Background
Term | Definition | References | |
---|---|---|---|
Analysis Plan | Describes the evidence and measurement endpoints to be used in the ERA, which can be tiered to prioritize the most informative evidence for decision-making | [80] | |
Assessment Endpoint | Explicit expression of environmental or health value to be protected | [37] | |
Direct Effect | Effects on individual organisms that the transgenic itself generates, such as via predation, competition, hybridization and introduction of new parasites and diseases. | [26] | |
Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) | Process to identify significant risks to the environment and health, estimating their magnitude and likelihood and defining any risk management required | ||
Conceptual Model | Environmental and health entities of value and their measurable attributes | [37] | |
Ecosystem Services | ‘Provisioning services’ such as water, ‘Regulating services’ such as pollination and ‘Supporting services’ such as nutrient recycling, delivered within an ecosystem and of benefit to humans | ||
Exposure Characterisation | Quantitative estimation of the likely exposure of other biota and the environment to the transgenic, conducted subsequent to the problem formulation in an ERA | [26] | |
Exposure Route | Possible route by which direct and indirect exposure to a potential harm may occur | [26] | |
Fitness | Success of an individual in surviving and reproducing, measured by the individual‘s genetic contribution to the next generation and subsequent generations | [26] | |
Harm | Adverse effect on something of value, relevant to an identified protection goal | [41] | |
Hazard | Potential adverse effects that can lead harm to the environment or health | [26] | |
Hazard Characterisation | Qualitative and/or quantitative evaluation of environmental or health adverse effects, conducted subsequent to the problem formulation in an ERA | [26] | |
Indirect Effect | Effects on individual organisms in the wider environment without immediate contact with the transgenic | [26] | |
Limits of Concern | Minimum ecological effects set for each assessment endpoint that are deemed both biologically relevant and of sufficient magnitude to cause harm. | [26] | |
Measurement Endpoint | Measurable characteristic that is related to the environmental or health value chosen as the assessment endpoint | [26] | |
Plausible Pathway to Potential Harm | Causal chain of events that would need to occur for a potential harm to a protection goal to be realised, often referred to a “pathway to harm” in the literature for brevity | [41] | |
Potential Harm | Theoretical adverse outcome relevant to a protection goal | [41] | |
Problem Formulation | First step in ERA where policy goals are identified, and pathways to harm, risk hypotheses and analysis plans are defining to guide the evaluation of data in the next steps of ERA. | ||
Protection Goal | Policy and legislation defining environmental or health resources to be protected, the degree of protection they deserve, or the maximum impacts that should be tolerated. | [38] | |
Risk | Combination of the magnitude of a hazard, if it occurs, and the likelihood that it occurs | [27] | |
Risk Hypothesis | Hypothesis generated in problem formulation for specific step in pathway to potential harm such that no more harm or risk will occur to a protection goal than via existing activities | [41] | |
Valued species | Species that is keystone, charismatic, threatened or endangered; identified and characterised from National Biodiversity Strategies and Actions Plans as set out by the CBD or the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, and locally derived knowledge. | ||
Vectorial capacity (V) | Total number of potentially infectious bites that would eventually arise from all the mosquitoes biting a single completely infectious (i.e., all mosquito bites result in infection) host on a single day, with individual elements that contribute to this value identified below: | ||
Protection goal | Plausible pathway to potential Harm | Cause of potential harm | Effect of potential harm | Correlation of Exposure Levels with Transgene Efficacy | Relevance to ERAs for other transgenic mosquito strains | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Biodiversity | 1 | Potential toxicological effects of dsxFCRISPRh transgenics on NTOs could reduce ecosystem services. | Transgenic contains toxin or allergen | Direct: Reduced density of valued species or ecosystem services | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | ||||
2 | Potentially broader tolerances for humidity, temperature, salinity, or desiccation in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could reduce densities of valued species or ecosystem services. | Increased fitness in transgenic; changes in competitive interactions | Direct: Reduced density of valued species or ecosystem services | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
3 | Potentially cumulative Cas9/gRNA off-target or retargeted nuclease activity in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could cause broader tolerances for humidity, temperature, salinity, or egg desiccation to reduce densities of valued species or ecosystem services. | Off-target or re-targeted mutations; increased fitness in transgenic; changes in competitive interactions | Direct: Reduced density of valued species or ecosystem services | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All CRISPR-Cas9-based transgenic strains | |||||
4 | Potential horizontal gene flow of the dsxFCRISPRh transgene that would contain construct backbone sequences could confer a growth advantage to bacteria that are pathogenic to a valued species, thus reducing densities of valued species or ecosystem services. | Gene flow to NTOs | Indirect: Reduced density of valued species or ecosystem services | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
5 | Potential horizontal gene flow of the dsxFCRISPRh transgene to a NTO eukaryote could lead to its unintended population suppression, thus reducing densities of valued species or ecosystem services. | Gene flow to NTOs | Indirect: Reduced density of valued species or ecosystem services | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All population suppression gene drive transgenic strains | |||||
6 | Reduction in densities of valued species or ecosystem services could be caused by their increased consumption by a predator. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; population suppression; changes in predator-prey interactions | Indirect: Reduced density of valued species or ecosystem services | Positive with gene drive; positive with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene in some circumstances | All population suppression gene drive transgenic strains, but potentially applicable any other successful gene drive transgenic strains | |||||
