Introduction
In everyday life, distraction can easily interfere with goal-directed behavior, limiting humans’ ability to stay focused on task-relevant information (Eltiti et al.
2005). Previous literature demonstrated that emotional events (mainly negative) have a privileged access to visual awareness because they tend to capture attention and processing resources in a bottom-up fashion (Vuilleumier
2005; Yiend
2010). For the same reason, negative stimuli have been shown to be particularly successful in distracting people from their current goal (Anticevic et al.
2010; Dolcos et al.
2006; Dolcos and McCarthy
2006; Iordan and Dolcos
2015; Wessa et al.
2013). Several studies reported evidence that negative stimuli are hard to be ignored, even when the emotional valence of the stimulus is entirely irrelevant to the current task (Fenker et al.
2010; Huang et al.
2011; Pessoa et al.
2002; Vuilleumier et al.
2001; Ziaei et al.
2014,
2018).
The neural mechanisms that allow for a prioritized processing of task-relevant negative information are thought to involve direct subcortical pathways that reach the amygdala (for reviews, see Pessoa and Adolphs 2010; Vuilleumier
2005) and the insula (Menon and Uddin
2010; Uddin
2015; Zaki et al.
2012). While the role of the amygdala in emotional processing has been suggested since a long time (MacLean
1952; see also Pessoa
2008), recent models emphasize the crucial role played by the insula as an emotional “hub” (Menon and Uddin
2010; Uddin
2015; Wessa et al.
2013; Zaki et al.
2012). This para-limbic region has been demonstrated to derive information about bodily states, and, subsequently, to play a crucial role in the experience of emotions (Critchley and Harrison
2013; Zaki et al.
2012). The insula would detect behaviorally relevant stimuli and coordinate high-level neural resources through extensive anatomical and functional connections with the rest of the brain (Menon and Uddin
2010; Uddin
2015). This region has been shown to have intrinsic functional connectivity with large-scale brain networks such as the dorsal frontoparietal network and the default mode network (e.g., Seeley et al.
2007; Sridharan et al.
2008; Uddin et al.
2011). For these reasons, the insula has been recently described as the core structure of the so-called “saliency network” (Uddin
2015), a brain system devoted to prioritize processing of potentially relevant information (Desimone and Duncan
1995; Itti et al.
1998), with implications for the allocation of spatial attention (e.g., Gottlieb et al.
1998; Nardo et al.
2014) and working memory (WM) encoding (e.g., Fine and Minnery
2009; Melcher and Piazza
2011; Pedale and Santangelo
2015; Santangelo and Macaluso
2013; Santangelo et al.
2015; see, for a review, Santangelo
2015). Overall, both limbic and para-limbic regions (namely the amygdala and the insula) are thought to automatically activate in the presence of negative stimuli and to modulate the activity of key regions involved in sensory processes (e.g., the primary visual cortex; Vuilleumier
2005) and high-level post-perceptual processes, such as top-down attentional control (e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Uddin
2015), short- and long-term memories (e.g., the medial temporal lobe and the hippocampus; Dolcos et al.
2004), and decision-making (e.g., the orbital frontal cortex; Bechara et al.
2000).
The impact of “emotional distraction” on goal-directed behavior has been primarily studied in the context of WM tasks, for example, by presenting task-irrelevant negative stimuli while the participants have to maintain previously encoded information (Anticevic et al.
2010; Dolcos et al.
2006; Dolcos and McCarthy
2006; Iordan and Dolcos
2015). Using this design, Dolcos and McCarthy (
2006) reported that the presentation of negative stimuli during the WM maintenance phase evoked increased activity in emotional-related areas, namely the amygdala and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Concurrently, the authors observed a decrement of activation in working memory-related areas, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the lateral parietal cortex. The latter imaging effect correlated with a concurrent behavioral decrement of WM performance. In the same year, Dolcos and colleagues (2006) also reported evidence that emotional-related areas, such as the amygdala, showed increased functional connectivity with the inferior frontal cortex—a well-known area involved with general inhibitory processes (e.g., Aron et al.
