Background
Risk group classification and biocontainment regulations for Orientia spp. research
Country or region | Risk Group 1 | Risk Group 2 | Risk Group 3 | Risk Group 4 |
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Australian/New Zealand Standard [16] | Low individual and community risk A microorganism that is unlikely to cause human or animal disease. | Moderate individual risk, limited community risk A microorganism that is unlikely to be a significant risk to laboratory workers, the community, livestock, or the environment; laboratory exposures may cause infections, Effective treatment and preventive measures are available, and the risk of spread is limited. | High individual risk, limited to moderate community risk A microorganism that usually causes serious human or animal disease and may present a significant risk to laboratory workers. It could present a limited to moderate risk if spread in the community or the environment, but there are usually effective preventive measures or treatment available. | High individual and community risk A microorganism that usually produces life-threatening human or animal disease, represents a significant risk to laboratory workers and may be readily transmissible from one individual to another. Effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually available. |
Belgium [17] | Micro-organisms known as nonpathogenic for the man, the animal, the plant and not-harmful for the environment or presenting a negligible risk for the man and the environment at the laboratory scale. This class includes, beside organisms whose harmlessness was proven, strains which can be allergens and opportunistic pathogens | Micro -organisms that can cause human disease and might be a hazard for directly exposed persons; they are unlikely to spread to the community. There is usually effective prophylaxis or treatment available. | Micro -organisms that can cause severe human disease and present a serious hazard for directly exposed persons. They may present a risk of spreading to the community. There is usually effective prophylaxis or treatment available. | Micro -organisms that cause severe human disease and are a serious hazard for directly exposed persons. They may present a high risk of spreading to the community. There is usually no effective prophylaxis or treatment available. |
Canada [18] | Low individual and community risk A microorganism, nucleic acid, or protein that is either a) not capable of causing human or animal disease; or b) capable of causing human or animal disease, but unlikely to do so. Those capable of causing disease are considered pathogens that pose a low risk to the health of individuals or animals, and a low risk to public health and the animal population. | Moderate individual risk, low community risk A pathogen or toxin that poses a moderate risk to the health of individuals or animals, and a low risk to public health and the animal population. These pathogens are able to cause serious disease in a human or animal but are unlikely to do so. Effective treatment and preventive measures are available and the risk of spread of diseases caused by these pathogens is low. | High individual risk, low community risk A pathogen that poses a high risk to the health of individuals or animals, and a low risk to public health. These pathogens are likely to cause serious disease in a human or animal. Effective treatment and preventive measures are usually available and the risk of spread of disease caused by these pathogens is low for the public. The risk of spread to the animal population, however, can range from low to high depending on the pathogen. | High individual risk, high community risk A pathogen that poses a high risk to the health of individuals or animals and a high risk to public health. These pathogens are likely to cause serious disease in a human or animal, which can often lead to death. Effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually available and the risk of spread of disease caused by these pathogens is high for the public. The risk of spread of disease to the animal population, however, ranges from low to high, depending on the pathogen. |
European Economic Community Directive 2000/54/EC and Directive 90/679/EEC [19] | Biological agent means one that is unlikely to cause human disease. | Biological agent means one that can cause human disease and might be a hazard to workers; it is unlikely to spread to the community; there is usually effective prophylaxis or treatment available. | Biological agent means one that can cause severe human disease and present a serious hazard to workers; it may present a risk of spreading to the community, but there is usually effective prophylaxis or treatment available. | Biological agent means one that causes severe human disease and is a serious hazard to workers; it may present a high risk of spreading to the community; there is usually no effective prophylaxis or treatment available. |
Germany [19] | Biomaterials, where it is unlikely that they cause disease in humans | Biomaterials that can cause human disease and might be a hazard to workers; Dispersal in the population is unlikely; Effective prophylaxis or treatment is normally possible | Biomaterials, which cause severe human disease and present a serious hazard to workers; The risk of spread to the community, but there is usually effective prophylaxis or treatment available | Biological agents which cause severe human disease and are a serious hazard to workers; The risk of spread in the population is high under certain circumstances; there is usually no effective prophylaxis or treatment. |