7 | Upon population suppression of Anopheles gambiae via gene drive, its niche could be occupied by competitor species that could cause suppression of a valued species to affect ecosystem services. | Changes in competitive interactions | Indirect: Reduced density of valued species or ecosystem services | Positive with gene drive; positive with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All population suppression gene drive transgenic strains, but potentially applicable any other successful vector control approaches | |||||
8 | Potential reductions in densities of valued species or ecosystem servicers due to poor nutrient composition of aquatic habitats could be caused by potentially increased dsxFCRISPRh transgenic larval mortality. | Fitness costs in transgenic | Indirect: Reduced density of valued species or ecosystem services | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Gene drive transgenic strains | |||||
Water quality | 9 | Potential adverse impact on quality of water, and its flora and fauna, from reduced nutrient composition of aquatic habitats could be caused by potential toxicity of dsxFCRISPRh transgenic products. | Fitness costs in transgenic; transgenic contains toxin or allergen. | Indirect: Toxic water quality for NTOs | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | ||||
10 | Potential adverse impact on drinking water in aquatic habitats could be caused by potentially higher mortality of dsxFCRISPRh transgenic larvae. | Fitness costs in transgenic | Indirect: Reduced water quality for humans and livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
Human health | 11 | Transgenic proteins could cause specific allergic or toxicological responses in humans from dsxFCRISPRh transgenic bites beyond responses to non-transgenic bites. | Transgenic contains toxin or allergen | Direct: Increased allergic or immune responses in humans; increased toxicity in humans | Independent of efficacy of gene drive or population suppression as defined by allergic responses in individual humans; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | ||||
12 | Potential incidental ingestion or inhalation of dsxFCRISPRh transgenic material could cause specific allergic responses in humans beyond responses to non-transgenic material. | Transgenic contains toxin or allergen | Direct: Increased allergic or immune responses in humans | Independent of efficacy of gene drive or population suppression as defined by allergic responses in individual humans; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
13 | Increased allergenicity in humans could occur from potentially altered levels of endogenous allergens in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics. | Transgenic contains toxin or allergen | Direct: Increased allergic or immune responses in humans | Independent of efficacy of gene drive or population suppression as defined by allergic responses in individual humans; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
14 | Potentially decreased mosquito defence response to pathogen in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics from altered levels of endogenous RNA, protein or microbiome could lead to increased human disease. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
15 | Potentially decreased human defence response to pathogen from altered levels of endogenous RNA or protein in the saliva dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could lead to increased disease in humans. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour | Direct: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
16 | Potential immunopathological responses via biting exposure to gRNA expressed in saliva of dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could lead to increases in morbidity and mortality in humans. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour | Direct: Increased allergic or immune responses in humans | Independent of efficacy of gene drive or population suppression as defined by allergic responses in individual humans; dependent on presence of transgene | All CRISPR-Cas9-based transgenic strains | |||||
17 | Potential secondary toxicological effects in humans from consuming NTOs which would have fed on dsxFCRISPRh transgenics. | Transgenic contains toxin or allergen | Indirect: Increased toxicity in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
18 | Potentially increased fitness, including insecticide resistance, of dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could increase disease transmission in humans. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased fitness in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
19 | Potentially increased biting rate of dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could increase disease transmission in humans. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased biting rates | Direct: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
20 | Potentially increased vector competence in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could increase disease transmission in humans. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
21 | Potentially altered anatomy, or host-seeking behaviour, in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could increase the transmission of human diseases, including lymphatic filariasis. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic; increased biting rates | Direct: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
22 | Potentially altered anatomy in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could lead them to vector human disease not previously-vectored by Anopheles gambiae. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Novel disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
23 | Potentially altered physiology in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could increase disease transmission in humans. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
24 | Potentially altered physiology in dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could lead them to vector human disease not previously-vectored by Anopheles gambiae. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Novel disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
25 | Potentially cumulative Cas9/gRNA off-target or retargeted nuclease activity in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could cause heritable increase in insecticide resistance, fitness or vector competence to increase human disease. | Off-target or re-targeted mutations; transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic; increased fitness in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All CRISPR-Cas9-based transgenic strains | |||||
