally-, and religiously-diverse ethnic minority groups and/or between the minority and majority ethnic groups co-existing within the same geographical regions in Nigeria.
Secondly, we found that both ethnicity and religion have significant independent influences on girl-child marriage practice in Nigeria. Specifically, our result shows that not only are there considerable differences between the major tribe of the North (the Hausa/Fulani) and those of the South (Yoruba and Igbo), but considerable differences also occur between major and minor ethnic groups in both the Northern and the Southern part of Nigeria – a result that is made possible by our more rigorous and appropriate approach to ethnic group classification. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to provide girl-child marriage prevalence figures specifically and separately for the Southern and Northern ethnic minority groups and to document the intra-regional differences between the majority and the minority ethnic groups. Despite Nigeria’s ethnic diversities, most studies on child marriage have focused on either only one ethnicity or the three major ethnic groups – Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba [
46], while other studies considered regions of residence [
14] which are often ethnically heterogeneous. Some studies combined all the ethnic minority groups as ‘others’ [
15], albeit they are culturally and geographically diverse. The present study attempted to address the deficiencies identified in ethnic categorizations in previous studies. We took Nigeria’s religious and cultural diversities into consideration by not categorizing all minority ethnic groups as one in our ethnic grouping.
The significant differences in the prevalence of girl-child marriage among the ethnic groups reflect differences in traditional beliefs, cultural values and social norms that relate not only to girl-child marriage but also to the broader issue of the perceived value of females and the degree of women’s autonomy. The strong desire to prevent young girls from engaging in premarital sex, which reflects the high value placed on girls’ pre-marriage virginity status and the strong stigma associated with premarital pregnancy and its implications for the family’s honour in traditional societies, have featured prominently in the cultural framing of the girl-child marriage. Viewed broadly, these issues are all rooted in an entrenched system of gender inequality and inequitable social norms that particularly plays out in traditional patriarchal societies and drive the age-long practice of child marriage [
12,
13,
47‐
49].
The influence of religious affiliation as an independent factor in child marriage practice with Muslim girls having a higher rate than Christians is worth noting particularly in the Nigerian context where religion plays a significant role in shaping values and practices at individual, household and community level, including girl-child development issues [
50]. It is interesting, for example, to note that the 12 states with the highest prevalence of girl-child marriage in Nigeria are all Muslim-dominated states that have instituted Sharia laws and have so far refused to domesticate the Child Rights Act [
34]. This picture reflects a classical interplay of religion and culture. As Braimah highlighted, “The Hausa-Fulanis in Northern Nigeria show strict adherence to the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad’s Sunnah. As Islam plays a pivotal role in the lives of most Northern Nigerians, the culture and traditions of the Hausa-Fulanis are intertwined with the Islamic religion. Therefore, due to the influence of Islam and Muhammad’s marriage to Aisha, as reported in the Hadiths, it is not surprising that Muslims in Northern Nigeria endorse and practise child marriage” [
34]. The widely publicized case of girl-child marriage involving a one-time state governor and later a senator, Ahmad Yerima, who married a 13-year-old Egyptian girl in 2010 provides a clear illustration regarding power of religion in driving and sustaining the practice of girl-child marriage. In his response to the public outcry over his behaviour, Senator Yerima justified his marriage on religious grounds, stating that he was simply following the teaching and practice of Prophet Muhammad who married Aisha at the age of nine [
34].
While the use of a nationally representative sample is one of the key strengths of this study, the use of secondary data also has its drawback as it constrains analysis to the variables with already collected information, which limits deeper exploration of germane issues such as cultural values and sociocultural framing of gender inequality that underlie girl-child marriage. Future studies should complement secondary quantitative data analysis with qualitative data for further interrogation and understanding of the sociological dynamics relating to girl-child marriage. Also, this study analysed self-reported information with the limitation of lack of any mechanism for validating the responses provided and reported. Furthermore, since this study is based on cross-sectional data, we can only infer association but in no way can we imply causality.
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