2004)—when negative distractors were presented during WM maintenance. These findings highlight a tight interplay between ventral “affective” and dorsal “control” regions that shows enhanced coupling to cope with emotional distraction in the context of WM tasks (see, for a review, Iordan et al.
2013).
However, in these previous WM studies, neutral stimuli and emotional distractors were temporally separated, with emotional interference arising in the absence of any simultaneous stimulation. On the contrary, in everyday life, our sensory experience is characterized by a multitude of concurrent stimuli competing among them to access our awareness (Bundesen et al.
2011). Emotionally salient stimuli are thought to have a high probability of winning the competition, affecting the distribution of our attentional resources (Vuilleumier
2005; Yiend
2010). In this sense, visual search tasks could offer an optimal scenario to understand the neural systems that are responsible for the facing of “emotional distraction” on goal-directed behavior during the deployment of visual attention resources. Visual search is an attention task involving an active scan of the environment for a specific target among a number of different distractors. During a visual search task, neutral and emotional objects could be simultaneously presented allowing to test for the efficacy of emotional stimuli in promoting visual attention selection when they are the target to be searched for, or in negatively affecting the capacity to pay attention to other (emotionally neutral) elements when they are task irrelevant (i.e., emotional distraction).
Previous behavioral studies showed that emotional distraction plays a detrimental role on visual search performance (Anderson et al.
2011; Fenker et al.
2010; Hodsoll et al.
2011; Huang et al.
2011). However, as far as we know, no studies have been conducted to investigate the specific neural correlates involved with the avoidance of task-irrelevant emotional stimuli during visual search. Moreover, only few studies directly compared searching for emotional vs. non-emotional targets (i.e., with the emotional item playing a distracting role). These studies reported contrasting results, and none of these investigated the neural correlates involved with these processes. Hodsoll and colleagues (
2011) reported a behavioral study in which participants were asked to search for a female target face among male distracting faces (or vice versa) and judge whether the target face was tilted to the left or to the right. When one of the distractor faces had an emotional expression, the orientation discrimination of the target face was impaired. This suggests that task-irrelevant emotional stimuli can capture attention resources, with a consequent detriment on search performance. Other studies showed, however, opposite findings. Hunt and colleagues (2007) asked participants to make a speeded saccade toward a predefined target among distractors. The valence (happy or angry) and orientation (upright or inverted) of the target and distractors, both consisting in “emoticon” faces, varied. The authors reported that task-irrelevant emotional faces captured oculomotor behavior, thus impairing search of the current target. However, this happened only when the current target was defined by an emotional expression. By contrast, when the participants were asked to search for a neutral feature, such as an upright face among inverted distractors, task-irrelevant emotional faces failed to capture the overt orienting of attention. The authors interpreted these results as an evidence that searching for neutral stimuli in the presence of emotional distractors depends on top-down attention control (e.g., Pessoa et al.
2002), and on the specific task-set related to the current target definition.
Overall, this behavioral literature indicates that under some circumstances emotional stimuli have privileged access to attentional and perceptual processes, while in other conditions efficient top-down regulation can prevent distraction/interference. Here, we conducted an eye tracking–fMRI experiment aimed at investigating—both at behavioral and neuro-physiological level—the interplay between emotional capture and emotional distraction (derived from either negative or positive stimuli), that is, the impact of task-relevant vs. -irrelevant emotional objects in biasing spatial attention selection. With respect to the previous literature, employing very simple and repetitive stimuli (e.g., words: Bradley and Lang
1999; faces: Lundqvist et al.
1998; single visual objects: IAPS, Lang et al.
1999), here we used complex everyday life scenes. Complex scenes involve a large number of discrete elements, thus enhancing stimulus competition and the need of attentional selection (e.g., Henderson
2003; see also Desimone and Duncan
1995). We hypothesized that the interplay between affective and control regions affects the allocation of spatial attention when searching through visual scenes that include emotional stimuli. Moreover, we asked whether any such mechanism of attention control would engage also when distraction derives from positive stimuli or it is rather selective for coping with negative-driven emotional distraction.