26 | Potentially broader tolerances for humidity, temperature, salinity, or desiccation in dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could lead to increased disease transmission in humans. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased transgenic fitness | Direct: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
27 | Increased or novel human disease transmission could be caused by replacement of Anopheles gambiae niche with another disease vector. | Population suppression; changes in competitive interactions | Indirect: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; positive with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All population suppression gene drive transgenic strains, but potentially applicable to any other successful vector control approaches | |||||
28 | Potential toxicological effects of dsxFCRISPRh transgenics on NTOs could increase disease transmission in humans. | Transgenic contains toxin or allergen | Indirect: increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
29 | Potentially reduced density of a predator species caused by population suppression of Anopheles gambiae could lead to increases in density of another human disease vector species. | Population suppression; changes in predator-prey interactions | Indirect: increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; positive with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All population suppression gene drive transgenic strains, but potentially applicable to any other successful vector control approaches | |||||
30 | Potential increases in disease levels beyond those pre-gene drive intervention following a resurgence in pathogen transmission after initial population suppression would have reduced human immunity to pathogen. | Population suppression; changes in herd immunity | Indirect: Increased disease transmission in humans | Positive with gene drive; positive with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All population suppression gene drive transgenic strains, but potentially applicable to any other successful vector control approaches | |||||
Animal health | 31 | Potential toxicity in livestock from dsxFCRISPRh transgenic proteins in saliva. | Transgenic contains toxin or allergen | Direct: Increased toxicity in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | ||||
32 | Potentially decreased mosquito defence response to pathogen in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics from altered levels of endogenous RNA, protein or microbiome could lead to increased disease in livestock. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
33 | Potentially decreased livestock defence response to pathogen from altered levels of endogenous RNA or protein in saliva of dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could lead to increased disease in livestock. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour | Direct: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
34 | Potentially increased fitness, including insecticide resistance, of dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could increase disease transmission in livestock. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased fitness in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
35 | Potentially increased biting rate of dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could increase disease transmission in livestock. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased biting rates | Direct: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
36 | Potentially increased vector competence of dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could increase disease transmission in livestock. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
37 | Potentially altered anatomy, or host-seeking behaviour, in dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could increase disease transmission in livestock. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic; increased biting rates | Direct: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
38 | Potentially altered anatomy in dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could lead it to vector livestock animal disease not previously-vectored by Anopheles gambiae. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic; increased biting rates | Direct: Novel disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
39 | Potentially altered physiology in dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could increase disease transmission in livestock. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
40 | Potentially altered physiology in dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could lead it to vector animal disease not previously-vectored by Anopheles gambiae. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Novel disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | Arises from specific anatomical alterations in homozygous dsxFCRISPRh transgenics but could be applicable to other transgenic strains | |||||
41 | Potentially cumulative Cas9/gRNA off-target or retargeted nuclease activity in dsxFCRISPRh transgenic could cause increase in insecticide resistance, fitness or vector competence to increase disease transmission in livestock. | Off-target or re-targeted mutations; transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased fitness in transgenic; increased vector competence in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All CRISPR-Cas9-based transgenic strains | |||||
42 | Potentially broader tolerances for humidity, temperature, salinity, or desiccation in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could lead to increased disease transmission in livestock. | Transgenic has altered physiology, anatomy, or behaviour; increased fitness in transgenic | Direct: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
43 | Increased or novel disease transmission in livestock animals could be caused by replacement of Anopheles gambiae niche with another disease vector. | Population suppression: changes in competitive interactions | Indirect: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; positive with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All population suppression gene drive transgenic strains, but potentially applicable to any other successful vector control approaches | |||||
44 | Potential toxicological effects of dsxFCRISPRh transgenics on NTOs could increase disease transmission in livestock. | Transgenic contains toxin or allergen | Indirect: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; negative with population suppression; dependent on presence of transgene | All transgenic strains | |||||
