The dynamics between doctors and patients in the sickness certification process, the transition from adversaries to comrades in and through their common powerlessness, can be understood in terms of philosopher Jan Patočka’s idea of a “solidarity of the shaken”.
7 In an essay in his
Heretical Writings (“Wars of the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War”) Patočka develops the idea that the horrors in the trenches of the First World War revealed something very important regarding human coexistence. Through depictions of the front-line experiences, he highlights a special type of coexistence, enabled by the limit-experience of war, of death, and violent conflict. The experience was utterly destabilizing and frightening: “The first phase, which few can transcend, is the experience of meaninglessness and unbearable horror. The front line is absurdity
par excellence”. One of the main consequences of this fundamental shaking is that the “adversary”—the one with whom we have nothing in common but conflict—becomes a “fellow participant in the same situation”, through the absurdity of war, and through the brush with death. This is what Patočka calls “the solidarity of the shaken for all their contradiction and conflict”. Whichever trench we happen to crouch down in, German or British, in the role of doctor or patient, we come to the insight that
“ultimately, all are subject to the crack of the whip
” [
46].
Likening mundane clinical encounters to life in the trenches of war may seem implausible, even tasteless. However, metaphors of war are commonplace in portrayals of healthcare, even though their use can be problematic. It has been claimed that they stigmatize the ill and shift focus “from fighting the disease to fighting the patient” [
42]. Yet, there are some fundamental similarities between war and the clinical encounter that warrant a comparison aided by Patočka’s
solidarity of the shaken. The concept constitutes a
critique of the senseless killing of war and is therefore less prone to reproduce the negative impact of warfare tropes; it might even counter such effects. The three fundamental similarities are the following: (1) Both war and the clinical encounter can involve severe suffering and death. Through illness as the reminder of the finitude of life, death figures at least to some extent in the background of many clinical encounters. Havi Carel, an influential thinker in the field of phenomenology of illness, goes further and establishes death as a transcendental-existential condition of illness as such: “Death is positioned on the existential horizon of illness, and therefore makes up part of the illness experience” [
12].
8 Furthermore, for the doctor, there is the limit-experience of being overworked to the brink of fatigue. It is a form of “self-sacrifice” and an “
endurance in the face of death”, not exclusively in relation to the patient, but also through an ever accelerating production process [
46]; (2) Both war and clinical encounters in the era of bureaucracy are in some respects
absurd: In war, the horror of death is its necessary condition. In healthcare, this may occasionally be the case. There is, however, another dimension of existential loss of meaning or ground that springs forth not from facing death in itself, but from confronting nightmarish bureaucratic inflexibility. This holds true for war as well: while the horror of death is necessary, it is not a
sufficient cause of that specific type of absurdity. Rather, it is the horror of death
in conjunction with the destruction of human bodies on an unprecedented industrial scale, initiated by impersonal state structures and carried out by opaque chains of command. Hence, the absurdity in question is not only of the transcendental Sisyphean variant, but simultaneously a worldly and historically specific subspecies often emphasized in the works of Franz Kafka.
9 When internal ends of healthcare are increasingly colonized and replaced by external goals of efficiency and austerity, a similar kind of absurdity emerges, that may lead to losing and being forced to find new ground. In the case of the absurdity of the sickness certification process (mentioned above), that new ground is the solidarity between physicians and patients; 3. There is a procedural similarity between the solidarity of soldiers in war and the encounters between doctors and patients in late capitalism. In contrast to the solidarity of, say, factory workers who start out from a relation of mutual
indifference to showing solidarity with each other, the starting point of this other form of solidarity is not indifference, but
antagonism, from which they transition over to solidarity.
10 In a way, the foundations of this new kind of solidarity were built by the metaphors and models of partnership and consumerism. The abandonment of the paternalist paradigm also meant that the interests of physicians and patient could not be assumed to automatically overlap. In the superseding framework of partnership their interests often appear as subject to negotiation, and in the framework of consumerism the participants even appear as mutually suspicious adversaries, whose interests must not only be negotiated, but sometimes even fought for [
24]. Antagonism is essential to market mediated relations, even if they do not always appear as such. Irrespective of the use-value of whatever is changing hands, the goal is nevertheless for one to buy cheap and for another to sell high. However, the argument of a foundational antagonism between doctor and patient is independent of the conceptual content of the partnership and consumer models. For example, the relationship between doctors and patients in the sickness certification process does not embody any specific doctor–patient relationship model. Even if the logic of mistrust pervades the entire field, in Sweden it is not directly a commodity relation because the
Social Insurance Agency is state-run and can only indirectly be understood in terms of the consumer model. Due to the institutional framework, the doctor and the patient have still been cast into the pit of sickness certification as adversaries, as “gatekeeping” the resources of the social insurance system is one of the main roles that the Swedish doctor is expected to assume [
60]. Given current circumstances, that role unfortunately amounts to being the guardian of austerity [
4].
Hence, the Patočkean take on solidarity, a subspecies of non-Durkheimian oppositional solidarity, extends the negative character of the phenomenon. In addition to being negative by being grounded in rebellion and opposition to an adversary, it is also negative insofar as it unites through the negative experience of death and suffering; that the point of departure for those who solidarize with each other is discord; and finally that it does not offer a “positive program” or have a “vision of society” common to those who are shaken.