During fMRI scanning, we presented participants with pictures depicting everyday scenes. These included an emotional object (either negative or positive) that in half of the trials corresponded to the to-be-searched and judged target. When emotional objects were task irrelevant, subjects were asked instead to search for an emotionally neutral object in the scene. Additionally, we added a baseline condition, consisting of scenes not including any emotional object, which enabled us to measure the behavioral performance and neural correlates of searching for a neutral object in the absence of emotional distraction. At a behavioral level (Behavioral Hypothesis, Beh H 1), we expected a “search benefit” for task-relevant emotional targets compared to neutral targets (Vuilleumier
2005; Yiend
2010). Following the literature on emotional distraction that mainly investigated the effect of “negative” distracting stimuli (Anderson et al.
2011; Anticevic et al.
2010; Dolcos et al.
2006; Dolcos and McCarthy
2006; Hodsoll et al.
2011; Iordan and Dolcos
2015; Wessa et al.
2013; Ziaei et al.
2014,
2018), we also predicted (Beh H 2) a “search cost” when the participants had to find neutral targets in scenes including a task-irrelevant negative distractor compared to scenes without emotional distractor.
Furthermore, we collected eye-movement data, which allowed us to assess the exploration of the scenes depending on the task relevance/irrelevance of the emotional stimuli. Here, we expected (Eye Movement Hypothesis, EM H 1) that task-relevant emotional objects would lead to faster fixations compared to neutral targets. Additionally (EM H 2), if emotional objects were automatically processed we would expect to find evidence of equally fast fixations, irrespectively of their task relevance. By contrast (EM H 3), if top-down control was efficient in avoiding emotional distraction we would expect a reduction of attentional capturing by task-irrelevant vs. task-relevant emotional stimuli (Huang et al.
2011; Hunt et al.
2007).
At a neuroimaging level (fMRI Hypothesis, fMRI H 1), we expected that searching for emotional objects would reflect in the activation of limbic (i.e., the amygdala; Vuilleumier et al. 2001) and para-limbic (i.e., the insular cortex; Uddin 2014) areas. Moreover (fMRI H 2), we expected that coping with emotional distraction when searching for a neutral target would result in an increased activation of brain regions involved in top-down attention control, such as the dorsal frontoparietal network to preserve goal-directed behavior (Corbetta et al.
2008; Corbetta and Shulman
2002; see also Iordan et al.
2013; Wessa et al.
2013; Ziaei et al.
2014). While the previous literature on emotional distraction (Anticevic et al.
2010; Dolcos et al.
2006; Dolcos and McCarthy
2006; Iordan and Dolcos
2015) mainly focused on the interference driven by negative distractors, in the present study we also aimed at investigating whether positive stimuli would produce a similar interference, and would engage the same coping mechanism at the neural level. Specifically, we expected an increased activation of regions related to voluntary eye-movement control—such as the frontal eye field (FEF; Mohanty et al.
2009; Tseng et al.
2014)—during the avoidance of both negative and positive emotional distractors. Further (fMRI H 3), on the basis of previous literature suggesting automatic processing of negative stimuli by limbic/para-limbic areas (i.e., the amygdala and the insular cortex; e.g., Phelps
2006; Uddin et al.
2014; Vuilleumier et al.
2001), we tested for higher activation of those areas specifically involved with the processing of negative stimuli, irrespective of their task relevance, also with the help of a localizer task for emotional-related processing areas. Finally (fMRI H 4), following the hypothesis that affective regions modulate the activity of the frontoparietal control regions during negative emotional distraction (Dolcos and McCarthy
2006), we expected an increased functional connectivity between limbic/para-limbic areas (mainly responding to negative stimuli; i.e., the amygdala and the insular cortex; e.g., Phelps
2006; Uddin et al.
2014) and the dorsal frontoparietal control network when subjects searched for a neutral target-object in the presence of a negative emotional distractor. This would be consistent with the notion that the interplay between affective and attention control regions can mitigate the impact of emotional distraction on the allocation of spatial processing resources.
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