Introduction
While the Department of Defense (DoD) has given increased attention and priority to preventing sexual assault and sexual harassment (SA/SH), it remains a problem for the US military. DoD’s epidemiological estimates among active-duty Service Members (SMs) in 2021 show 8.4% of women (about 19,000) and 1.5% of men (about 17,000) experienced unwanted sexual contact in the past year. While a somewhat different metric for contact was used in 2021 which prevents comparison to 2018, numerically, these rates appear higher in 2021. Estimated rates of sexual harassment in 2021 among active-duty women increased from 2018, from 24 to 29%. The 2021 rate for men was similar to 2018, about 7%. Female victims are at increased risk of PTSD and other mental health disorders, attempted suicide, demotion in rank, and premature attrition from service (Rosellini et al.,
2017). PTSD and mental health issues are nearly entirely explained by increased exposure to SA/SH (Jaycox et al.,
2022). Reported less, male victims also face similar negative outcomes (Matthews et al.,
2018; Millegan et al.,
2016), and both male and female SA/SH victims are more likely to voluntarily leave the military than SMs who do not experience these crimes (Morral et al.,
2021). DoD recognizes that comprehensive primary prevention is needed to stop SA/SH before it occurs.
DoD Faces Multiple Challenges to Preventing SA/SH in the Military
First released in 2019 and updated in 2022, DoD developed the Prevention Plan of Action (PPoA). Drawing upon years of research on SA/SH prevention and implementation science, the PPoA outlines the requirements for a prevention system across several domains—e.g., infrastructure, leadership, and collaborations—for how each installation should conduct SA/SH prevention. To create a method by which to measure the elements of the PPoA in 2020, we developed the Prevention Evaluation Framework, an assessment tool describing what prevention should look like at military installations and military service academies (Acosta et al.,
2022). The tool, based on literature and a panel of experts, describes organizational and program-level capacities needed to support military SA/SH prevention efforts, operationalized into 36 items in eight domains (see Table
1). Assessments using the PEF found that the implementation of effective prevention in DoD has been challenged by the organizational complexity of the Department of Defense and lack of prevention capacity at all levels (Acosta et al.,
2021). For example, until very recently, DoD has had few designated positions whose sole function was to implement and evaluate SA/SH prevention activities. Furthermore, DoD’s infrastructure for prevention—e.g., leadership support, accountability, systematic evaluation, coordinated activities—has been underdeveloped and most prevention activities focus on building awareness rather than skills—e.g., brief lecture-based presentations (Office of Force Resiliency,
2022). Finally, another challenge is that SA/SH have many risk factors—e.g., perceptions of what peers believe is acceptable behavior, willingness to intervene on behalf of a potential victim, and alcohol and drug use (Tharp et al.,
2013)—that can vary across the Department. Thus, multiple organizational capacities are needed both at the program (e.g., matching programming to documented need, continuously evaluating) and system (e.g., operate with accountability up and down the chain of command, provide leadership support) levels (Acosta et al.,
2022) to address these challenges.
Table 1
Prevention evaluation framework—organizational factors
Leadership | Leaders use best evidence, monitor prevention activities, and hold subordinates accountable for their prevention work |
Prevention workforce | Have sufficient numbers of training personnel who have regular contact with leadership |
Collaborative relationships | Prevention personnel collaborate with each other inside the organization and with experts outside the organization |
Data | Data is collected to document the specific nature of the problem locally and data is also used to track prevention impact |
Resources | SA/SH prevention efforts have a dedicated budget for staffing, adaptation, implementation, evaluation, sustainability |
Comprehensive approach to prevention | Prevention activities are evidence-based, target multiple risk factors across multiple ecological levels, and build skills as well as attitudes and knowledge |
Quality implementation | Implementation processes are monitored for multiple elements of fidelity |
Continuous evaluation | All prevention is regularly evaluated and improved |
Efforts to Build Capacity for Quality Prevention of SA/SH in the Military
DoD has taken multiple steps to build SA/SH prevention capacity, developing policies and guidance to support changes made at service headquarters (from the top-down), while simultaneously supporting capacity-building at individual installations (from the bottom-up).
