Mothers
Data strongly point to the ways in which mothers are tasked with managing the abuse perpetrated by their partners; a responsibility fomented and sustained at the level of state, and at the societal level via dominant gender role expectations. At the same time, women are encouraged to engage with opportunities to perform ‘good’ mothering and to comply with measures installed by children’s social care. Anita’s (PG1 and PG2) account reflects this:
Why is it the women? Women get so much sh*t, you know? I attended all those child-in-need meetings, rightly so because it was my responsibility. Where was her dad in all of this? You know? Erm (...) all the focus, social care, children’s workers, you name it, it’s mum mum mum, gets all the f*cking sh*t! It’s like ‘[I] made choices’; well, I don’t really know how many choices I really had in all of that!
After being involved with children’s social care while experiencing domestic abuse, Anita began supporting other women with similar experiences in a practitioner role. Her use of rhetorical questioning here conveys the extent of the responsibilisation and accompanying surveillance inculcated by a network of children’s social care and allied providers; the mother’s compliance and behavior change their central preoccupation – not that of the abusing parent. While accepting her personal obligations, Anita refutes her culpability by drawing upon a discourse of false choice and a socially embedded discourse of gendered blame. Practitioner Debbie (PG2) echoes this sentiment:
But […] as a society (..) we put it all on the woman don’t we, to deal with [the domestic abuse]? We just ask the woman to make the changes, ‘well you’ll have to leave him’ (.) but then, he, even if she manages to leave him (.) he goes on to the next one (.) So I just don’t know how far we need to roll that back, and... Well, patriarchy (..) We need to roll that off! (..) Gender.
The prosodic features of Debbie’s speech have the effect of foregrounding fragments of a pervasive victim-blaming discourse that gains legitimacy when situated within a framework of unequal gender relations and patriarchy. The discourse is mobilized to account for the disproportionate charge placed on women to mitigate the harm posed by the perpetrator of DVA by leaving the relationship first and foremost, while the abusing parent in turn is free to establish new relationships. Debbie also alludes to the often-limited degree of support provided to women to practically enable separation, irrespective of whether this is an outcome she seeks or that will enhance safety. The nature and extent of victim-survivor agency in this context is dependent on the social context in which she is situated and the socio-material resources available to her. As Anita and Debbie both indicate, this is inextricably bound up with the construction of mothers as primary caregiver. Together, these converge to produce the preservation of gendered hierarchies, both within the family and beyond it. Offering another perspective on the same set of discourses is practitioner Gemma (PG2):
I think it’s a patriarchal society. And I think we’re conditioned; we grow up with very clear ideas of what a woman’s place is. I think it’s also...I do think it’s biological, you know, women are nurturers. The whole nature of having a baby and giving birth tends to be that you want to fix things. You want to look after people, you want to have that caring side. Therefore, when you’re suffering abuse, you tend to blame yourself and think well, what did I do wrong?
Socially and culturally constructed gender scripts, and the enduring gender binary are both discernible in this account, which together scaffold the roles ascribed to women and men within the family. Gemma imports a discourse which correlates the dominant gender order with the perpetration of DVA in so far as an experience of abuse disrupts a woman’s ability to comply with the expectations of the ‘good’ mother; the blame adhering to her as she becomes a ‘failed’ mother. Motherhood and care work are located here as the product of both “biology” and patriarchal “conditioning”; two discourses brought into relation with one another to account for a socially embedded narrative of mother-victim-blame. A crucial component of women’s work to meet the requirements of this socially assigned role is the routine resistance and safety decision-making practices undertaken by mothers in highly constrained environments (Author, forthcoming). These practices are often unacknowledged by practitioners, shoring up an individualising ‘failure to protect’ discourse and absolving the perpetrator of responsibility; a point discussed further in the next section.
Fathers
Cohering with the accounts offered by all the mothers involved in this study, practitioners working both in dedicated domestic abuse services, as well as those working within children’s social care services, discuss how fathers who use violence are often not seen as ‘legitimate’ clients of children and family services. This in turn functions to sustain their comparative invisibilisation within service settings (Heward-Belle et al.,
2019) and upholds a disproportionate focus on mothers:
The expectation, […] particularly when we get child protection [involved] […] If you look at the child protection plan (..) 99% of what the tasks are, are for the mother to do (.) and the father, he can get off by just saying, ‘well, I’m not living there at the minute’. Oh well, then...But he’s still a father to children with responsibilities and I just think, we just seem to almost hand them a ‘get out of jail free card’, don’t we?