United Kingdom [20] | Unlikely to cause human disease | Can cause human disease and may be a hazard to employees; It is unlikely to spread to the community and there is usually effective prophylaxis or treatment available. | Can cause severe human disease and may be a serious hazard to employees; It may spread to the community, but there is usually effective prophylaxis or treatment available. | Causes severe human disease and is a serious hazard to employees; It is likely to spread to the community and there is usually no effective prophylaxis or treatment available |
Laboratory studies | ||||
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Country | Regulations | Activity | Low-risk | Enhanced-risk |
USA | BMBL5th Ed. [21] | Clinical | “BSL2 practices, biocontainment equipment, and facilities are recommended for non-propagative laboratory procedures, including serological and fluorescent antibody procedures, and for the staining of impression smears. | New species are being described frequently and should be evaluated for appropriate biocontainment on a case-by-case basis. Because of the proven value of antibiotic therapy in the early stages of rickettsial infection, it is essential that laboratories have an effective system for reporting febrile illnesses in laboratory personnel, medical evaluation of potential cases and, when indicated, institution of appropriate antibiotic therapy. |
Research | R prowazekii; R typhi (R. mooseri); Orientia (Rickettsia) tsutsugamushi and Spotted Fever Group agents of human disease; R rickettsii, R conorii, R akari, R australis, R siberica, and R japonicum - BSL3 practices, biocontainment equipment, and facilities are recommended for all other manipulations of known or potentially infectious materials, including necropsy of experimentally infected animals and trituration of their tissues, and inoculation, incubation, and harvesting of embryonated eggs or cell cultures. R. montana, R. rhipicephali, R. belli, and R. canada,- are not known to cause human disease and may be handled under BSL2 conditions. | |||
UK | ACDP [20] | Clinical | “Microbiology laboratories offering a diagnostic service to a hospital will from time to time isolate a hazard group 3 pathogen when working at CL2. Once identified, work on such isolates and on material known or suspected to contain hazard group 3 biological agents must be conducted in a CL 3 laboratory, unless the agent is specifically identified as an exemption in the ACDP Second supplement 2000.” | “It is recognised that pathogens may be present in specimens which, had they been identified, would need to be handled at a higher level of containment. If such pathogens are identified during the course of work at CL 2, all further work on the specimen or associated specimens must be conducted at a higher biocontainment level, usually CL 3 or exceptionally CL 4. If higher biocontainment level facilities are not available, the isolate should be sent to an appropriate laboratory, or be destroyed. If it is suspected, for example from a clinical history, that a specimen may contain hazard group 3 biological agents, all work on that specimen or other specimens from that patient must be conducted at CL3.” |
Research | Rickettsia spp (specified as the following R. akari, R canada, R conorii, R montana, R prowazekii, R rickettsii, R (Orientia) tsutsugamushi, R sennetsu, R typhi) are classified as a Hazard Group 3 Pathogen “the minimum biocontainment level… shall be…— level 3 for activities which involve working with a Group 3 biological agent” and so in the UK all work with known Orientia spp. must be conducted in a CL3/BSL 3 laboratory. | |||
Australia | AS/NZS 2243.3.2010 [16] | Clinical | Clinical specimens are generally regarded as low risk and handled under BSL2 conditions. Very few laboratories attempt cell culture isolation of Orientia spp. from clinical specimens and the recovery rate of viable organisms is very low. However, once an isolate has been identified the specimen must be subsequently be handled at BSL3. | There may be a need for further characterisation of a clinical isolate with respect to typing and as such these activities need to be performed at BSL3. |
Research | Inactivated Orientia isolates can be handled at BSL2 | All viable Orientia/rickettsial agents need to be handled at BSL3. | ||
Singapore | BATA 2005 [22] | Clinical | For samples where the diagnosis is unknown, diagnostic testing that does not result in amplification of the pathogen tested for can be performed in a BSL2 environment. Laboratories conducting clinical diagnostics of Rickettsia and Orientia spp. are required to conduct risk assessment and provide appropriate measures and safeguards to significantly reduce risk of infection of laboratory staff. | In enhanced risk situation, the work environment will need to be BSL3. This covers all work that involves “live” organisms in the sample or culture, whereby no prior approved steps have been applied to the material that would render the pathogen inert and non-infectious. |
Research | For research work on live samples and cultures, the work environment is required to be at BSL3. Large scale culture (> 10 l) is prohibited without written authorization of the Director of Medical Services, Ministry of Health Singapore. | |||
Thailand | Pathogens and Animals Toxins Act 2015 [23] | Clinical | Routine diagnostic laboratory processing within hospital laboratories can be performed in BSL-2 laboratories with strict adherence to Good Laboratory Practice guidelines. | Culturing with the aim of producing large amounts of bacteria should be performed in BSL3 laboratories or equivalent safety level (BSL2 enhanced). |
Research | As per clinical activity |
USA regulations
UK regulations
Australia
Singapore
Thailand
Risk-assessment for Orientia spp.