Purpose and Contributions
The purpose of this study was to (1) describe how GTO was used at these installations; (2) identify benefits and challenges from using GTO and to what extent GTO was able to overcome those challenges and build prevention capacity; and (3) discuss lessons the GTO effort yielded for prevention more broadly. The contributions to prevention science are the lessons learned from employing a bottom-up capacity-building intervention in a military context, which represents a very large, and traditionally top-down organizational structure. To our knowledge, there has not been such an effort to build prevention capacity in the military using an implementation support like GTO before. To date, GTO has generally been evaluated in organizationally flat, community-based, and low-resource settings implementing youth prevention programming (e.g., Boys & Girls Clubs). In previous trials comparing organizations randomized to implement a prevention evidence-based program (EBP) on their own with youth or to implement the EBP with GTO, organizations using GTO implemented the EBP with higher fidelity (Chinman et al.,
2016,
2018a,
b) demonstrated better outcomes among participating youth (Chinman et al.,
2018a,
b), and were more likely to sustain the EBP after the end of the GTO support (Acosta et al.,
2020). GTO sites made these gains despite facing organizational barriers such as a poor implementation climate (Cannon et al.,
2019). In contrast, this study advances our understanding of the barriers and facilitators of using an implementation support like GTO in a large system, one of the first to do so.
Discussion
This project was the first systematic effort to build capacity for SA/SH prevention in the US military using a bottom-up approach like GTO. Almost all participating sites were able to implement a prevention program, some with multiple cohorts of SMs, despite COVID-19 restrictions. Although mostly qualitative, the data is consistent with previous GTO randomized and quasi-experimental trials in civilian contexts in which those who were more engaged in the GTO process experienced greater improvements in their programming and had larger gains in capacity (Acosta et al.,
2013; Chinman et al.,
2013; Matthew Chinman et al.,
2008a,
b).
The challenges that GTO faced in the 10 sites reveal larger prevention systems issues within DoD that have implications for prevention across the Department. These larger issues are not just relevant for the US military. They could as easily apply to the public school systems, who have also been looked to for implementing various prevention programs, but often have not been able to do so with any impact (Chinman et al.,
2019). The eight domains of the Prevention Evaluation Framework (in
italics below) are a useful guide for how to view these key systems issues of prevention—which of these a bottom-up approach like GTO can impact—and how the lessons learned from the GTO pilot can inform plans for the future of prevention in DoD and in large organizations in the civilian sector as well as what changes are needed for implementation strategies like GTO to make those strategies more accommodating to sites.
While the top DoD
leadership (e.g., Secretary of Defense Austin) strongly endorses a robust prevention system,
1 leaders lower in the chain of command (i.e., base commanders) often have a more direct impact. In the pilot, sites with more engaged, knowledgeable installation leaders used GTO more comprehensively, operated with greater accountability, and were more likely to endorse continuing to use GTO. Although many correctly point to “leadership” as being an important predictor of evidence-based practice uptake (Hannes et al.,
2010; Vroom et al.,
2021), this study highlights the need for all organizations, including DoD, to activate the “middle” leadership layer. Included in this layer are champions, those who support, market, and support program implementation and help to overcome resistance to prevention efforts in an organization (Bonawitz et al.,
2020). This study showed how champions were effective—e.g., by communicating the benefits of GTO and prevention up the chain of command and providing consistency in the face of GTO Team member turnover. As is in this study, organizations that have both champions and supportive leadership appear better poised to conduct effective prevention.
Given the importance of leadership and champions, additions to the GTO implementation strategy could include securing preliminary agreements up front and making changes to the construction of the GTO implementation teams. In the current and past projects (Chinman, Acosta, et al.,
2018; Chinman, Ebener, et al.,
2018), the GTO implementation teams have been made of naturally emerging champions and individuals who were directly responsible for implementation who would then reach out to leadership for assistance. In these projects, the participating organizations were much flatter than DoD. Thus, in the current project, while certain champions did emerge and facilitate, it would likely improve implementation if GTO coaches engaged in a more intentional process of identifying champions a priori. Including key opinion leaders across multiple levels as part of the team, and strategically identifying them through a diffusion of innovation lens (i.e., early adopters) and matching their characteristics to contextual factors of the organization as recommended by (Bunce et al.,
2020), could improve leadership support. Furthermore, studies have shown that
multiple champions are often needed for successful implementation (Damschroder et al.,
2009; Shaw et al.,
2012; Soo et al.,
2009), especially in a hierarchical organization like DoD with multiple levels of command. This approach could help ameliorate the fact that the senior leaders who volunteered the participation of their sites were not involved in GTO or the implementation of the chosen intervention at the site in their command—a circumstance that is common especially in large organizations.
