Skip to main content
Erschienen in: Neuroethics 3/2016

01.12.2016 | Original Paper

My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance Enhancement for Realists

verfasst von: John R. Shook

Erschienen in: Neuroethics | Ausgabe 3/2016

Einloggen, um Zugang zu erhalten

Abstract

How should ethics help decide the morality of enhancing morality? The idea of morally enhancing the human brain quickly emerged when the promise of cognitive enhancement in general began to seem realizable. However, on reflection, achieving moral enhancement must be limited by the practical challenges to any sort of cognitive modification, along with obstacles particular to morality’s bases in social cognition. The objectivity offered by the brain sciences cannot ensure the technological achievement of moral bioenhancement for humanity-wide application. Additionally, any limited moral enhancement will not easily fulfil ethical expectations. Three hypothetical scenarios involving putative moral enhancement help illustrate why. Philosophical concerns about the “Does-Must Dichotomy” and the “Factor-Cause Plurality,” as I label them, forbid easy leaps from views about morality on to conclusions about ways to enhance morality, and then further on to ethically justifying those enhancements. A modest and realistic approach to moral enhancement emerges from exploring these issues.
Fußnoten
1
Quoted in [11], p. 9.
 
2
Quoted in [16], p. 142.
 
3
Paraphrasing David Hume [27], book III, part I, section I.
 
4
Ranking moral theories as more or less ethical can be handled by moral psychology and moral neurology, according to Joshua Greene [28, 29].
 
5
These kinds of concerns have bases in moral psychology [31] and get raised in reviews [3235] of Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s Unfit for the Future [36].
 
6
Critics of moral enhancement by various means, not just involving fairness, have appealed to these Limits. Examples for each Limit are: Limit I – [12] on losing freedom; Limit II – [39] on negative feedback systems; Limit III –[40] on trusting morally enhanced persons; Limit IV – [41] ch. 8 on the morality of posthumans; Limit V – [42] on chasing moral perfectionism; Limit VI – [43] ch 3 on overcoming prejudice in institutions.
 
