Surveillance activities should go beyond simply documenting and tracking where HPAI H5 viruses occur, but rather target sampling in areas where management outcomes can be applied that enhance biosecurity. The existing HPAI surveillance plan for waterfowl focuses on early detection of viruses in specific areas (Fig.
1, box 1), selected on the basis of watershed characteristics, dabbling duck populations and movements, and previous AI activity [
2]. For example, that plan calls for a greater sampling effort in areas of Utah and Nevada with prioritized watersheds and mixing of dabbling ducks but little commercial poultry production, than in the portions of Iowa and Minnesota where commercial poultry losses associated with H5N2 exceeded 40 million birds in spring 2015 [
2,
15]. We propose that sampling be stratified in relation to the risk of economic damage to the poultry industry associated with these viruses by targeting areas of highest poultry density (Fig.
2) [
3]. When HPAI is detected in a region, either in wild birds or poultry, directed sampling should immediately expand to include potential bridge species appropriate to specific locations and time (Fig.
1, box 2). Poultry facilities attract flies, rodents, and other pests and an investigation of 81 HPAI-positive turkey farms in the Midwestern U.S. in 2015 indicated that wild birds were observed within facilities on 35 % of farms [
35,
36]. Wildlife surveys and poultry facility investigations can be used to identify high priority bridge species [
16,
17,
36]. Identification of the pathways by which HPAI can move from waterfowl into commercial poultry holdings can then be used to enhance and actively target biosecurity [
31] (Fig.
1, box 3). We emphasize that in our conceptual model of HPAI movement, biosecurity is the only factor that could be controlled (Fig.
1). As such, a logical goal of a surveillance program would be to facilitate enhancement of biosecurity. Understanding which bridge species may be involved, when, how, and why they enter poultry facilities is necessary to define potential counter strategies. Clearly the response to avian vs mammalian bridge species would be different. It may also be productive to pursue identification of bridge species associated with low pathogenic AI infections, as these are common in wild waterfowl and occur annually in commercial poultry [
37]. Detailed studies of epidemiological links between wild waterfowl and commercial poultry may provide a means to target biosecurity and lessen the economic impacts of the HPAI viruses currently circulating in in North America. Timely analyses of collected samples and rapid response to positive detections from surveillance results are also essential to facilitating management outcomes.