Another critical factor for GTO in these sites and across DoD is the availability of a dedicated, trained
prevention workforce. While GTO was able to successfully train GTO teams at each site, turnover, busy schedules, and the lack of dedicated personnel were constraints over time. Whether asking middle school teachers to incorporate drug prevention into their health class or asking DoD sexual assault
response personnel to add prevention to their portfolio, organizations attempting prevention will be less successful without qualified and dedicated prevention personnel—with or without implementation support approaches such as GTO. The time required and complexity of GTO were drawbacks mentioned by sites; however, a qualified and dedicated workforce may be more effective in utilizing such support. The effort underway by DoD to hire new dedicated prevention personnel— ~ 350 as of May 2023, ~ 2000 planned (Department of Defense,
2022)—is an opportunity, but must be done with care as new staff who are tasked to implement a new kind of service can be siloed or unwelcome. For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hired and deployed 1200 “Peer Specialists,” individuals with mental illnesses and substance abuse disorders who are trained to use their experience to help other Veterans with similar problems (M. Chinman et al.,
2008b). Using implementation science methods, many researchers have documented how traditional VA staff have been extremely hesitant about incorporating this new kind of provider, despite evidence showing they improve outcomes and are greatly valued by Veteran patients (e.g., Chinman et al.,
2006). Implementation strategies, such as collaboratively planning the new service, have been helpful in mitigating these challenges (Chinman et al.,
2010) and would likely be useful in deploying the prevention workforce in DoD.
After the foundational domains of leadership and the prevention workforce, three additional domains—
collaborative relationships, data, and
resources—must be considered. GTO was able to make some impact on all three: brokering collaborations across silos, ensuring program evaluation data was collected and analyzed to support data-driven decisions, and helping GTO site team members to request more resources. However, to truly have a functional prevention system, organizations like DoD must integrate previously siloed efforts—including having personnel tackling different related domains (e.g., sexual assault, alcohol), coordinating their programming, and sharing data. While adequate resources are needed to support personnel and programming (e.g., Chinman et al.,
2012), this study shows that resources do not exist in a vacuum, but are tied to engaged and supportive leadership, which in turn often requires ongoing access to data showing the impact of prevention on outcomes.
Lastly, the final three domains—
comprehensive approach to prevention, quality implementation, and
continuous evaluation—all relate to the conduct of prevention activities on the ground. GTO’s training, tools, and coaching were able to support better quality prevention than had previously been implemented. GTO guidance strongly encourages organizations to implement comprehensive prevention that is consistent with evidence; however, in the military, that was difficult. Most evidence-based prevention programs were developed outside the military and must be adapted (Acosta et al.,
2021; Perkins et al.,
2016), requiring a higher level of skill among those doing the adapting. Implementation supports like GTO can help, as shown in this study, but having a larger number of military-tested, evidence-based programs available would greatly enhance adoption. Implementing with quality and conducting continuous evaluation—key elements of any prevention effort—often requires a culture that genuinely uses the results of these activities (i.e., evaluation data) and rewards them. As demonstrated, GTO was able to support these activities, but ultimately, meeting the demands of these three domains across the entire military will largely be dependent on the other domains of Prevention Evaluation Framework—e.g., supportive leadership, appropriate workforce, and resources.
Limitations and Future Research
Although the first to evaluate implementation support—GTO—for prevention in the military, this study used a small number of sites and did not assess SM outcomes but focused on the impacts of GTO on sites’ prevention capacity and performance. Future studies in the military, and other large organizations, should include large, cluster-randomized trials where sites tasked with prevention are randomized to receive GTO or not. Similar to GTO studies in community settings (Acosta et al.,
2013; Chinman, Acosta, et al.,
2018; Chinman, Ebener, et al.,
2018), such trials should assess site- and implementer-level characteristics, implementation outcomes (e.g., fidelity, dose), outcomes of individual participants, while adding social network analyses to assess impacts of champions.
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