Literatur
1.
Zurück zum Zitat Murray, Thomas H. 2007. Enhancement. In Oxford handbook of bioethics, ed. Bonnie Steinbock, 491–515. New York: Oxford University Press. Murray, Thomas H. 2007. Enhancement. In Oxford handbook of bioethics, ed. Bonnie Steinbock, 491–515. New York: Oxford University Press.
2.
Zurück zum Zitat Shook, John R., and James Giordano. 2016. Neuroethics beyond normal: performance enablement and self-transformative technologies. Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 25(1): 121–140.CrossRef Shook, John R., and James Giordano. 2016. Neuroethics beyond normal: performance enablement and self-transformative technologies. Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 25(1): 121–140.CrossRef
3.
Zurück zum Zitat Douglas, Thomas. 2008. Moral enhancement. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25(3): 228–245.CrossRef Douglas, Thomas. 2008. Moral enhancement. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25(3): 228–245.CrossRef
5.
Zurück zum Zitat Cabrera, Laura, Nicholas Fitz, and Peter Reiner. 2015. Empirical support for the moral salience of the therapy-enhancement distinction in the debate over cognitive, affective and social enhancement. Neuroethics 8(3): 243–256.CrossRef Cabrera, Laura, Nicholas Fitz, and Peter Reiner. 2015. Empirical support for the moral salience of the therapy-enhancement distinction in the debate over cognitive, affective and social enhancement. Neuroethics 8(3): 243–256.CrossRef
6.
Zurück zum Zitat Daniels, Norman. 2000. Normal functioning and the treatment-enhancement distinction. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9(3): 309–322.CrossRef Daniels, Norman. 2000. Normal functioning and the treatment-enhancement distinction. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9(3): 309–322.CrossRef
7.
Zurück zum Zitat President’s Council on Bioethics. 2003. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. Washington, D.C.: President’s Council on Bioethics. President’s Council on Bioethics. 2003. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. Washington, D.C.: President’s Council on Bioethics.
8.
Zurück zum Zitat Mehlman, Maxwell. 2009. The Price of Perfection: Individualism and Society in the Era of Biomedical Enhancement. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Mehlman, Maxwell. 2009. The Price of Perfection: Individualism and Society in the Era of Biomedical Enhancement. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
9.
Zurück zum Zitat Gordijn, Bert. 2014. Enhancement. In Handbook of global bioethics, eds. Henk ten Have, and Bert Gordin, 649–670. Berlin: Springer. Gordijn, Bert. 2014. Enhancement. In Handbook of global bioethics, eds. Henk ten Have, and Bert Gordin, 649–670. Berlin: Springer.
10.
Zurück zum Zitat Shook, John R., and James Giordano. 2016. Defining contexts of cognitive (performance) enhancements: neuroethical considerations, and implications for policy. In Cognitive enhancement: Ethical and policy implications in international perspectives, eds. Fabrice Jotterand, and Veljko Dubljevic, 76–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef Shook, John R., and James Giordano. 2016. Defining contexts of cognitive (performance) enhancements: neuroethical considerations, and implications for policy. In Cognitive enhancement: Ethical and policy implications in international perspectives, eds. Fabrice Jotterand, and Veljko Dubljevic, 76–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
11.
Zurück zum Zitat Harris, John. 2007. Enhancing evolution: the ethical case for making better people. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Harris, John. 2007. Enhancing evolution: the ethical case for making better people. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12.
Zurück zum Zitat Harris, John. 2011. Moral enhancement and freedom. Bioethics 25(2): 102–111.CrossRef Harris, John. 2011. Moral enhancement and freedom. Bioethics 25(2): 102–111.CrossRef
13.
Zurück zum Zitat Shook, John R. 2012. Neuroethics and the possible types of moral enhancement. AJOB Neuroscience 3(4): 3–14.CrossRef Shook, John R. 2012. Neuroethics and the possible types of moral enhancement. AJOB Neuroscience 3(4): 3–14.CrossRef
14.
Zurück zum Zitat DeGrazia. 2014. Moral enhancement, freedom, and what we (should) value in moral behavior. Journal of Medical Ethics 40(6): 361–368.CrossRef DeGrazia. 2014. Moral enhancement, freedom, and what we (should) value in moral behavior. Journal of Medical Ethics 40(6): 361–368.CrossRef
15.
Zurück zum Zitat Hauskeller, Michael. 2016. The art of misunderstanding critics: the case of Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s defense of moral bioenhancement. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25(1): 153–161.CrossRef Hauskeller, Michael. 2016. The art of misunderstanding critics: the case of Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s defense of moral bioenhancement. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25(1): 153–161.CrossRef
16.
Zurück zum Zitat Kahane, Guy, and Julian Savulescu. 2015. Normal human variation: refocussing the enhancement debate. Bioethics 29(2): 133–143.CrossRef Kahane, Guy, and Julian Savulescu. 2015. Normal human variation: refocussing the enhancement debate. Bioethics 29(2): 133–143.CrossRef
17.
Zurück zum Zitat Agar, Nicholas. 2014. A question about defining moral bioenhancement. Journal of Medical Ethics 40(6): 369–370.CrossRef Agar, Nicholas. 2014. A question about defining moral bioenhancement. Journal of Medical Ethics 40(6): 369–370.CrossRef
18.
Zurück zum Zitat Haidt, Jonathan, and Craig Joseph. 2007. The moral mind: how five sets of innate intuitions guide the development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules. In The innate mind, vol 3, eds. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich, 367–392. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haidt, Jonathan, and Craig Joseph. 2007. The moral mind: how five sets of innate intuitions guide the development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules. In The innate mind, vol 3, eds. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich, 367–392. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19.
Zurück zum Zitat Agar, Nicholas. 2010. Enhancing genetic virtue? Politics and the Life Sciences 29(1): 73–75.CrossRef Agar, Nicholas. 2010. Enhancing genetic virtue? Politics and the Life Sciences 29(1): 73–75.CrossRef
20.
Zurück zum Zitat De Melo-Martín, Inmaculada, and Arleen Salles. 2015. Moral bioenhancement: much ado about nothing? Bioethics 29(4): 223–232.CrossRef De Melo-Martín, Inmaculada, and Arleen Salles. 2015. Moral bioenhancement: much ado about nothing? Bioethics 29(4): 223–232.CrossRef
21.
Zurück zum Zitat Raus, Kasper, Farah Focquaert, Maartje Schermer, Jona Specker, and Sigrid Sterckx. 2014. On defining moral enhancement: a clarificatory taxonomy. Neuroethics 7(3): 263–273.CrossRef Raus, Kasper, Farah Focquaert, Maartje Schermer, Jona Specker, and Sigrid Sterckx. 2014. On defining moral enhancement: a clarificatory taxonomy. Neuroethics 7(3): 263–273.CrossRef
22.
Zurück zum Zitat Beck, Birgit. 2015. Conceptual and practical problems of moral enhancement. Bioethics 29(4): 233–240.CrossRef Beck, Birgit. 2015. Conceptual and practical problems of moral enhancement. Bioethics 29(4): 233–240.CrossRef
23.
Zurück zum Zitat Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008. Is moral phenomenology unified? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7(1): 85–97.CrossRef Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2008. Is moral phenomenology unified? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7(1): 85–97.CrossRef
24.