Recommended risk assessments for Orientia spp. research activities
Mitigation strategy | Experimentally-infected animals | Arthropods and necropsy of infected animals |
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Personnel protection | Experimental Orientia spp. and any work on isolates of the organism would be undertaken in a Class II BSCa meaning that the risk of airborne exposure of staff is minimal. If a Class II BSC is not available and there is a risk of aerosol exposure, staff should be fitted with and wear an N-95 respirator. All work on samples that are suspected of containing Orientia spp. and any work on isolates of the organism would be undertaken by staff wearing gloves with avoidance of sharps wherever possible, minimising the risk of inoculation. Outer garments, such as lab coats or Tyvek overalls, should be worn during work which has the potential to produce splashes or aerosols of bacteria. Workers can be provided with a medical alert card to take to medical clinics should an accidental exposure occur. This card contains information about the nature of the work, the agent being worked with, and appropriate medical management to help inform and educate health care providers who may not be familiar with scrub typhus or laboratory animals. | As for experimentally-infected animals |
Primary containment | Class II BSC | As for experimentally-infected animals |
Secondary biocontainment | ABSL2 | BSL3/ABSL3 |
Animal Handling | Appropriate PPE for the species of animal should be worn. Working with non-human primates (NHP) poses a risk of infection with Macacine herpesvirus and PPE should be utilized to prevent infection with this virus. If using rodents, the risk of bites can be mitigated by acclimatizing the animals to handling or by wearing bite-resistant gloves. Non-human primates should also be trained and acclimatized to the various procedures encountered in the course of the protocol. Use of pole, collar, and chair restraint devices minimize direct animal handling for examination, injections/inoculations, and treatments. If this is not possible, NHP should be anesthetized using an appropriate anaesthetic protocol for the procedure. Necropsy of scrub typhus-infected animals should be undertaken in appropriate facilities based on the infection status of the animal. If the animal is infectious, (i.e. active bacteraemia or infection), the animal should be necropsied in a Class II BSC and/or within an ABSL3 or BSL3 laboratory. If the animal is non-infectious, standard necropsy procedures can be followed. | As for experimentally-infected animals |
Disinfection (any of the following options) | Autoclave – 121 °C for 30 min Dry heat - 160-170 °C for at least 60 min Chemical (At least 30 min contact time) 1% Virkon (surfaces) or 2% Virkon (liquids) 1% sodium hypochlorite 70% ethanol, Glutaraldehyde Formaldehyde Quaternary ammonium disinfectants. | As for experimentally-infected animals |
Training | Additional, specialized training should occur when working with laboratory animals. The type of training may vary depending on the regulatory requirements of the country in which the work is being performed. Staff working with NHP should receive training about Macacine herpesvirus since this is an extremely dangerous zoonotic disease that can lead to death if not treated. Staff should be trained and proficient in animal handling, restraint, sample collection, treatment administration, necropsy procedures, and other experimental procedures on animals before working with scrub typhus-infected animals. | As for experimentally-infected animals |
Recommendations for risk-based biocontainment levels for Orientia spp. laboratory activities
Mitigation strategy | Lowa to Mediumb-risk laboratory activities | High-risk laboratory activities c |
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Personnel protection | Gown Gloves Eye protection Covered shoes Avoidance of sharps | Respiratory protection Gown Gloves Eye protection Covered shoes Avoidance of sharps |
Primary containment | Class II BSC (annually certified) Aerosol generating procedures (i.e., centrifugation) devices with bioseal (gaskets buckets and corresponding lids (screw or clip type). Buckets may only be opened in the BSC | Class II BSC (annually certified) Aerosol generating procedures (i.e., centrifugation) devices with bioseal (gaskets buckets and corresponding lids (screw or clip type). Buckets may only be opened in the BSC |
Secondary biocontainment | Biosafety Level 2 or Core | Biosafety Level 3 or Heightened Control Measures |
Disinfection (any of the following options) | Autoclave – 121 °C for 30 min Dry heat - 160-170 °C for at least 60 min Chemical (at least 30 min contact time) 1% Virkon (surfaces) or 2% Virkon (liquids) 1% sodium hypochlorite 70% ethanol Glutaraldehyde Formaldehyde Quaternary ammonium disinfectants | Autoclave – 121 °C for 30 min Dry heat - 160-170 °C for at least 60 min Chemical (at least 30 min contact time) 1% Virkon (surfaces) or 2% Virkon (liquids) 1% sodium hypochlorite 70% ethanol Glutaraldehyde Formaldehyde Quaternary ammonium disinfectants |
Training | Staff need to be trained and demonstrate proficiency in GMPP | Staff need to be trained and demonstrate proficiency in GMPP |