45 | Reduced density of a predator species that could be caused by population suppression of Anopheles gambiae could lead to increases in density of another animal disease vector species. | Population suppression: changes in predator-prey interactions | Indirect: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; positive with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All population suppression gene drive transgenic strains, but potentially applicable to any other successful vector control approaches | |||||
46 | Potential increases in livestock disease beyond pre-gene drive intervention levels following resurgence in pathogen transmission after initial population suppression would have reduced livestock immunity to pathogen. | Population suppression: changes in herd immunity | Indirect: Increased disease transmission in livestock | Positive with gene drive; positive with population suppression; independent of presence of transgene | All population suppression gene drive transgenic strains, but potentially applicable to any other successful vector control approaches |
Methods
Defining Anopheles gambiae
Defining the transgenic strain and release conditions
Defining the population dynamics of gene drive genotypic risk profiles
Defining target organisms
Defining intended efficacy outcomes and their relationships to potential harms
Defining protection goals and plausible pathways to potential harm
Defining ‘fitness’
Defining ‘valued species’ and ‘ecosystem services’
Defining ‘vectorial capacity’
Defining off‐targeting and retargeting effects from the CRISPR/Cas9 system
Results
Plausible pathways to potential harms to biodiversity protection goals
Pathway 1. Biodiversity: Potential toxicological effects of dsxFCRISPRh transgenics on NTOs could reduce ecosystem services
Pathway 3. Biodiversity: Potentially cumulative Cas9/gRNA off-target or retargeted nuclease activity in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could cause broader tolerances for humidity, temperature, salinity, or egg desiccation to reduce densities of valued species or ecosystem services
Pathway 5. Biodiversity: Potential horizontal gene flow of the dsxFCRISPRh transgene to a NTO eukaryote could lead to its unintended population suppression, thus reducing densities of valued species or ecosystem services
Plausible pathways to potential harms to water quality protection goals
Pathway 9. Water quality: Potential adverse impact on quality of water, and its flora and fauna, from reduced nutrient composition of aquatic habitats could be caused by potential toxicity of dsxFCRISPRh transgenic products
Plausible pathways to potential harms to human health protection goals
Pathway 11. Human health: Transgenic proteins could cause specific allergic or toxicological responses in humans from dsxFCRISPRh transgenic bites beyond responses to non-transgenic bites
Pathway 21. Human health: Potentially altered anatomy, or host-seeking behaviour, in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could increase the transmission of human diseases, including lymphatic filariasis
Pathway 25. Human health: Potentially cumulative Cas9/gRNA off-target or retargeted nuclease activity in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics could cause heritable increase in insecticide resistance, fitness or vector competence to increase human disease
Pathway 29. Human health: Potentially reduced density of a predator species caused by population suppression of Anopheles gambiae could lead to increases in density of another human disease vector species
Plausible pathways to potential harm for animal health protection goals
Pathway 32: Animal health: Potentially decreased mosquito defence response to pathogen in dsxFCRISPRh transgenics from altered levels of endogenous RNA, protein or microbiome could lead to increased disease in livestock
Pathway 43. Animal health: Increased or novel disease transmission in livestock could be caused by replacement of Anopheles gambiae niche with another disease vector
Discussion
Causes of potential harms
Effects of potential harms
Exposure routes to potential harms
Exposure levels leading to potential harms
Risk hypotheses and experiments with widest impacts
Dismissed pathways to potential harm
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n = 5 pathways to loss of efficacy of population suppression gene drive from the suite of initial pathways considered, as it was agreed they did not directly result in potential harms to protection goals and therefore should not be included amongst the plausible pathways to potential harm;
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n = 3 pathways related to transboundary movement as it was subsequently recognized that ERA does not formally include socio-economic or legal issues, such as the potential for transboundary movement of transgenics, despite these warranting further exploration in the context of gene drive organisms that are anticipated to cross national borders;
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n = 1 pathway to potential harm that would be caused by vertical gene transfer (via hybridization) of the population suppression gene drive from An. gambiae to species outside the complex, as it was subsequently recognized that the most closely related species to those within the An. gambiae complex is An. christyi, but which is separated by circa 9 million years of evolution. The absence of observed gene flow between species of An. gambiae and An. christyi supports the lack of any significant hybridization between these species so that, for even less closely related species of Anopheles, hybridization is considered implausible. Moreover, in species of Anopheles more distantly related to An. gambiae than An. christyi, the guide RNA target DNA sequence of the dsxFCRISPRh transgene diverges from that found in An. gambiae;
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n = 2 pathways leading to potential increases in disease transmission caused by increased transgenic larval mortality because it was based on the false assumption that population suppression would automatically lead to increased larval mortality and because it was ultimately considered biologically implausible as a potential route to increased disease transmission;
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n = 6 pathways to potential harm to either human or animal health that would result in transmission of a novel pathogen caused by altered host-seeking behaviour in, or off-target mutations in, or extension in geographic range of, the transgenic. By contrast, pathways involving altered transgenic anatomy or physiology leading to the transmission of a novel pathogen were retained as plausible;
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n = 6 pathways, which were eliminated when n = 12 pathways were combined together into n = 6 pathways at the request of peer reviewers to help identify more efficiently common risk hypotheses and key experiments that could interrogate the viability of a number of pathways to a low level of remaining uncertainty.