Zurück zum Zitat Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Thalia Wheatley. 2014. Are moral judgments unified? Philosophical Psychology 27(4): 451–474.CrossRef Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Thalia Wheatley. 2014. Are moral judgments unified? Philosophical Psychology 27(4): 451–474.CrossRef
25.
Zurück zum Zitat Faust, Halley. 2008. Should we select for genetic moral enhancement? A thought experiment using the MoralKinder (MK+) haplotype. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29(6): 397–416.CrossRef Faust, Halley. 2008. Should we select for genetic moral enhancement? A thought experiment using the MoralKinder (MK+) haplotype. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29(6): 397–416.CrossRef
26.
Zurück zum Zitat Sáez, Ignacio, Lusha Zhu, Eric Set, Andrew Kayser, and Ming Hsu. 2015. Dopamine modulates egalitarian behavior in humans. Current Biology 25(7): 912–919.CrossRef Sáez, Ignacio, Lusha Zhu, Eric Set, Andrew Kayser, and Ming Hsu. 2015. Dopamine modulates egalitarian behavior in humans. Current Biology 25(7): 912–919.CrossRef
27.
Zurück zum Zitat Hume, David. 2007. A treatise of human nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hume, David. 2007. A treatise of human nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
28.
Zurück zum Zitat Greene, Joshua. 2008. The secret joke of Kant’s soul. In Moral psychology, vol. 3: The neuroscience of morality, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 35–79. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Greene, Joshua. 2008. The secret joke of Kant’s soul. In Moral psychology, vol. 3: The neuroscience of morality, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 35–79. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
29.
Zurück zum Zitat Greene, Joshua. 2014. Beyond point-and-shoot morality: why cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics. Ethics 124(4): 695–726.CrossRef Greene, Joshua. 2014. Beyond point-and-shoot morality: why cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics. Ethics 124(4): 695–726.CrossRef
30.
Zurück zum Zitat Crockett, M., and R.A. Rini. 2015. Neuromodulators and the (in)stability of moral cognition. In The moral brain: a multidisciplinary perspective, eds. J. Decety, and T. Wheatley, 221–235. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Crockett, M., and R.A. Rini. 2015. Neuromodulators and the (in)stability of moral cognition. In The moral brain: a multidisciplinary perspective, eds. J. Decety, and T. Wheatley, 221–235. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
31.
Zurück zum Zitat Decety, J., and J. Cowell. 2015. Empathy, justice, and moral behavior. AJOB Neuroscience 6(3): 3–14.CrossRef Decety, J., and J. Cowell. 2015. Empathy, justice, and moral behavior. AJOB Neuroscience 6(3): 3–14.CrossRef
32.
Zurück zum Zitat Agar, Nicholas. 2015. Moral bioenhancement is dangerous. Journal of Medical Ethics 41(4): 343–345.CrossRef Agar, Nicholas. 2015. Moral bioenhancement is dangerous. Journal of Medical Ethics 41(4): 343–345.CrossRef
33.
Zurück zum Zitat Beauchamp, Tom. 2015. Are we unfit for the future? Journal of Medical Ethics 41(4): 348–352.CrossRef Beauchamp, Tom. 2015. Are we unfit for the future? Journal of Medical Ethics 41(4): 348–352.CrossRef
34.
Zurück zum Zitat Cordell, Jean. 2014. Review of Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the future. Philological Quarterly 64(255): 330–332. Cordell, Jean. 2014. Review of Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the future. Philological Quarterly 64(255): 330–332.
35.
Zurück zum Zitat Sparrow, Robert. 2014. Review of Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the future. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(2): 404–407.CrossRef Sparrow, Robert. 2014. Review of Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the future. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(2): 404–407.CrossRef
36.
Zurück zum Zitat Persson, Ingmar, and Julian Savulescu. 2012. Unfit for the future: the need for moral enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef Persson, Ingmar, and Julian Savulescu. 2012. Unfit for the future: the need for moral enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
37.
Zurück zum Zitat Chemero, Anthony. 2009. Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chemero, Anthony. 2009. Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
38.
Zurück zum Zitat Chicharro, Daniel, and Anders Ledberg. 2012. When two become one: the limits of causality analysis of brain dynamics. PloS One 7(3): e32466.CrossRef Chicharro, Daniel, and Anders Ledberg. 2012. When two become one: the limits of causality analysis of brain dynamics. PloS One 7(3): e32466.CrossRef
39.
Zurück zum Zitat Crockett, Molly. 2014. Moral bioenhancement: a neuroscientific perspective. Journal of Medical Ethics 40(6): 361–368.CrossRef Crockett, Molly. 2014. Moral bioenhancement: a neuroscientific perspective. Journal of Medical Ethics 40(6): 361–368.CrossRef
40.
Zurück zum Zitat Barilan, Y.M. 2015. Moral enhancement, gnosticism, and some philosophical paradoxes. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24(1): 75–85.CrossRef Barilan, Y.M. 2015. Moral enhancement, gnosticism, and some philosophical paradoxes. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24(1): 75–85.CrossRef
41.
Zurück zum Zitat Agar, Nicholas. 2010. Humanity’s end: why we should reject radical enhancement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRef Agar, Nicholas. 2010. Humanity’s end: why we should reject radical enhancement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRef
42.
Zurück zum Zitat Sparrow, Robert. 2014. Better living through chemistry? A reply to Savulescu and Persson on ‘moral enhancement’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31(1): 23–32.CrossRef Sparrow, Robert. 2014. Better living through chemistry? A reply to Savulescu and Persson on ‘moral enhancement’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31(1): 23–32.CrossRef
43.
Zurück zum Zitat Wiseman, Harris. 2016. The myth of the moral brain: the limits of moral enhancement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wiseman, Harris. 2016. The myth of the moral brain: the limits of moral enhancement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
44.
Zurück zum Zitat Earp, Brian, Anders Sandberg, Guy Kahane, and Julian Savulescu. 2014. When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 8: 12. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2014.00012.CrossRef Earp, Brian, Anders Sandberg, Guy Kahane, and Julian Savulescu. 2014. When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 8: 12. doi:10.​3389/​fnsys.​2014.​00012.CrossRef
45.
Zurück zum Zitat Focquaert, Farah, and Maartje Schermer. 2015. Moral enhancement: do means matter morally? Neuroethics 8(2): 139–151.CrossRef Focquaert, Farah, and Maartje Schermer. 2015. Moral enhancement: do means matter morally? Neuroethics 8(2): 139–151.CrossRef
46.
Zurück zum Zitat Schaefer, G. Owen. 2015. Direct vs. indirect moral enhancement. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25(3): 261–289.CrossRef Schaefer, G. Owen. 2015. Direct vs. indirect moral enhancement. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25(3): 261–289.CrossRef
47.
Zurück zum Zitat Crutchfield, Parker. 2016. The epistemology of moral bioenhancement. Bioethics 30(6): 389–396.CrossRef Crutchfield, Parker. 2016. The epistemology of moral bioenhancement. Bioethics 30(6): 389–396.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance Enhancement for Realists
verfasst von
John R. Shook
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2016
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Neuroethics / Ausgabe 3/2016
Print ISSN: 1874-5490
Elektronische ISSN: 1874-5504
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9270-y