The discourse deployed here by practitioner Debbie (PG2) is situated within the frame of an equality-focused feminist politics, while an entrenched cultural narrative in which women continue to carry the burden of childcare and child protection responsibilities is explicitly derided. The injustice of these gender norms is warranted through reference to numeral formulations (“99% of what the tasks are…”).This has the persuasive effect of validating the argument (Potter et al.,
1991), and provides a counter-discourse to the “get out of jail free card” handed to men. But data produced with other practitioners indicates that in a climate of under resourcing and high caseloads, the task of engaging men as fathers in order to hold them to account is made more complex:
[A]s a local authority there was this, ‘go and do this training’, […] and it’s kind of like a tokenistic rather than a realistic (.) thing, you know. […] I did a report to the board and it was like, ‘oh so we’re thinking about how we’re engaging men’ […] (…) But really (.) it didn’t follow through to mum, because actually when we’ve got a busy workload (.) and mum answers the door, we need to sit down and have a conversation with mum (..) […]. And we probably aren’t tenacious, and probing and you know, inquisitive enough to get the dad involved as much as we could.
Children’s and families’ practitioner Stuart (PG3) provides an account which illustrates how organizational and practice culture change are jeopardized when implemented in an environment in which practitioners are over-stretched, under-resourced, and time poor. In this extract the task of “engaging men” is established as the unattained “tokenistic” ideal in contrast to that of the practice norm of engaging “mum”. The engagement of the mother is instead construed as a more “realistic” and achievable avenue for intervention, given extant constraints and in the continued absence of the father. The reflection upon current practice paradigms here orientates this account towards an acknowledgement of the current system’s inadequacies, while also functioning to pre-empt possible counterarguments to the claims made (Edwards & Potter,
1993). Together, these accounts substantiate the material consequence of not holding fathers to account, as well as the challenges of doing so. In carrying the responsibility for the domestic abuse, mothers must simultaneously bear the blame and consequences of being unable to manage the behaviors of their partners, the most significant of which is the court-ordered removal of children, elaborated in the next section.
Court-Ordered Removal of Children
Several of the women involved in this study discussed the complex trauma of having experienced the involuntary removal of their children, during or after experiencing DVA. In this, the haunting (Gordon,
2008) experienced by these mothers is clearly discernible:
I will have a word with [children’s] social services and explain that, if [my son] comes to find me, I don’t want to have no contact with the father (.) And that’s gotta be put in the plan; I don’t want no contact with the father (…) (…)
Author: Does it make you anxious that he’s going to be 18 soon?
Yeah, and he’s going to want to know everything, and I’ve got to explain it all to him.
Author: Do you know what you’ll say?
I’ve wrote a letter (.) for his file. But (.) it just never leaves you, does it. […] But I’ve had to rebuild the best I can do (..) So I am like a survivor, in a way (…)
Fifteen years after her child was removed from her care and adopted, Jacqueline (PG1) lives with the anticipation that her son may one day try to find her when he turns 18. But it is a futurity complicated by the anxiety that his father may also seek her out, coupled with the belief that she will need to provide an explanation if she ever sees her son again. In this extract, children’s social care is constructed as a key constituent in the work to keep her safe, but also, in permitting Jacqueline to articulate her side of the story via the limited formal channels available to her. Her account has the effect of foregrounding the significant power of institutional storytelling in the lives of care experienced women and their children in circumstances of DVA. It is also strongly orientated towards a discourse of survivorship, allowing for the emergence of a personal narrative and subject-position which counters the construction of those who experience DVA as always-already ‘helpless’ or ‘passive’.
This extract illustrates the way in which some women’s futures are emphatically, and ongoingly shaped by past experiences of DVA, long after it has occurred or ended (Morriss,
2018). Substantiating this point and cohering with the account prior, victim-survivor Melanie (PG1) describes exiting the family court:
That day, all I’d got was my solicitor, and I literally...I walked out of that court (.) completely alone, and my mum was totally worried, until I walked through her door, that I was gonna throw meself under a bus. ‘Cause I just phoned her in a total state, she said ‘shall I come to town and meet you’, and I’m like no (.) I’ll just catch tram. And I sat on tram all the way from town to me mum’s […], and I was just streaming. […] (…) So you pay for it, and you go on (.) suffering for it, a lot longer than when it, it finishes, in many ways, by many professionals (.) and it should not be allowed.