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 3/2016

Neuroethics 3/2016 Zur Ausgabe

Leitlinien kompakt für die Neurologie

Mit medbee Pocketcards sicher entscheiden.

Seit 2022 gehört die medbee GmbH zum Springer Medizin Verlag

Schützt Olivenöl vor dem Tod durch Demenz?

10.05.2024 Morbus Alzheimer Nachrichten

Konsumieren Menschen täglich 7 Gramm Olivenöl, ist ihr Risiko, an einer Demenz zu sterben, um mehr als ein Viertel reduziert – und dies weitgehend unabhängig von ihrer sonstigen Ernährung. Dafür sprechen Auswertungen zweier großer US-Studien.

Bluttest erkennt Parkinson schon zehn Jahre vor der Diagnose

10.05.2024 Parkinson-Krankheit Nachrichten

Ein Bluttest kann abnorm aggregiertes Alpha-Synuclein bei einigen Menschen schon zehn Jahre vor Beginn der motorischen Parkinsonsymptome nachweisen. Mit einem solchen Test lassen sich möglicherweise Prodromalstadien erfassen und die Betroffenen früher behandeln.

Darf man die Behandlung eines Neonazis ablehnen?

08.05.2024 Gesellschaft Nachrichten

In einer Leseranfrage in der Zeitschrift Journal of the American Academy of Dermatology möchte ein anonymer Dermatologe bzw. eine anonyme Dermatologin wissen, ob er oder sie einen Patienten behandeln muss, der eine rassistische Tätowierung trägt.

Wartezeit nicht kürzer, aber Arbeit flexibler

Psychotherapie Medizin aktuell

Fünf Jahren nach der Neugestaltung der Psychotherapie-Richtlinie wurden jetzt die Effekte der vorgenommenen Änderungen ausgewertet. Das Hauptziel der Novellierung war eine kürzere Wartezeit auf Therapieplätze. Dieses Ziel wurde nicht erreicht, es gab jedoch positive Auswirkungen auf andere Bereiche.

Update Neurologie

Bestellen Sie unseren Fach-Newsletter und bleiben Sie gut informiert.