The extensive and prolonged disruption to Melanie’s present as well as her recovery is in evidence, as she describes “pay[ing]” for her perceived culpability which in this instance is instantiated by the court-ordered removal of her son. Melanie’s experience also captures the extent to which decisions made or interventions initiated by actors from within the children’s social care system and allied agencies, are often experienced as punitive and disempowering by victim-survivor parents, leading to resentment and a reluctance to engage. The interaction between two starkly different discourses here – that of the banal (“I’ll just catch tram”) and that of extraordinary visceral pain (“I was just streaming”), converge to produce Melanie’s subjectivity as the bereft mother, alone and wrought with grief. The sheer depth of her traumatic loss is typified via the extreme case formulation of possible suicide (Pomerantz,
1986). Dawn (PG1) offers an account which engages with a comparable discourse:
I got a proper house last year, from a housing association, which is in a lot nicer area. I did that for my little boy, who’s 7, and then several weeks later social care took him into care (.) because they said I couldn’t keep him safe (.). Because of all the bad relationships that I’ve had. That’s what they blamed it on. And it’s like I said to social care (.) […] we’ve not got a rewind button on life (.) I can’t go back there (..) I can’t change anything, so (…) They keep going on about having like all these different therapies but sometimes they don’t do no good.
Attending to the temporality of this account is crucial to understanding its primary proposition: “we’ve not got a rewind button on life” and past events cannot be changed. We see how the genealogical lines mapped out in this extract knit together to communicate the impact of Dawn’s partner’s abuse (Tamboukou,
2016). Together they chart the ways in which a history of abuse has disrupted Dawn’s housing security and future aspirations. Her use of temporal signifiers of only past and present further corroborate how Dawn is prevented from making any claims for her future or that of her son’s. Victim-survivor Jean (PG1) also offers a narrative in which her life trajectory is radically suspended following the removal of her son into adoption; “that was before I got on the alcohol. Was when I lost my son and that. That year. That year was…Yeah, that was the year that, I become an alcoholic basically. 14 year ago”. This account, as well as those of the other mothers discussed, demonstrate how women affected by court-ordered removal and separation procedures often encounter heightened levels of social exclusion or material insecurity, and are frequently less well-resourced to cope with the consequences of this traumatic loss independently of assistance.
As such, the women who have experienced child removal evidence an urgent need for ongoing and specialist trauma-informed support, especially therapeutic intervention, as Jacqueline (PG1) describes:
Social services are very quick to put your child into adoption, but they offer no (.) support for the mother afterwards, whose gone through an experience like this. So, there’s no support. They’re just, ‘that’s it’, they leave (...) And I had to go and find counselling on me own (.) So I found it through a charity in the end. And they had about a 9-month waiting list for it. […] Women are losing their kids through abuse. They should have offered support to me, at the time there was none. I kind of just dealt with it on me own. And I still do sometimes.
Evident here is a familiar discourse of survivorship, as Jacqueline cogently captures her sense of abjection. We see how despite the years elapsed, the residual traumatic impact of her son’s removal at age three, continues to pattern daily life. Jacqueline goes on to import a discourse of death, describing hers and other mothers’ experience as; “[mothers] grieving for their child, and their child’s not dead!”. But in these circumstances, mothers who experience child removal are not afforded the typical cultural and social rituals of grief and bereavement (Broadhurst & Mason,
2020; Morriss,
2018), and instead are left to “[deal] with it on [their] own”. Jacqueline reinforces this sentiment by simultaneously orientating her account towards a discourse of self-sufficiency, resisting any notion of implicit weakness. Her experiences of independent help seeking are indicative of many others in this study; characterized by a scarcity of local, accessible options and long periods on waiting lists, during which time the women’s mental health often deteriorates, as victim-survivor Abigail (PG1) relays:
If I had therapy, as soon as I actually needed it, right at the beginning then I would be more moved on in my life than where I am now. And that panicked me because I kept feeling like -- you know, I’m 51 --, I kept thinking, my god how long is it going to be for me to get sorted? I’m going to be retirement age by the time I feel like I’m a normal human being again! And you kind of panic, like you feel like time is running out...And I was so...you know, I have suicidal thoughts and there were quite a few times where, I’d gather tablets. The only reason I didn’t commit suicide was because of my kids. Because one, I didn’t want to give my daughter permission to commit suicide, and two, if my son does come looking for me, I want to be here.
At the time of interview, Abigail had not seen her youngest son for almost six years. He was abducted by his father at the age of five, shortly after unsupervised contact was awarded to him. The interlocking discourses of time in this account function to convey the lasting affective and psychological impact of child removal upon women such as Abigail, and Jacqueline, Anita, and Melanie before her. The hope that her son may try to find her, coupled with the need to live for her daughter, both serve as vital protective factors for Abigail’s mental health, as she contends with the unbearable sense that “time is running out”.